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CRIME AND THE MYTHOLOGY OF POLICE
Shima Baradaran Baughman*
The legal policing literature has espoused one theory of policing after another in an
effort to address the frayed relationship between police and the communities they
serve. All have aimed to diagnose chronic policing problems in working towards
structural police reform. The core principles emanating from these theoretical
critiques is that the mistrust of police among communities of color results from
maltreatment, illegitimacy and marginalization from the law and its enforcers.
Remedies have included police training to encourage treating people with dignity,
investing in body cameras and other technology, providing legal avenues to
encourage constitutional action by police, and creating a voice for community
members to express their needs. These preeminent policing theories do not fully
address a core cause of police mistrust and disaffection of communities of color and
the poor. To address these symptoms of policing failure requires a consideration of
the purpose and function of police. Though at the core of police function is a
misunderstanding of policing that this Article terms “the police myth.”
The police myth is the two-fold belief that a primary function of police is crime
control and that police solve crimes with regularity. Reliance on the police myth may
provide societal comfort but has made it difficult to address rudimentary policing
failure. Without understanding what police actually do and their relationship with
crime, it is impossible to reimagine policing. This Article seeks to understand the myth
that in large part contributes to the anomie between police and communities of color,
but also creates a structural dissonance regarding the nature and function of police
and their role in a community. Dispelling this myth recasts the policing function and
the underlying expectations of public security, while pointing towards a new
instrumentalist approach to police reform.
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There is a critical conversation afoot about the future of police in America. All
options are on the table as states and the federal government are considering
defunding,1 restructuring,2 reducing the role of,3 or otherwise reimagining police in
1

See, e.g., FY 2020–21 Adopted Budget Dashboard, CITY BUDGET OFF., THE CITY OF
PORTLAND (defunding the police bureau budget by $15 million); see also FY2021 Revenue
Summary,
BUDGETS,
CITY
OF
NORTHAMPTON,
https://www.northamptonma.gov/DocumentCenter/View/15588/FY2021-BudgetApproved-on-June-18-2021---updated-documents (last visited Dec. 12, 2020) (defunding
the police budget by 10%); Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132
HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1635 (2019) (providing an example of a participatory city-budgeting
project where “the public is empowered to defund the police and reinvest recourses by
‘setting a living wage and by fully funding healthcare, social services, public schools, and
sustainable economic development projects’”); James Rainey et al., Growing the LAPD Was
Gospel at City Hall, George Floyd Changed That, L.A. TIMES (June 5, 2020, 5:00 AM)
(reducing the Los Angeles Police Department budget by up to $150 million).
2
See, e.g., CITY OF PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA, CODE OF ORDINANCES, ART. I, §
103.06 (banning the purchase of surplus U.S. military equipment and weapons); see also id.
§116.02A (requiring police officers to step in and stop other officers from using illegal or
unnecessary force); KATE HAMAJI ET AL., CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY ET AL., FREEDOM
TO THRIVE: REIMAGINING SAFETY & SECURITY IN OUR COMMUNITIES 4 (2017) (examining
budgets across 12 jurisdictions highlighting “invest/divest campaigns, which advocate for
investments in supportive services and divestment from punitive institutions”); ENHANCE
LAW ENFORCEMENT INTEGRITY, S.B. 217, 2020 Sess. (Colo. 2020) (requiring data collection
on interactions with the public and use of force, requiring that body cameras be activated,
allowing lawsuits against officers in their individual capacities, and increasing transparency
of prosecutorial and grand jury decisions); PRESS RELEASE, GOVERNOR ANDREW M. CUOMO,
GOVERNOR CUOMO SIGNS ‘SAY THEIR NAME’ REFORM AGENDA PACKAGE (June 12, 2020)
(increasing transparency of disciplinary records); S.B. 5024, 2020 Spec. Sess. (Va. 2020)
(authorizing investigations of patterns of police misconduct); SACRAMENTO CITY COUNCIL
REPORT, CREATION OF AN INSPECTOR GENERAL POSITION (July 1, 2020) (creating an
inspector general to investigate police misconduct); PRESS RELEASE, NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AG GREWAL ISSUES STATEWIDE ORDER REQUIRING LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES TO IDENTIFY OFFICERS WHO COMMIT SERIOUS DISCIPLINARY
VIOLATIONS (June 15, 2020) (ordering police departments to identify officers disciplined for
misconduct); Kabir Bhatia, Akron Voters Approve New Policies for Police Body Camera
Footage, City Hiring Practices, WKSU (Nov. 4, 2020, 12:47 AM) (requiring release of body
and dashboard camera footage of police use of force); Adhiti Bandlamudi, San Jose Voted
to Expand Police Oversight. What Happens Next?, KQED (Nov. 20, 2020) (approving
independent review of officer use of force); PRESS RELEASE, MAYOR’S OFFICE, MAYOR
KEISHA LANCE BOTTOMS ISSUES NEW ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS RELATED TO
TRANSFORMING THE CITY OF ATLANTA POLICE DEPARTMENT: MAYOR CHANGES USE OF
FORCE POLICIES AND CALLS FOR COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT HOW WE POLICE IN ATLANTA
(June 16, 2020), https://www.atlantaga.gov/Home/Components/News/News/13380/672
(requiring reporting of deadly force use to a citizen review board).
3
See, e.g., Sam Levin, California City Moves to Replace Police with Unarmed
Civilians for Traffic Stops, GUARDIAN (July 15, 2020, 9:48 PM) (approving proposal that
Berkeley City police no longer issue traffic citations, instead giving those duties to unarmed
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modern society.4 There have been strong feelings expressed by grassroots
movements pushing to abolish police,5 and on the other side opposition based in fear
that reducing policing will threaten public safety and increase crime.6 At the crux of
these debates is what role police should play in modern society. Policing scholars
have recently commented that if we want to determine how to fix American policing,
we must determine the purposes of police.7 While the role of police may seem
evident, it may not be so simple. The media, average citizens, and even some
scholars have assumed that the role of police is to fight crime and “make people
safe.”8 Maybe because it has assumed the obvious, the legal policing literature on
city workers); see also Austin R. Ramsey & Maryl Kornfield, Amid Calls to Defund Police,
Albuquerque Creates an Alternative Department, WASH. POST (June 15, 2020, 1:32 PM)
(announcing the creation of a civilian public safety branch which will dispatch trained
professionals to nonviolent emergency calls rather than police officers).
4
See, e.g., Joshua Hoyos & Christina Carrega, Minneapolis City Council Votes to
Replace the Police Department with a New Organization, ABC NEWS (June 26, 2020, 1:11
PM) (voting unanimously, the city council voted in favor of a proposal that would replace
the city’s police department).
5
See, e.g., Abolition for the People: The Movement for a Future Without Policing &
Prisons, LEVEL (Oct. 6, 2020) (containing a collection of 30 pro-abolitionist Articles from
community organizers, political prisoners, scholars, and advocates); see also ALEX S.
VITALE, THE END OF POLICING 47 (2017) (arguing that policing is a tool of social control
that facilitates the exploitation of people of color); Alec Karakatsanis, Why Crime Isn’t the
Question and Police are not the Answer, CURRENT AFFAIRS (Aug. 10, 2020); Derecka
Purnell, How I Became a Police Abolitionist, ATLANTIC (July 6, 2020) (discussing the roles
that other people can do better than police).
6
See, e.g., Stephen Rushin & Roger Michalski, Police Funding, 72 FLA. L. REV. 277,
277, 285, 318 (2020) (arguing that defunding the police could have “unintended
consequences” such as increased crime rates, hampered efforts to control officer misconduct,
reduced officer safety, and over ticketing, among other things).
7
See Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. __
(forthcoming 2021) (“[Policing] goals are relatively consistent throughout the literature on
law enforcement, even if particular scholars do not embrace all of them: that policing
practices should reduce crime, make people feel safe, and promote trust between police
officers and communities so that they can work together to coproduce safety—all while
limiting the harms of policing, such as police violence, as much as possible.”); Monica C.
Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2061
(2017) (noting the dual purposes of the criminal justice system: “crime response and
reduction” and “the management and control of disfavored groups”); Tracey L. Meares &
Tom R. Tyler, The First Step Is Figuring Out What Police Are For, ATLANTIC (June 8, 2020)
(“As a starting point, citizens of the United States need to come to a consensus about the
meaning of public safety that includes the perspective of those most affected by both the
problems that the state deploys police to solve and the way that the state responds to those
problems.”).
8
See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Mays, Who Opposes Defunding the N.Y.P.D.? These Black
Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2020) (noting that council members in communities
across New York are against defunding the police because various communities “are not safe
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policing has largely neglected to engage in a meaningful discussion of the purpose
and function of police.
The veins of policing scholarship have historically included both
instrumentalist and legitimacy approaches; the former focused on improving police
crime control and the latter focused on improving police and community
relationships.9 Early 1960s instrumentalist approaches in policing literature relied
on patrol policing and community policing which aimed to improve police ability to
solve crime and address community concerns. As reported crime rates rose in the
1970s, instrumentalist policing adapted to new technology and approaches with

yet”); see also W.G. SKOGAN, POLICE AND PUBLIC IN ENGLAND AND WALES: A BRITISH
CRIME SURVEY REPORT (1990) (proffering that people have favorable views of police unless
they need police to solve a crime). There is a “mythology” around criminal investigation that
can be understood not only in the “glamour” of “catching criminals” that created a “good
living for thousands of authors, filmmakers and television directors, but also in terms of both
the real and the symbolic importance of successful criminal investigation in delivering one
of the key promises of the modern centralized state, on which a significant portion of its
legitimacy has rested: the promise of providing effective security of the state.” See TIM
NEWBURN, HANDBOOK OF POLICING 433 (2d. ed. 2008). Solving crime is related to crime
control and prevention, as well as addressing disorder, though the concepts are not identical.
See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 870, 901 (2015) (“Most local policing seeks to facilitate criminal justice and prevent
crime and disorder in order to make a community safer[.]”).
9
I owe this categorization of policing scholarship to Jocelyn Simonson, see Simonson,
supra note 7.
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broken windows policing,10 hot spots policing,11 and predictive policing,12 which all
purportedly aimed to reduce crime and delinquency in communities. More recently,
legitimacy theories have rejected instrumentalist approaches—focusing not on goals
of reducing crime or improving police function—but concentrating on community
lack of trust in police.13 These varied, and sometimes diametrically opposed,
10

See generally George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police
and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC (March 1982) (establishing the theory of “broken
window policing” and arguing that police should focus on responding to minor crimes);
Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception
of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York
Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 302 (1998) (recognizing the implementation of “ordermaintenance policing,” based on the broken windows theory and noting that the idea is “one
of the principal policy recommendations emerging along the new path of deterrence”).
11
Hot spots policing is a proactive policing method that focuses “patrol resources on
places and times that have the most crime.” David Weisburd, Does Hot Spots Policing
Inevitably Lead to Unfair and Abusive Police Practices, or Can We Maximize Both Fairness
and Effectiveness in the New Proactive Policing?, 2016 UNIV. CHI. LEGAL F. 661, 664
(2016). Hot spots policing developed in the late 1980s out of empirical observations from
Lawrence Sherman and David Weisburd. Lawrence W. Sherman & David Weisburd,
General Deterrent Effects of Police Patrol in Crime “Hot Spots”: A Randomized, Controlled
Trial, 12 JUST. Q. 625, 630, 645 (Dec. 1995) (“We defined hot spots operationally as small
clusters of addresses” where “substantial increases in police” create deterrence effects). Hot
spots are “cluster[s] of crime problems [in] geographically defined” areas. David Weisburd
& Lorraine Green, Policing Drug Hot Spots: The Jersey City Drug Market Analysis
Experiment, 12 JUST. Q. 711, 713 (Dec. 1995). The logic underlying hot spots policing is
that if crime is “highly concentrated on specific streets in the city, the police should focus
their interventions at those places.”
See also David Weisburd & Lorraine Green Mazerolle, Crime and Disorder in Drug
Hot Spots: Implications for Theory and Practice in Policing, 3 POLICE Q. 331, 331 (Sept.
2000) (examining hot spot policing response in Jersey City, New Jersey); Anthony A. Braga
et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime: An Updated Systematic Review and MetaAnalysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633, 634 (2014) (presenting “findings of a . . . systematic review of the
effects of hot spots policing on crime”); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and
Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259, 273 (2012) (“Sometimes up to 50% of crime was
concentrated in 3% of the city.”).
12
See generally ANDREW FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING (2017)
(discussing the use of technology and artificial intelligence by police); Elizabeth Joh,
Automated Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 559 (2018) (discussing the challenges of
artificial intelligence used by police); John E. Eck & D. Kim Rossmo, The New Detective:
Rethinking Criminal Investigations, 18 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 601, 603 (2019) (“Over
time, as police have employed increasingly sophisticated technology—DNA analysis,
automated fingerprint identification, multiple linked computer databases, closed-circuit
television recordings, and more—we would expect to see greater success at solving crimes
and a rise in solution rates.”).
13
See WILLIAM H. WEBSTER & HUBERT WILLIAMS, THE CITY IN CRISIS: A REPORT BY
THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS ON THE CIVIL DISORDER
IN LOS ANGELES 4 (1992) (discussing the need for “a profound change in the relationship
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theories, promulgated by Tracey Meares, Tom Tyler, Monica Bell, Jocelyn
Simonson and others include procedural justice,14 democratic and power lens
policing,15 and legal estrangement.16 Tom Tyler and Tracey Meares focus on training
of police to improve legitimacy,17 Monica Bell encourages constitutional action to
reduce public marginalization,18 and Simonson considers democratization or
wholesale shifts of power in policing structures.19 To the extent that these theories
between the police department and the communities” and arguing for police to have a
“working partnership” with the community).
14
Jason Sunshine & Tom Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in
Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 513 (2003); Tracey Meares,
Policing and Procedural Justice: Shaping Citizens’ Identities to Increase Democratic
Participation, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1525 (2017).
15
See Simonson, supra note 7 (“[T]he power lens opens up discussions of reform to
first-order questions about how the state should go about providing safety and security in our
time, with or without the police as we know it.”); see also Anthony A. Braga, Better Policing
Can Improve Legitimacy and Reduce Mass Incarceration, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 233, 238–
39 (2016) (“Developing close relationships with community members would help the police
gather information about crime and disorder problems, understand the nature of these
problems, and solve specific crimes.”); Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police)
Reform, 108 CAL. L. REV. 101 (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 123–24) (promoting a
“democracy reforms” approach to improving police function).
16
Bell, supra note 7, at 2066–67 (introducing “legal estrangement” as a way to clarify
the relationship between police and the public).
17
Tracey L. Meares, The Path Forward: Improving the Dynamics of Community-Police
Relationships to Achieve Effective Law Enforcement Policies, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1355,
1365 (2017) (stating that trust and legitimacy were the most important areas in need of
improvement); Tom R. Tyler, From Harm Reduction to Community Engagement: Redefining
the Goals of American Policing in the Twenty-First Century, 111 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1537,
1555 (2017) (“Training officers in procedural fairness is an important way to build
legitimacy in the community because it changes the way officers think about how to
police.”); Meares, supra note 14 (“Positive changes in procedural justice may encourage
more democratic participation in government.”); Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective
Action, and Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1513, 1539 (2002) (discussing new
community police initiatives to improve public and police relationships).
18
Bell, supra note 7, at 2139–43 (proffering that judges should avoid “giving too much
leeway to the police,” particularly when the issue is a question of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment).
19
Simonson, supra note 7 (examining “the movement focus on power-shifting in the
governance of the police”); Akbar, supra note 15, at 123–26 (arguing that more democracy
is not sufficient to address systemic policing issues because it “fails to account for the antidemocratic nature of the carceral state”); see also Tyler, supra note 17, at 1539–40)
(“rethink[ing] the vision of what policing in our democratic society should be about”);
Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project, 111 NW. UNIV.
L. REV. 1597, 1598–99 (2017) (“The problem is not black communities’ alienation from law
enforcement because criminal law is not democratic enough; the problem is that criminal law
excludes black people from democratic participation in the political economy.”); Bell, supra
note 7, at 2143 (advocating for “a deep, meaningful approach to democratizing police
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have examined policing, they often focus on symptoms of policing failure—
including racial discrimination,20 excessive force,21 corruption,22 police
misconduct,23 and marginalization.24 The last thirty years, legal scholars have largely
lost sight of overall police function, goals or police crime control metrics,25 with
governance”); Janet Moore, Democracy Enhancement in Criminal Law and Procedure, 2014
UTAH L. REV. 543, 610 (2014) (promoting “a democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law
and procedure”).
20
See Julian R. Murphy, Is It Recording? – Racial Bias, Police Accountability, and the
Body-Worn Camera Activation Policies of the Ten Largest Metropolitan Police Departments
in the USA, 9 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 141, 148–49 (2018) (discussing police materials that
may increase racial profiling of minority defendants for drug crimes); Paul J. Larkin, Jr. &
David L. Rosenthal, Flight, Race, and Terry Stops: Commonwealth v. Warren, 16 GEO. J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 163, 205–06 (2018) (“Discrimination . . . exacerbates any police-citizen
tensions that already exist within a community and dissuades the victims of crime in those
neighborhoods from cooperating with the police.”); Elias R. Feldman, Strict Tort Liability
for Police Misconduct, 53 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 89, 100–01(2019) (“[i]t is also fair
to assume policing’s risk of wrongful harm falls disproportionately upon racial minorities
given what is known about how unconscious racial biases affect police decision-making”).
21
Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1119,
1150, 1156 (2008) (“[P]olice officers continue to rely on justification defenses, including
self-defense . . . to justify their uses of force in state criminal and civil suits challenging their
behavior.”); Aaron Goldstein, Race, Reasonableness, and the Rule of Law, 17 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1189, 1195–96 (2003) (asserting that the “most politically polarizing types of cases
involves police who claim self-defense in shooting an African American victim”).
22
See, e.g., Chapter One Policing and Profit, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1735–36 (2015)
(noting that “attempts to monetize law enforcement . . . not only . . . discriminate against the
poor, [but] allowing these programs to generate revenue also tends to corrupt whatever value
they might otherwise provide” by moving policing from a focus of “identifying culpability
and gathering evidence” to a focus on “aggressively managing poor communities”).
23
Benjamin Levin, What’s Wrong with Police Unions, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (arguing that in addition to the more traditional institutions that help
shape and define police practices and misconduct, police unions have an increasingly more
important role in monitoring and critiquing police misconduct); John Rappaport, How
Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1547 (2017) (asserting
that “an understanding of how insurers manage police risk is essential to any persuasive
theory of civil deterrence”); Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CAL. L. REV. 391 (2016)
(discussing how the “reasonableness standard” of the Fourth Amendment fails to hold police
accountable” for misconduct); Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body
Camera Revolution, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 927 (2017) (noting how the use of body
cameras may also protect police officers from allegations of misconduct). See generally
MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT AND LITIGATION (3d ed. 2014).
24
Bell, supra note 7, at 2068 (“[I]n order to dismantle . . . legal estrangement, multiple
levels of government must engage in policy reform aimed not only at procedural injustice,
but also at vicarious marginalization and structural exclusion.”).
25
For broader research on police function and police abolition, see, e.g., KRISTIAN
WILLIAMS, OUR ENEMIES IN BLUE: POLICE AND POWER IN AMERICA (2004) (examining the
history of policing); STUART SCHRADER, BADGES WITHOUT BORDERS (2019) (considering
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some exception.26 The theoretical framework of police investigation and more
broadly, instrumentalist approaches to police reform, have remained largely without
progress.27 Legal academia has largely neglected to pursue any rigorous inquiry into
the function and purpose of police.28 With theory ignoring the issues with
investigation and crime solving function of police, the lofty goals of ending
marginalization and democratizing police remain unfulfilled.
To begin examining the purpose of police, two (so-far) uncontroversial
assumptions at the foundation of the public view of police must be addressed. The
first is that policing’s core function is crime.29 This involves preventing,
investigating, and solving crimes. And second, that crimes are solved by police.30
These assumptions together are what this Article terms the police myth. The public
recognizes that there are unsolved mysteries and that police are not perfect—
especially when it comes to abuse and misconduct—but it also assumes largely that
police fulfill their core function.
A brief historical review confirms that from the founding of American police,
the state has charged police to investigate and solve crimes.31 Indeed, police hold a
monopoly in their duty to solve crime—they are the only actors who can arrest and
turn individuals over for prosecution.32 While the charge of police has always been
crime fighting, the function of police has been much broader. A closer examination
how the U.S. involvement in the Cold War shaped domestic policing function); VITALE,
supra note 5.
26
See e.g., RACHEL HARMON, THE LAW OF THE POLICE (2021) (dedicating a section to
“The Pathological Myth of Police as Crime Fighters” and a discussion of “Do Detectives
Solve Crimes?”); Barry Friedman, Disaggregating the Policing Function, __ UNIV. PA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2020–21).
27
Nina J. Westera et al., Towards a More Effective Detective, POLICING & SOC’Y 1, 1
(2014) (“Despite the recognised importance of detective work, to date, few empirical studies
examine the less tangible skills, abilities, and other characteristics that differentiate between
those detectives who perform the role effectively and those who do not.”); JEAN-PAUL
BRODEUR, THE POLICING WEB 185 (2010) (“According to a report written under the auspices
of the U.S. National Research Council, the topics that were the least researched in the field
of police studies . . . [included] criminal investigation[.]” and taking note of the lack of
research focused on criminal investigation); Eck & Rossmo, supra note 12, at 605 (“Despite
significant technological advances in forensics and information systems, there has been little
experimentation or innovation in the investigation process itself. Detective work is typically
reactive, initiated by the report of the commission of a crime. Most arrests are made by patrol
officers on the basis of information from the community[.]”). But see Friedman,
Disaggregating the Policing Function, supra note 26.
28
But see HARMON, supra note 26.
29
See Harmon, supra note 8.
30
See infra Part II and note 36. By ‘police’ I also include detectives who are a subset
of police that can operate somewhat independently within in police department. PETER W.
GREENWOOD ET AL., THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS, VOLUME III: OBSERVATIONS
AND ANALYSIS 8 (1975) (noting the separation between police and detectives).
31
See infra Part II.
32
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE
FUNCTION 1–2.2 (1997) (articulating the classic responsibilities of police).
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reveals that the police function is one limited expression of a broader constitutional
“police power” that includes state power over health, safety, and transportation.33
This “police power” covers much more than criminal policing and is a power used
by states to enact laws, including criminal laws. The constitutional “police power”
is also used to delegate power for enforcement of laws to police. Although the
authority of police comes from this state “police power,” the two are distinct
concepts. It also reveals that police have always dealt with public order issues—
examples over the years range from resolving interpersonal disputes and clearing
sheep from city streets to managing sewer issues and traffic.34 So while the core
function of police may have been crime control—this has only ever been in name
only, as police have been involved with health, safety and transportation issues
throughout their history.35
The second part of the police myth is the inherent assumption that crimes are
regularly solved by police. In that sense, the police myth implicates both the core
function of police and the performance of police. Indeed, underlying many legal
discussions of policing policy is a widely accepted, though false, assumption that
police are solving serious crimes.36 The serious crimes considered here include
33

See U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway
Com., 294 U.S. 613, 622 (1935) (“[The authority to establish police] springs from the
obligation of the State to protect its citizens and provide for the safety and good order of
society . . . . It is the governmental power of self-protection and permits reasonable regulation
of rights and property in particulars essential to the preservation of the community from
injury.”).
34
HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 24–25 (1990) (noting that studies
of police time pre-1990 found a “large number of [police] hours [were] devoted to . . . traffic
accidents,” and other “tasks unrelated to crime”); ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE
231 (1977) (stating that officers in the 1960s spent time responding to “domestic disputes, .
. . accidents, . . . noisy parties, . . . and respond[ing] to all sorts of calls that were generated
by something other than a violation of the criminal law”); Jordan Blair Woods, Traffic
Without the Police, 73 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2, 4) (noting that
“traffics stops are the most common interaction between police and civilians today” and
“challeng[ing] the conventional wisdom that traffic enforcement is impossible without the
police”); William E. Crozier & Brandon L. Garrett, Driven to Failure: An Empirical Analysis
of Driver’s License Suspension in North Carolina, 69 DUKE L.J. 1585, 1586 (2020)
(“find[ing] that black and Latinx people are overrepresented relative to the population” when
it comes to driver’s license suspensions).
35
For broader discussion of “crime control” see Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the
Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964) (examining the Due Process and Crime
Control Models).
36
The public assumes that police solve crimes. Rick Muir, Great Expectations: What
Do the Public Want from the Police, POLICE FOUND. (Sept. 23, 2016) (noting that the public
expects that police will “investigate offen[s]es” and “catch criminals”); GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 34, at 57 (acknowledging “[t]he myth that detectives are capable of solving all crimes”);
P. Greenwood et al., The Investigative Function, in POLICING: KEY READINGS 247 (Tim
Newburn ed., 2005) (citing the media image of the police investigator as “the resourceful,
streetwise cop, who always gets his man”).
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classic felonies of murder, rape, aggravated assault, burglary, robbery, arson, and
motor vehicle theft.37 What this Article means by solving crime refers to a crime that
is reported, then investigated and resolved through arrest and clearance.38 The public
perception of “crime solving” is a police officer determining the perpetrator
responsible for a particular offense and holding that person accountable for their
crime. By either definition however, crimes are not being solved as might be
anticipated.

Some policing literature recognizes and discusses the “police crime myth.” But see
Egon Bitter, Florence Nightingale in the Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police
(1974) where he argues that fighting crime is not the basic function of police and
recognizes that police do not spend most of their time on fighting crime and even further
that police rarely invoke criminal law in their work. See also RICHARD ERICSON,
REPRODUCING ORDER: A STUDY OF POLICE PATROL WORK; NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL. 2004. FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE. WASHINGTON,
DC: THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS; see RACHEL HARMON, THE LAW OF THE POLICE
(2021) (dedicating a section to “The Pathological Myth of Police as Crime Fighters”).
37
See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, infra note 39. Murder also includes nonnegligent
manslaughter.
38
I acknowledge here that some of the problem is that police are resolving crimes by
alternative means and this is not being accounted for. For instance, when an officer chooses
to mediate an aggravated assault case rather than turn it to prosecutors, the case is considered
resolved.
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Police have never successfully solved crimes with any regularity,39 as arrest and
clearance rates are consistently low throughout history.40 Indeed while the public
overwhelmingly assumes that police are solving crimes,41 they have never solved
the majority of serious crimes. However, the police myth has persisted over time.
Based on this myth, the public has regularly reported crimes to police with an
39

Clearance rates (or police making an arrest and turning over to prosecution) and arrest
rates have remained below 30% in the 1940s and dropped until the 1970s to the present when
they have been reported at around 20% in 2019. See 12 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE
UNITED STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONS 20 (1941) (In 1940, 28.1% of offenses were cleared
by arrest, however, the UCR makes several changes in its reporting over the course of the
years sampled including the introduction or removal of metrics, making comparisons across
time difficult. For example, in 1940 total offenses included: rape, robbery aggravated assault,
burglary, larceny-theft, auto theft, and criminal homicide. Criminal homicide included
“manslaughter by negligence” and “murder and non-negligent manslaughter.”); 22 UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONS 42 (1951) (in 1950, for total
offenses, 28% were cleared by arrest); 78 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES
AND ITS POSSESSIONS 103 (1960) (26.1% of crimes were cleared in 1960); 99 UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONS 118 (1970) (1970 saw only
20.1% cleared). However, beginning in 1965, the UCR began including a “Crime Index
Total” in addition to a “Grand Total” for reporting the total number of offenses cleared by
arrest. The “Crime Index Total” focuses only on those crimes deemed most serious—either
by their nature or the disproportionate amount of time law enforcement must dedicate to
them. The Crime Index Total includes murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape,
robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny greater than $50 and auto-theft and is the
number cited here. See 91 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS
POSSESSIONS 106 (1965); 180 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS
POSSESSIONS 188 (1980) (by 1980, only 19.2% of crimes were cleared); Shima Baradaran
Baughman, How Effective Are Police? The Problem of Clearance Rates and Criminal
Accountability, 72 ALA. L. REV. 47, 113 tbl.1 (2020) (in 1990 21.25% of crimes were
cleared); 205 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONS 207
(2000) (20.5% of crimes were cleared in 2000). In 2003, the FBI began only calculating an
overall clearance rate for violent or property crimes, rather than an overall clearance rate that
included both types of crime. See FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: SUMMARY OF THE
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING (UCR) PROGRAM 5–6, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/2003/03sec1.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2020); Baughman, supra note 39, at 116 tbl.3
(21.64% of crimes were cleared in 2018); FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2019 tbl.25
[hereinafter FBI, 2019], https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.2019/tables (21.52% of crimes were cleared in 2019). See Baughman, supra note 39, at 113
n.16 (articulating how to calculate percentages of cleared crimes).
40
A better way to measure police effectiveness actually requires measuring reporting
to police and conviction rates (to determine whether arrests were based on good evidence in
the first place). See Baughman, supra note 39, at 85.
41
See supra note 36 and accompanying text. A 2016 CATO Institute survey focused
on policing in America found that respondents thought the top three priorities of law
enforcement should include (1) “[i]nvestigating murder, assaults, and domestic violence”
(78% of respondents); (2) “[p]rotecting [Americans] from being a victim of crime” (64% of
respondents); and (3) “[i]nvestigating property crime and robbery” (58% of respondents).
CATO INSTITUTE/YOUGOV, CATO INST. POLICING IN AMERICA SURVEY 1 (2016).
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expectation that they are addressed. These crimes typically are not addressed as the
police myth disproportionately impacts poor communities of color. The results of
this failure are most profound in these communities as deeper issues of legitimacy
and disaffection result with the realization that police are not available when they
are needed. While this Article makes no attempt to determine why police are not
solving more crimes, it does recognize the consequences of the police myth. Three
in particular are identified here.
First, the police myth leads to an obfuscation of police role and a lack of
accountability for crime solving. Police are charged with solving crimes, but their
actual function is much broader and more diffuse, and most of their focus is not on
crime. Though because the expectation is there, particularly among police
themselves, the police myth leads police to hide the rate at which they are solving
crimes. There is also a lack of transparency in what police typically do, how often
they actually solve crimes, and little oversight from the public on the lack of training
they receive for the functions they perform. The problem may not lie simply with
police, since the public relies on police for many functions both criminal and noncriminal, but yet expect them to solve serious crimes. This incongruity and dual
function have not been reconciled by policing scholars or the public. Perhaps there
is an unrecognized tradeoff here: when police focus arrests on minor crimes and
spend most of their time on public service functions, they are unable to focus on and
solve serious crimes.
A second result of the police myth is police disaffection.42 Some common
justifications for disaffection with police include racial profiling, police misconduct,
gang violence, procedural injustice and minor crime arrests.43 This Article identifies
another potentially major cause of police disaffection. Members of many
communities with high crime rates are disaffected with police because they have
grown used to police failing to address crime and because they often receive poor

Bell calls this concept “marginalization” and blames this on police abuse, witnessing
police abuse and other causes. Bell, supra note 7, at 2113 (marginalization may be direct or
vicarious; “pathways of vicarious marginalization” include “stories from family members,
witnessing friends’ interactions, and watching videos and media coverage of strangers’
experiences of police-related violence and injustice”).
43
Tracey Meares, Broken Windows, Neighborhoods, and the Legitimacy of Law
Enforcement or Why I Fell in and Out of Love with Zimbardo, 52(4) J. RSCH. CRIME &
DELINQ. 609, 621 (2015) (“Poor, urban-dwelling people of color bear the brunt, not only of
privacy and autonomy intrusions, but also of the constant stream of official messaging they
could easily interpret—and appear to interpret—as insulting[.]”); Bell, supra note 7, at 2100
(arguing “that experiences in which individuals feel treated unfairly by the police are one
key provocateur of legal estrangement”); Tyler, supra note 17, at 1539, 1547 (“[W]idespread
stops . . . not only engender anger and resentment but also promote cynicism . . .
undermin[ing] police legitimacy and contribut[ing] to the issues of distrust that suggest the
need to change policing policies and practices.”).
42
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levels of police protection, which encourages self-help and in turn can increase
crime.44 This is very much connected with the third result.
Third, and finally, the police myth creates what this Article terms a punishmentprotection paradox. Individuals sometimes fail to report crime because of the threat
of “punishment” from different avenues.45 First, reporting crime poses a threat to
individuals, both from community members, and from incarceration and potential
police mistreatment. But then the punishment-protection paradox also prevents
reporting of crimes. People in communities of color understand the police myth all
too well. They know from experience of years of ineffective policing that police do
not typically solve crimes. Also, in some cases, solving of a crime may result in
more negative interactions and a lack of “protection” felt by communities, which
might make people even less likely to approach police. Even when police do arrest
and sometimes incarcerate members of a community, this can cause disaffection for
all who are involved and an encouragement by others not to turn in a member of the
community to the police.46 Though on the other side, the lack of police intervention
when a community member is a victim of crime is perceived as a problem of police
refusing to keep the community safe or being unable to do so. And because the vast
majority of serious crimes are solved by the public, not police, a refusal to report
crime or cooperate with police perpetuates the failure of police to solve crimes and
Bell, supra note 7, at 2116 (“In response to police abandonment, marginalized people
seeking protection or redress for grievances have generally turned to ‘self-help[.]’”); Meares,
supra note 17, at 1359 (“The fact that people would decline to call the police to report crime
after a serious incident of police brutality is, to put it mildly, concerning. It means that some
people are making decisions not to call on public servants who have sworn to protect and
help them even after they have been seriously victimized.”); Tom Tyler, Police Discretion
in the 21st Century Surveillance State, 2016 UNIV. OF CHI, LEGAL F. 579, 587 (2016)
(suggesting “that the degree to which people feel that they receive fairness from the police
shapes whether people respond to the police deferentially, as opposed to with hostility and
defiance”).
45
See Robert F. Kidd & Ellen F. Chayet, Why Do Victims Fail to Report? The
Psychology of Criminal Victimization, 40 J. SOC. ISSUES 39, 39 (1984) (“[N]onreporting is
the result of three factors acting singly or in concert: (a) victim fear, (b) feelings of
helplessness and the perceived powerlessness of police, and (c) the threat of further
victimization from authorities.”); Heike Goudriaan et al., Reporting to the Police in Western
Nations: A Theoretical Analysis of the Effects of Social Context, 21 JUST. Q. 933, 933–69
(2004) (finding that the perceived competence of the police results in whether property
crimes are reported); Heike Goudriaan et al., Neighbourhood Characteristics and Reporting
Crime, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 719, 719 (2006) (“Approximately 25 per cent of the people
in the Western world are crime victims every year and about one in five of them is victimized
more than once[]. Many of these crimes are never reported to the police.”); MARTIN
GREENBERG & BARRY RUBACK, AFTER THE CRIME: VICTIM DECISION MAKING (1992)
(discussing findings of 20 studies involving more than 5,000 people and exploring the
decision to report and the immediate aftermath of a victimization); Stephen M. Schnebly,
The Influence of Community-Oriented Policing on Crime-Reporting Behavior, 25 JUST. Q.
223, 224 (2008) (studying “empirically . . . whether police involvement in communityoriented policing influences whether—or to whom—citizens report crime.”).
46
See Bell, supra note 7, at 2104–14.
44
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furthers the negative feedback loop.47 This results in a serious paradox that
perpetuates the police myth.
There is a latent fear about disincentivizing policing,48 and a burgeoning fear in
the criminal literature about the effects of decreased policing due to recent protests
and reform efforts.49 More recently as police departments reduce police budgets,
there is a concern that there will be a dramatic loss of public safety. To understand
this anticipated loss, there must be an understanding of the public function that
police serve today. If, for instance, police serve mostly a social or transportation
function rather than a crime control function, that has implications for what sort of
risk the public absorbs with fewer police, and what costs might ensue from over- or
under-deterrence of policing. The theoretical legal police literature has recognized
the importance of understanding the relationship of police with the communities
they serve.50 However, it has primarily focused on the root causes (and solutions)
for the misconduct and distrust of police.51 Much of this important prior work has
47

See W.T. SINGLETON, SOCIAL SKILLS 153 (1983) (identifying the public solving
crimes as a “myth” of policing).
48
See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 762
(noting the importance of striking the proper balance between regulating policing to protect
communities and ensuring that police functions—“reduc[ing] fear, promo[ing] civil order,
and pursu[ing] criminal justice”—are not diminished); Paul David Stern, Tort Justice
Reform, 52 UNIV. MICH. J. L. REFORM 649, 652 (2019) (arguing that public tort law reform,
like the doctrine of qualified immunity, should not “be so burdensome that it creates a
disincentive for officers to properly perform their difficult, and often dangerous, duties”).
49
Paul G. Cassell, Explaining the Recent Homicide Spikes in U.S. Cities: The
“Minneapolis Effect” and the Decline in Proactive Policing, FED. SENT’G REP. 1
(forthcoming 2020), (positing that “a reduction in proactive policing” due to the protests
following the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis caused “spikes in homicides”).
50
See, e.g., Jamelia Morgan, Rethinking Disorderly Conduct, CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 17–32) (examining the impact of policing disorderly conduct
on communities); Tyler, supra note 17, at 1539 (arguing that police “could potentially play
a role in building not only trust in themselves but also trust in government and among the
people in the community”); Tracey L. Meares et al., Lawful or Fair? How Cops and
Laypeople Perceive Good Policing, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 297, 302 (2015) (examining
the disconnect between community definitions of police misconduct and police definitions
of misconduct); Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference Between Lawful
or Effective Policing and Rightful Policing —and Why it Matters, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1865, 1883 (2013) (noting the alienation of citizens that results from differing police and
citizen understanding of law governing police).
51
See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 50, at 38–45 (arguing that criminalization of disorderly
conduct gives broad discretion to law enforcement that can marginalize public spaces);
Monica C. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 650, 655, 658 (2020) (arguing
“that policing is one of many mechanisms that reinforce segregation” and that “the police
reform agenda should directly contend with racial residential segregation”; Meares, supra
note 17, at 1365 (recognizing the potential for police to play a role as “community builders,”
but recognizing the potential for “mission creep” inherent in reforms); see also Tyler supra
note 44, at 579 (identifying potential reforms “that could help build popular legitimacy, i.e.
public trust and confidence in the police”).
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neglected that at the core of public mistrust of police, and the low rates of
cooperation with police could be the neglected issue of police function. The majority
of discussions in theoretical legal police literature also assume, at a minimum, that
solving crime is the primary function of police.52 Little prior work has really
grappled with the empirics that demonstrate that police are generally not solving
crimes, and explored the potential affects the police myth has for policing theory and
function.
This Article, first and foremost, attempts to identify and define the police myth
and its impacts, particularly on communities of color. To introduce this discussion,
in Part I, this Article attempts to trace a brief, superficial history of policing,
articulating the key functions of police over time. It demonstrates that the
constitutionally animated police power delegated by states to law enforcement has
always been broad—including crime but also including health, transportation, and
public order functions. Part II defines the police myth and provides its empirical
backing by briefly reviewing thirty years of independent data on American crime to
consider the rate at which police solve serious felony crimes. It determines that
overall, in the last thirty years, no more than 20% of serious crimes have been solved
by police through arrest or clearance. Then finally in Part III, this Article discusses
the impacts of police mythology and the consequences of police failure to solve
crimes, particularly where it is most damaging, among communities of color.53 It
provides a path forward inclusive of the groundbreaking work of policing and
abolitionist circles, as well as police investigation literature. The existence of the
police myth prevents a precise understanding of policing function, and certainly, the
reexamining of policing, making meaningful police reform impossible.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF POLICE FUNCTION
Police officers have historically served as public officials, but with a broader,
more opaque public function than firefighters, teachers or doctors. While police—
See, e.g., Simonson, supra note 7 (identifying crime reduction as a “relatively
consistent” goal of police “throughout the literature on law enforcement”). Others focus on
functions related to solving crime, such as crime prevention and response. See Bell, supra
note 7, at 2061 (noting “crime response and reduction” as a primary purpose of policing);
Harmon, supra note 8, at 901 (stating the goal of “most local policing” involves
“facilitate[ing] criminal justice and prevent[ing] crime and disorder”). The shift toward
community policing was an extension of this focus on crime. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE
WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 269 (4th ed. 2011); Rinat
Kitai-Sangero, Extending Miranda: Prohibition on Police Lies Regarding the Incriminating
Evidence, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 611, 614 (2017) (“The main role of the police is
to solve crimes.”). This assumption is not unique to academia. See supra note 36.
53
Over twenty years ago, Paul Robinson notes the low rate of crime solving. This is
one of the few discussions in the legal academic literature of the failure of police to solve
crimes, though in passing. See Paul Robinson & John Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW.
U. L. REV. 453, 458–61 (1997) (considering the ways an offender can escape punishment for
an offense by discussing deterrence and punishment).
52
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from early on—were expected to prevent crimes and create safe communities, they
have also always served the public through such varied activities as dealing with
unruly sheep, inspecting vegetable markets and breaking up neighborhood spats.
The history of policing in the United States is heavily intertwined with racial
discrimination. Policing is deeply tied to a legacy of slave patrols in the American
South, the exercise of control over free blacks, forceful responses to civil rights
protests, and control of other unpopular immigrant groups.54 While the police
function included solving of crimes from early on, police were never formally
trained in this role. As police function became more defined with departments
becoming more professional, the public increased their expectation that police solve
crime. Today, according to police and the public—the core police function is
preventing and solve crimes. Though, in actuality, police are still expected to
perform many other public service functions and may never receive formal training
on solving crimes even after earning the title of detective. While it is impossible to
do justice to a history of policing in a brief Article, this high-level review
demonstrates how policing functions have developed from early America.
Part A briefly defines “police” at their origin. Then it reviews a cursory history
of police in America and how their role and function has developed over time. Police
largely started as informal public servants and developed a greater focus on the
professional crime-solving function. While crime solving was always part of the job
description, this is one that has been cemented over time, though commensurate
training in this area has not followed suit. Police have historically always been
charged with public order including resolving noncriminal disputes, health issues,
transportation as well as the first official response to poverty and racial tension.55
A. Defining Police
“Police” comes from the Latin word politia which means civil administration
or government.56 From the 16th century onward, “police” was used in English as a
synonym for “policy” as it pertains to an organized state, civil organization, and
civilization.57 Over the next few hundred years, “police” started to mean regulation,

54

WILLIAMS, supra note 25.
55
Bell, supra note 7, at 2147 (“Police . . . have become the primary vehicle through
which the state responds to social deprivation.”); see also Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Myth of
Police Reform, ATLANTIC (Apr. 15, 2015) (“Vexing social problems—homelessness, drug
use, the inability to support one’s children, mental illness—are presently solved by sending
in men and women who specialize in inspiring fear and ensuring compliance.”).
56
J. LEONARD PEIRCE & HARRY CLAYTON COOK, MANUAL TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES ANNOTATED 52 (1938). Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background
of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 757–58 (2007).
57
DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 812–13 (Robert K. Barnhart ed., 1988); Legarre, supra
note 56 (addressing the connection between police and the public domain stating that “police
is synonymous with civil administration or . . . domestic administration”).
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discipline, and control of a community.58 To control and discipline a community
began to mean managing crime and punishment. Under the common law, the
definition of policing was always connected with crime,59 as well as general public
order.60 In 1769, William Blackstone, argued that the king, as “pater-familias of the
nation,” directs “the public police,” exercising the means by which “the individuals
of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their
general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and good
manners[.]”61 Blackstone used the term “police” to describe the power of the King
to address public wrongs.62 Blackstone broke up offenses administered by police
into five categories—offences against public justice, the public peace, public trade,
public health and the public order.63 Adam Smith seemed to also believe that police
function included the regulation of the inferior parts of government like cleanliness
and security.64 Indeed, historically, the definition of police included regulating crime
in society as well as managing health, trade and public order. Police began as a
public servant that helped society function more smoothly in many aspects, not one
singularly focused on crime.
B. Early American Policing
Early American police filled a role in society that was very much a manifestation
of the broad constitutional “police power” that states rely on in granting authority
58

12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 22 (2d ed. 1989); Legarre, supra note 56, at 761–
62 (articulating this concept and asserting that “this meaning survives today in the vocabulary
of American constitutional law—especially in the context of the ‘police power’”).
59
LORD HENRY H. KAMES, STATUTE LAW OF SCOTLAND ABRIDGED:
WITH HISTORICAL NOTES 271 (1757). The term “police” was used in 1773 by Erskine who
broadly categorized crimes in three classes: crimes against god, crimes against laws enacted
for the police or good government of a country, and other minor crimes. JOHN ERSKINE, AN
INSTITUTE OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND ¶ 16, at 705, 714–15 (1773). The second class includes
laws restraining idleness, punishing beggars, and preserving game. See also PATRICK
COLQUHOUN, A TREATISE ON THE POLICE OF THE METROPOLIS (1797) (distinguishing peace
kept in the streets from justice administered by the courts and indicating that police were
responsible for the regulation and correction of behavior and “the prevention and detection
of crimes”).
60
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, n.3 (1776).
61
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 162 (11th ed.
1791).
62
Legarre, supra note 56; see, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 61, at 128 (dividing
crimes into “offenses against public justice, against the public peace, against public trade,
against the public health, and against the public policy or economy”).
63
See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 61, at 128, 162 (discussing offenses against
“police” as public order offenses).
64
See ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 5 at 486 (R. L. Meek et al. eds.,
1978) (1896) (The Greek root of “police” “properly signified the policey of civil government,
but now it only means the regulation of the inferior parts of government” including
“cleanliness, security, and cheapness or plenty”).
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to law enforcement—including health, transportation and social welfare. In Early
America, the power to establish a police force derived from the U.S. Constitution
“police power.” The state “police power” reserves to the states “[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States, nor prohibited by it to the States.”65 This “police
power” is not merely the power to establish police and law enforcement. Rather, it
is a much larger concept leaving to the states broad authority to take all manner of
actions, including to legislate and regulate and enforce health and safety through
law enforcement. Through this “police power,” state governments passed many
regulations, including regulations targeting health, public order and criminal
affairs. Some of this state power was delegated to localities and to their agents,
including the police. Though throughout this Article I discuss the “police power”
as it relates to police, I recognize that this is a broad constitutional power delegated
to states that has been allocated, as relates to this Article, from states to localities
and their agents, police.66 However, the point remains that the portion of “police
power” exercised by police—like that allocated to states—involves broad
functions beyond the criminal realm—including health, transportation and public
order. This may partially explain the broad and diffuse role police have always
played in society.
The early authority of police was similar to that of the common law where
police had wide-ranging public service duties. In the 1600s, New York and Boston
started the first private police systems with officers employed part time.67 From
establishment, one of the early police’s core functions was solving crime.68 When
the Constitution was drafted, the “police power” was seen as a vital state power and
one that was integral to the functioning of a modern state.69 In 1844, the statute
U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving for the states “[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,” including the states’
ability to create criminal laws and to delegate law enforcement responsibilities to police).
66
I appreciate Rachel Harmon helping me to clarify this point to avoid confusion.
67
BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 17–18, 73–74,
86–87 (2017); DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 3–4 (2007); Olivia
B. Waxman, How the U.S. Got Its Police Force, TIME (May 18, 2017) (discussing the
privately-funded police systems of Boston in 1636 and New York in 1658).
68
BRADLEY CHAPIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN COLONIAL AMERICA, 1606–1660, 96–97
(1983) (noting that American constables’ duties in the 1650s included, among other things,
“apprehend[ing] all minor offenders and suspicious persons”); DAVID R. JOHNSON, POLICING
THE URBAN UNDERWORLD: THE IMPACT OF CRIME ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN
POLICE, 1800–1887, 8–9 (noting that public concern around crime spurred some citizens to
urge for policing to address the issue and focus on crime prevention); David A. Sklansky,
The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1207, 1207 n.231 (1999) (explaining that in
the U.S, “the new police explicitly emphasized crime prevention as their principal objective;
the manuals for most of the new departments contained language echoing Peel’s instruction
that the officers’ ‘every effort’ should be directed toward ‘this end’”).
69
ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
(1904); Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
429, 429–31 (2004) (evaluating the differing views on the proper scope of the Constitutional
65
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establishing the first contemporary police department is passed, setting forth the role
of police to detect and report offenders to the courts, recover property and prevent
crimes.70 By the mid-1800s,71 police became a branch of government that focused
on promoting public health, safety, and morality.72 In the latter-1800s, police
officially became responsible for solving crime in Boston,73 New York, and
Chicago.74 Indeed crime solving and investigation were emphasized as important for
a professional police force.75 Policing during this period was heavily influenced by
Sir Robert Peel, whose principles impacted the development of American policing.76
police power; some argue it is broad, some argue it is narrow and limited, but all
acknowledge that the power comes from the Constitution).
70
HARMON, supra note 36.
71
FOGELSON, supra note 34, at 13 (noting that authorities “organize[d] the first police
departments in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s”); JOHNSON, supra note 68, at 15 (“In the years
from 1830 to the 1850s each American city evolved its own police department[.]”).
72
See e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (“It belongs to that department
to exert what are known as the police powers of the State, and to determine, primarily, what
measures are appropriate or needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health,
or the public safety.”); see also Legarre, supra note 56, at 787 (stating that the promotion of
“public health, public safety, and public morals” were “essential to the police power of the
states”). The mid-1800s is generally accepted as the period when “police forces throughout
the United States converged into a single type.” WILLIAMS, supra note 25 at 29.
73
The first small detective department was formed by the London Metropolitan Police
in 1842 after concerns of street crime. NEWBURN, supra note 8, at 423; see also T.A.
CRITCHLEY, A HISTORY OF POLICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 900–1966 160 (1967). Boston
followed suit, establishing a detective unit in 1846. Matthew Pearl, The Incredible Untold
Story of America’s First Police Detectives, BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 28, 2016, 11:33 AM)
(examining the introduction of detectives in 1840s’ Boston); Gerald F. Uelmen, Fighting
Fire With Fire: A Reflection on the Ethics of Clarence Darrow, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1543,
1547 (2003) (“Boston created the first municipal detective bureau in 1846, and New York
followed suit in 1857 . . . .”); George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L. J.
857, 977 (2000) (noting that the “Boston Police Department appointed its first detectives in
1846”).
74
JOHNSON, supra note 68, at 65 (“Boston . . . organized the first detective force in
1846. New York followed suit in 1857, Philadelphia in 1859, and Chicago in 1861.”). The
first New York police manual contained the following exhortation: “‘The prevention of
crime being the most important object in view, your exertions must be constantly used to
accomplish that end.”’). See SIR ROBERT PEEL’S PRINCIPLES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (1829).
75
Sklansky, supra note 68, at 1204 (“It was not until 1877, and the creation of the
Criminal Investigations Division, that detection became a major part of the work of the
Metropolitan Police, and even then it remained clearly secondary to patrol.”); CAROL A.
ARCHBOLD, POLICING: A TEXT/READER 31 (2013) (“Inevitably police departments were
involved in crime prevention and control, and order maintenance . . . .”); JOHNSON, supra
note 68, at 16 (noting that Philadelphia in particular shifted police emphasis to “three distinct
duties: collection of information regarding crime, investigation of all details necessary to
prepare a legal case, and arrest of culprits” and that similar responses occurred in Boston and
New York); cf. FOGELSON, supra note 34, at 16–17 (stating that “[F]ew Americans were sure
whether the police forces . . . should be authorized to deal with crime”).
76
For an overview of Peel’s model of policing, see WILLIAMS, supra note 25 at 35–36.
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Peel made clear in his first and last principle that the key purpose of police was crime
control: the “basic mission for which police exist is to prevent crime and disorder”
and “the value of police is shown by the absence of crime and disorder[.]”77 Most of
his other principles focus on police having a trust-based relationship with the
community, and limiting physical force in fulfilling their duties.78 With a public
police force, it was clear that crime solving as well as a trusting community
partnership were critical to policing. However, like their predecessors, nineteenth
century police officers spent their time on public order functions like cleaning
streets, inspecting boilers, distributing supplies to the poor and homeless,
investigating vegetable markets and operating emergency health services.79
At the turn of the twentieth century, police became even more focused on arrest
and crime solving than other public service functions.80 After Reconstruction and
into the Twentieth Century, American police targeted blacks in their criminal efforts,
patrolling black neighborhoods most often.81 This was dramatic in the twentieth
century as the proportion of blacks arrested for crimes vis-à-vis whites shot up
dramatically.82
Starting in the late 1800s until the 1930s, the public became aware that police
practices routinely involved violent interrogation to obtain confessions.83
77
SIR ROBERT PEEL’S PRINCIPLES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (1829)
[https://perma.cc/4CUS-7KMP]. The final principle of policing also emphasizes the
importance of crime solving as the value of police is measured by the “absence of crime and
disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them. Id.
78
Id. (emphasizing principles 2–8).
79
FOGELSON, supra note 34, at 16.
80
Sklansky, supra note 68, at 1205 (stating that in England “the police acted not just as
patrolmen but also as “poor law relieving officers, inspectors of nuisances, market
commissioners, impounders of stray cattle, and inspectors of weights and measures.” “As
the nineteenth century drew to a close, however, the police shed most of these functions and
concentrated increasingly on crime control: patrol, detection, and arrest”).
81
Akbar, supra note 15, at 133 (noting that policing in the twentieth century was shaped
by “the longer arc of enslavement, Jim Crow, and settler colonialism”); KHALIL GIBRAN
MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF B LACKNESS: RACE, C RIME, AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN URBAN AMERICA 53–54 (2010) (discussing the “writing” of crime into race over
American history starting from the 1890s).
82
Jill Lepore, The Invention of the Police, NEW YORKER (July 13, 2020) (“[I]n 1911,
about eleven per cent of people arrested were African-American; under Robinson, that
number rose to 14.6 percent in 1917. By the nineteen-twenties, a quarter of those arrested
were African-Americans, who, at the time, represented just 7.4 percent of the population.”).
Progressive Era, Vollmer-style policing criminalized Blackness. MUHAMMAD, supra note
81, at 266–71 (noting that “Blackness. . . stood as the singular mark of a criminal” as a result
of the oversimplification of crime data in the 1930s). Police patrolled Black neighborhoods
and arrested Black people disproportionately. The “frontline soldiers” in Johnson’s war on
crime . . . spent a disproportionate amount of time patrolling Black neighborhoods and
arresting Black people. ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON
CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 12–15 (1983).
83
GEORGE C. THOMAS III & RICHARD A. LEO, CONFESSIONS OF GUILT: FROM TORTURE
TO MIRANDA AND BEYOND 112 (2012).
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Widespread frustration with police abuse and a desire to improve police
effectiveness lead to the Wickersham Commission in 1929.84 This Commission
criticized police in several areas, including “general failure” in solving a variety of
violent crimes resulting in a significant “loss of public confidence.”85 The
Wickersham Commission’s aim was not only to root out abuse, but to consider
police’s failure in solving crimes.86 This secondary Wickersham charge never gained
much traction however, or attention by scholars while after the Wickersham Report
in 1931 violent police tactics became less frequent.87 The Wickersham reforms were
successful by some measures, the first public recognition that police were not
solving crimes failed to result in any meaningful change.
C. Mid-Century American Policing
Mid-Century policing focused on instrumentalist aims of addressing
skyrocketing crime rates by focusing on arrests for minor crimes. In the 1950s and
‘60s, police focused more on crime control through apprehension rather than
prevention.88 The rationale and purposes behind this federal investment into crime
NAT’L COMM’N ON L. O BSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT , REPORT ON THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 2 iii, 1, 89 (1931)
(explaining President Hoover’s formation of the Wickersham commission and to determine
the nature and extent of police abuse and causes, and to “suggest definite and constructive
remedies”); Ronald F. Wright, The Wickersham Commission and Local Control of Criminal
Prosecution, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (2013) (“The Wickersham Commission was
skeptical of Prohibition, documenting many of the unanticipated costs that resulted from the
sudden criminalization of a widespread activity.”).
85
NAT’L COMM’N ON L. OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON POLICE NO. 14 1
(June 26, 1931) (“The general failure of the police to detect and arrest criminals guilty of the
many murders, spectacular bank, pay-roll, and other hold-ups, and sensational robberies with
guns, frequently resulting in the death of the robbed victim, has caused a loss of public
confidence in the police of our country.”); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Neglected History
of Criminal Procedure, 1850–1940, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 514 (2010) (noting that the
Wickersham Commission was created “to look into the state of lawlessness that had
accompanied Prohibition, including the abuses perpetrated by police”); Barry Friedman &
Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1827, 1858–59 (summarizing
the general opinion of the nation’s police as “ill-trained, ill-supervised, and badly
outmatched,” that “[c]orruption was rampant,” and conducted in a manner demonstrating
“incivility, ignorance, brutality, and graft”).
86
NAT’L COMM’N ON L. OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, supra note 84, at 1 (stating
that the purpose of the Commission was to inquire into “the problem of the enforcement of
prohibition . . . together with the enforcement of other laws”).
87
Tracey Maclin, Comprehensive Analysis of the History of Interrogation Law, with
Some Shots Directed at Miranda v. Arizona, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1387, 1391 (2015).
88
ARCHBOLD, supra note 75, at 10–11 (noting that police in the 1950s and 1960s placed
“a heavy emphasis on crime control” and that police reforms in the 1960s “were based
heavily on a traditional model of policing” that focuses on responding to serious crime);
Richard Adams, Implementing Community-Oriented Policing: Organizational Change and
84
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control have received significant scrutiny and the topic is a subject of much debate.
For instance, according to Elizabeth Hinton, in the 1960s, the federal government
invested massively into the carceral state to enforce law-and order as a reaction
against the civil rights movement.89 And whatever the rationale, it became clear even
with research at this time, that police only spent about 1/5 of their time on fighting
crime,90 as opposed to public order and public safety duties they always had.91 It was
clear in studies in the 1960s and 1970s that police were still not solving most major
crimes.92
Street Officer Attitudes, 48 CRIME & DELINQ. 399, 401 (2002) (“Traditional policing tends
to stress the role of police officers in controlling crime and views citizens’ role in the
apprehension of criminals as minor players at best and as part of the problem at worst.”);
JAMES J. CHRISS, BEYOND COMMUNITY POLICING: FROM EARLY AMERICAN BEGINNINGS TO
THE 21ST CENTURY 35 (2016) (noting police emphasis on clearance rates and crime rates
during the 1950s and into the 1960s); Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the
Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L. J.
4, 557–58 (1960) (describing the role that police were believed to provide as stated in police
manuals was to be responsible “so far as in [their] power, for the prevention and detection of
crime and the enforcement of all criminal laws and ordinances”); Sklansky, supra note 68,
at 1226 (“In the mid-twentieth century, police departments changed their principal claim of
expertise - if not their principal area of practice - from prevention to apprehension[.]”).
89
ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING
OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 333 (2016) (discussing the increased growth of
criminalization from the Johnson administration forward); see also “Amidst movements
and rebellions, the federal wars on crime and poverty jointly contributed to the exponential
growth of policing and incarceration.” Akbar, supra note 15, at 133–34.
90
FOGELSON, supra note 34, at 230–31 (noting that, in the mid-1960s “perhaps as much
as 80 percent” of officers’ time was spent “dealing with . . . noncriminal matters”).
91
Id. at 231 (stating that officers “resolved domestic disputes, helped out at accidents,
broke up noisy parties, headed off potential rumbles, looked for stray children, handed out
traffic directions, and responded to all sorts of calls that were generated by something other
than a violation of the criminal law”); Sklansky, supra note 68, at 1208–09 (noting that
American police “were called upon to perform tasks that had less to do with crime control
per se than with the general control of urban disorder . . . [including providing] the homeless
with temporary lodging, and sometimes with food”).
92
George L. Kelling et al., The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, POLICE
FOUND. 34 (1974) (finding “the overwhelming evidence is that decreasing or increasing
routine preventive patrol within the range tested in this experiment had no effect on crime,
citizen fear of crime, community attitudes toward the police on the delivery of police service,
police response time or traffic accidents” in a year-long experiment of policing effectiveness
in Kansas City, Missouri); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in
Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 569
(1997) (describing the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment as “a landmark social
scientific study conducted in 1972 and 1973, concluded that the study's experimental
variations in the level of random, motorized police patrol in Kansas City, Missouri, had no
significant effect on crime statistics, citizen fears, or the response time of police to calls for
service”); Anthony L. Guenther, A Study of the Detective Role in a Metropolitan Police
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During this same period was the birth of community policing with the Kerner
Commission.93 The Commission advocated that police should be part of the
community and help address social problems, including with a “more cooperative
police-community relationship” which later became known as community
policing.94 Around the same time, James Wilson suggested in a groundbreaking
book that police should be removed from social functions like helping with stray
animals and that they should focus on arrest for minor crimes that will lead to arrests
for more serious crimes.95 Wilson also suggested that there was a shift among police
in the 1970s that moved them away from the principal role as crime fighters, even
though the public still perceived that this was their role.96
Some might argue that the idea of community policing was lost as police
ramped up to deal with the crime waves of the 1970s and 1980s,97 but others would
argue that community policing was part and parcel of this targeted ramp up and

System 4-16–4-17, (“One of the pervasive beliefs in the Department is that if enough
manpower, time and resources could be mobilized, virtually every reported crime could be
solved. Since that state of affairs is unlikely, detectives systematically evaluate the closure
prospects for each assignment and invest their energies and talents in the most promising.
Knowing that this policy will eventuate in a perfunctory follow-up of many larcenies,
burglaries, and robberies, detectives obtain residual satisfaction from those cases which do
close.”).
Professors Paul Cassell and Richard Fowles have argued that the Supreme Court’s 1966
decision in Miranda v. Arizona caused a substantial drop in violent crime clearance rates in
1966–68. See Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year
Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN L. REV. 1055
(1998); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of Fifty
Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 BOST.
U.L. REV. 685 (2017). See also Amos N. Guiora, Relearning Lessons of History: Miranda
and Counterterrorism, 71 LA. L. REV. 1147, 1148 (2011) (analyzing Miranda exceptions);
Paul G. Cassell & Amos N. Guiora, Point/Counterpoint on the Miranda Decision: Should It
Be Replaced or Retained?, 31(5) UTAH BAR J. 18 (2018) (arguing for and against the
Miranda decision).
93
Tracey L. Meares & Tom R. Tyler, The Battle for the Constitution: The First Step Is
Figuring Out What Police Are For, ATLANTIC (June 8, 2020).
94
Id.
95
JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW
AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 4–5, 284 (1978) (noting that such “service functions”
are only ancillary to true “law enforcement functions,” that they could easily be privatized,
and arguing that “benevolent” disregard of “minor misdeeds” undermines justice and that
such behavior increases discrimination because “what is benevolence to the beneficiary
becomes malevolence to the neglected”); But see James Baldwin, A Report from Occupied
Territory, THE NATION (July 11, 1966) (“[P]olice are simply the hired enemies of this
population. . . . This is why those pious calls to ‘respect the law,’ always to be heard from
prominent citizens each time the ghetto explodes, are so obscene.”).
96
WILSON, supra note 95, at x (noting that police were publicly stating in 1977 that
they could do little about crime and focused more on service functions).
97
Meares & Tyler, supra note 93.
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increased minor crime arrests in poor black neighborhoods.98 Either way, the
community policing period—and increased crime rates—dramatically increased
arrests throughout the United States. Community policing was intended to have
police seeking counsel and support from community organizations and citizens to
help solve the “problems of crime, drugs and violence,”99 however many police
stations continued to operate like traditional patrol departments.100 Though the new
community police focus on minor crimes increased arrests dramatically. This
increase of arrests between the 1960s and 1980s cannot be understated. Arrest rates
in this twenty-year period matched arrest rates for the entire hundred preceding
years.101 In the 1970s, studies confirmed that police patrols did not effectively reduce
crime or fear of crime,102 or improve crime solving.103 By the 1980s, many police
departments claimed their focus was community policing, seemingly moving away

Akbar, supra note 15, at 125 (“Many accounts . . . frame community policing as
central to government attempts to re-legitimate police amidst the rebellions of the 1960s.”).
99
SKOLNICK, supra note 52. Practical steps involve organizing community-based crime
prevention activities, like Neighborhood Watch, informational newsletters, and groups that
remove graffiti.
100
Id. at 270, 272–73 (community policing was widespread but did not change policing
practices as some hoped it would).
101
HINTON, supra note 82, at 5 (There were fewer individuals incarcerated in the
century from 1865 to Johnson’s War on Crime than from that time to Reagan’s War on
Drugs); see also Lepore, supra note 82 (“More Americans went to prison between 1964 and
1982 than between 1865 and 1964[.]”).
102
Kelling et al., supra note 82, at vii (finding that changes in levels of preventive patrol
did not result in “significant differences in the level of crime, citizens’ attitudes toward police
services, citizens’ fear of crime, police response time, or citizens’ satisfaction with police
response time”); Livingston, supra note 92, at 569. But see WILLIAM G. GAY ET AL.,
NEIGHBORHOOD TEAM POLICING: NATIONAL EVALUATION PROGRAM PHASE I SUMMARY
REPORT 35–36 (1977) (citing improved community attitudes in Albany and Los Angeles,
including “consistently more positive” attitudes towards “police fairness, dependability and
trustworthiness” and improved “citizen perceptions of police fairness and impartiality,” but
“no impact” in Cincinnati, Holyoke, and New York); LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., TEAM
POLICING: SEVEN CASE STUDIES 107 (1973) (noting some evidence “that team policing had
certain consequences for . . . community relations” but cautioning that “[t]he data are far too
scant . . . to make such conclusions final”).
103
David I. Sheppard & Antony M. Pate, Operation Homestead in Newark Final Report
(Draft), POLICE FOUNDATION 1, 44–45, (Nov. 13, 1991) (finding no “substantial reductions
in reported crimes” but “demonstrated measurable effects on citizen attitudes” and that
“resident perceptions of the conditions in the target neighborhood improved significantly” in
a study evaluating a team and community policing strategy in Newark, New Jersey).
This study did not focus on police solving crimes, however; See also POLICE
FOUNDATION, THE NEWARK FOOT PATROL EXPERIMENT 118 (1981) (noting that street
patrols were effective at making citizens “feel safe,” even when there was no clear impact
on levels of crime).
98
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from an institutional focus on solving major crimes.104 While serious crime rates,105
and arrests increased during this period,106 the proportion of serious crimes solved
by police remained the same.107
Police continued to focus on increased arrests for minor crimes from the 1980s
to the 2000s. The practice of arresting for minor crimes was influenced by the
“broken windows” theory, and became even more prevalent than when it initially
gained theoretical traction in the 1970s.108 Misdemeanor arrests rose dramatically in
major cities between 1980s and 2000s, even though there was a decrease in violent—
and other major crime.109 Ruth Gilmore describes a 500x increase in the California

104

HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING 21–27, 35–36 (1990) (arguing
that “a community must police itself” with police in a supporting role and raising concerns
of police effectiveness); Kelling & Wilson, supra note 10 (detailing community policing
programs in Newark, New Jersey and Washington, D.C. and noting that community disorder
leads to community fear of violent crime); David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy,
103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1771, 1779 (2005) (describing “community policing” as “the new
orthodoxy of law enforcement” in the 1980s); Livingston, supra note 92 at 556 (portraying
community policing “as a result of perceived inadequacies in the ideas associated with what
they term the "reform era" in American policing” starting around the turn of the century and
proceeding into the 1970s).
105
Between 1960 and 1995 violent crime and serious property crime rates went up
dramatically. See FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1975 49 tbl.2 (the percentage change
in the rate of violent crimes per 100,000 from 1960-1975 was +199.3 and for property crimes
was +178.1. In 1960 there were an estimated 288,460 violent crimes in the U.S. (a rate of
160.9 per 100,000) and 3,095,700 property crimes (a rate of 1,726.3 per 100,000). By 1975
there were 1,026,280 violent crimes (481.5 per 100,000) and 10,280,300 property crimes
(4,800.2 per 100,000). In 1985 there were 1,328,800 violent crimes (a rate of 556.6 per
100,000 inhabitants) and 11,102,600 property crimes (4,650.5 per 100,000) while in 1995
there were 1,798,790 violent crimes (a rate of 684.6 per 100,000) and 12,068, property
crimes (a rate of 4,593 per 100,000) See FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1995: SECTION
II, CRIME INDEX OFFENSES REPORTED 58, tbl.1.
106
See supra note 101.
107
See supra note 39 (clearance rates have hovered around 20% since 1960 and were
at 21.52% in 2019).
108
The first mention of this as a concept was by James Wilson in 1968. WILSON, supra
note 95, at 7–8, 284 (examining the issues raised when police discretion is used to determine
whether and how to intervene in response to minor crimes; noting that when an officer
chooses to “ignore[] minor misdeeds” it implies some degree of unfairness); GEORGE L.
KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND
REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 242 (1997) (supporting that “order-maintenance
activities will have a major impact on index crime, as well as low-level disorder”); see
Kelling & Wilson, supra note 10; Harcourt, supra note 10, at 302.
109
PREETI CHAUHAN, ET AL., TRENDS IN MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS IN NEW YORK, JOHN
JAY
COLL.
OF
CRIMINAL
JUST.
(OCT.
28,
2014),
http://johnjay.jjay.cuny.edu/files/web_images/10_28_14_TOCFINAL.pdf at 8–11.
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prison population in these twenty years, without any increase in crime.110 Police
increased apprehension rates for minor crimes, but were unable to improve the rates
at which they solved major crimes.
Police claimed to be focused on high crime rates in the early 1990s, which
dropped by the end of the decade.111 There was a renewed instrumentalist focus by
police nationally to improve crime solving—now with the help of technology. The
1990s brought an increasing focus on technology like COMPSTAT,112 and “hot
spots policing,”113 which led police to focus their efforts in smaller areas given that
crime was concentrated in small areas of the city.114 Hot spots policing utilized
historical crime data to predict future crime hot spots.115 Though crime fell, police
110
RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND
OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 7, 109–10 (Earl Lewis, George Lipsitz, Peggy
Pascoe, George Sánchez & Dana Takagi eds., 2007) (“California state prisoner population
grew nearly 500 percent between 1982 and 2000” and “Police forces throughout the state,
from tiny rural sheriffs’ offices to the highly capitalized LAPD, systemically fulfilled their
mandates through enhanced surveillance of neighborhoods and individuals suspected of
extralegal activity. . . . [N]ew laws widened and deepened the capacity of police, prosecutors,
and judges to identify, arrest, charge, and convict people and remand them to [the California
Department of Corrections] custody. Indeed, the legislature embarked on a criminal-law
production frenzy . . . .”).
111
Gary Lafree, Explaining the Crime Bust of the 1990s, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 269
(2000) (“The crime bust period, from 1991 to 1999, is marked by steep declines in crime.”).
112
Simultaneously, the police increased technology to fight crime. The police were
early adopters of computer database technology. COMPSTAT: Its Origins, Evolution, and
Future in Law Enforcement Agencies, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE POLICE EXECUTIVE
RSCH. F., 2–3, 6 (2013) (describing how Bill Bratton and a command staff developed
Compstat for the NYPD as it shifted to focus on crime prevention and data-driven
performance in the 1990s; explaining Compstat’s purpose as a performance management
system that “emphasizes information-sharing, responsibility and accountability, and
improving effectiveness. . .” outlining the adoption of Compstat from the NYPD to other
police agencies “large and small” and now to non-law enforcement agencies as well); see
also Vincent E. Henry, CompStat The Emerging Model of Police Management, in CRITICAL
ISSUES IN CRIME AND JUST. 117, 119 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 2d ed. 2003). The U.S. had
been using technology to solve crime since at least 1967. See National Crime Information
Center Celebrates 40th Birthday, GOV’T TECH. (Jan. 22, 2007) (stating that the National
Crime Information Center (NCIC) “became operational on January 27, 1967”).
113
Hot spots policing is a proactive policing method that focuses patrol resources on
places and times that have the most crime. See supra note 11.
114
Henry, supra note 112, at 117, 119 (noting that Compstat technology helped finetune
policing and target it toward critical areas); Ferguson, supra note 11, at 265, 271–72, 273
(“[R]esearchers in Minneapolis, Minnesota found that 3.3% of street addresses and
intersections in Minneapolis generated 50.4% of all dispatched police calls for service.”).
115
See Renata M. O’Donnell, Challenging Racist Predictive Policing Algorithms
Under the Equal Protection Clause, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 544 (2019) (predictive policing
perpetuates racial bias); but see United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 344 (4th Cir. 2020)
(Thacker, S., concurring) (“[P]reventive policing . . . has revealed itself to be tarnished with
racial bias. predictive policing is merely a covert effort to attempt to justify racial profiling.”).
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did not improve in the proportion of serious crimes solved in this period, as with
earlier periods of policing. As the mid-century period of policing closed,
instrumentalist aims moved from solving major crime to arrests for minor crimes
through community policing and technology.
D. Modern American Policing
The last thirty years of policing have witnessed reduced numbers of arrests,
with legitimacy and democratic aims prevailing in policing theory. The current
system of American policing includes over 440,000 officers.116 Serious crime rates
have fallen dramatically,117 yet police arrest rates have not improved, and arrest
numbers have actually fallen.118 The prevailing policing theories focus on legitimacy
and procedural justice aims of reducing racial profiling and improving community
distrust that has resulted from decades of mistreatment by police.119 Another
prevailing legitimacy theory is democratic policing.120 Though similar in aim to
116
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FULL-TIME LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, BY
REGION AND GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION BY POPULATION GROUP, NUMBER AND RATE PER 1,000
INHABITANTS, 2019 tbl.71 (2019); DUREN BANKS ET AL., NATIONAL SOURCE OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT
EMPLOYMENT
DATA,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.
(2016),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf (approximating 18,000 total agencies).
117
Compare supra note 105, with FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009 tbl.1,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2009 (in 1990 the FBI estimated that the violent crime
rate was 729.6 per 100,000 and the property crime rate was 5,073.1 per 100,000); See FBI,
2019 supra note 39, at tbl.1 (in 2019 the violent crime rate was 366.7 per 100,000 and the
property crime rate was 2,109.9 per 100,000).
118
The number of arrests have gone down pretty consistently since 1995 (with a slight
blip in 2009). Shima Baradaran Baughman & Megan S. Wright, Prosecutors and Mass
Incarceration, 94 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 5 n.9) (“The number
of arrests nationally have decreased since 2006.”). Over the last thirty years, the number of
people arrested has decreased. In 1995 there were 2.9 million arrests, by 2006 arrests reduced
to 2.1 million and in 2019 there were 1.6 million arrests for the selected serious crimes
discussed here. Baughman, supra note 39, at 114 tbl.2&3 (for 2006); FBI, 2019, supra note
39, at tbl.29; Id. (selected crimes include murder and non-negligent manslaughter,
rape/sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, larceny-theft, burglary, motor vehicle theft).
119
See Tracey Meares, The Legitimacy of Police Among Young African-American Men,
92 MARQ. L. REV. 651 (2009) (examining procedural justice and police legitimacy);
Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 14 (considering the interplay between procedural justice and
legitimacy).
120
See Samuel Walker, Governing the American Police: Wrestling with Problems of
Democracy, 2016 UNIV. CHI. LEGAL F. 615, 617 (2016) (recognizing calls for constitutional
policing); Sklansky, supra note 104, at 1700–02 (identifying democratic policing; arguing
that democratic policing can mean a variety of things: “procedural regularity and the ‘rule of
law’”; “certain substantive rights”; “popular participation in policing” through civilian
review or community policing or control; or “service-style” policing); SKLANSKY, supra note
67 (similar discussion); Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1120–21
(2000) (identifying “democratic and trustworthy” policing as that which focuses on greater
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community policing, after broad criticism of earlier iterations of community
policing,121 scholars have focused on adding more community perspectives and even
shifting the power dynamic to the public to determine the focus of police.122
A result of these guiding theoretical approaches has been procedural justice
police training and community councils.123 The focus in the last twenty years has
been in training officers to be professional and exercise appropriate force. In 2014,
Ferguson police shot Michael Brown resulting in the Obama Administration
establishing a policing task force that found that police had become more militant
and less protective of the public.124 Other high profile shootings in 2016 and 2020
have led scholars to critique police for perceived abusive practices, particularly
transparency); Richard A. Bierschbach, Fragmentation and Democracy in the Constitutional
Law of Punishment, 111 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1437 (2017) (examining how fragmentation of
power relates to democracy in punishment); Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 85, at
1830 (noting “a failure of democratic processes and accountability” underlying policing);
Joshua Kleinfeld, Three Principles of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. UNIV. L. REV.
1455, 1456 (2017) (advocating for linking together a reconstructivist theory of criminal
justice and a democratic theory of government to “characterize a democratic society’s
approach to criminal justice”); Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision
for “Community Engagement” Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 793 (2016) (examining the role of communities in “influenc[ing] the DOJ’s policereform consent decrees”); Maria Ponomarenko, Rethinking Police Rulemaking, 114 NW.
UNIV. L. REV. 1, 6 (2019) (arguing for applying administrative rulemaking procedures to
policing agencies as a way to enhance democratic engagement in police rules); Christopher
Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 91, 118 (2016) (taking a “new
administrativist” viewpoint “that police [should be] accountable for their actions through the
democratic process”).
121
Bierschbach, supra note 120, at 1452–53 (advocating for “do[ing] more to ensure
that multiple voices are heard” within the criminal legal system); Cf. Simonson, supra note
23 (proposing copwatching as an agonistic form of public participation in policing); Akbar,
supra note 15 (critiquing community policing).
122
See Simonson, supra note 7 (noting a “growing emphasis within social movements
[that is] reckoning with police violence by imagining new forms of governance and
policymaking in which power is shifted to those who have been most harmed by mass
criminalization and mass incarceration.”).
123
Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 952 (2006) (arguing that greater “information and participatory rights”
should be extended to both victims and “other members of the public” in the criminal
process); Kleinfeld, supra note 120, at 1483 (arguing for a “‘We the People’ principle of
criminal procedure hold[ing] that the administration and enforcement of criminal law should
be by and of the people” and noting that the current system has “profoundly . . . drifted away
from it”). Some have raised concerns about the limited impact of these solutions. Akbar,
supra note 15, at 124–25 (arguing that democratization of policing is insufficient to address
the systemic issues in modern policing); Sklansky, supra note 104, at 1802–03 (cautioning
that “very little scholarly attention has been paid” to the effectiveness of many forms of
civilian oversight).
124
Ronald L. Davis, President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing
Recommendations: From Print to Action, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (July 28, 2015).
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targeted at minority defendants.125 The recommendations of this presidential
taskforce, like the previous Wickersham and Kerner commissions were never
implemented.126 Though this taskforce, unlike the Wickersham commission did not
focus on police failure to solve major crimes, possibly assuming that this was not a
problem since the last time it was broadly recognized was in the 1970s.127 While
there has not been a national push to improve police crime solving, the stated priority
of the largest U.S. police departments is preventing crime, and apprehending the
person responsible for those crimes.128 For instance, Los Angeles police clearly
restate the Peel principles from early policing: “[t]he test of police effectiveness is
the absence of crime and the presence of public order.”129 However, the focus today
of the leading policing scholarship does not include instrumentalist aims of
preventing or solving crimes.

125

Rachel Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (depicting police misconduct as “not accidental, incidental, or
inevitable” but “systematic”); L. Song Richardson, Police Racial Violence: Lessons from
Social Psychology, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2961 (2015) (discussing the phenomenon of
police killing unarmed black men as bringing national attention to “the persistent problem of
policing and racial violence”); David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be
Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 467 (1992) (summarizing the circumstances
within our society that have led to the abuse and brutality of police and on some level the
acceptance of such behavior); Feldman, supra note 20, at 90 (noting that “[s]tudies have
shown that police officers use force against racial minorities at disproportionately high rates,
and there is reason to believe much of this force is unjustified”).
126
Charles H. Ramsey et al., Opinion, There Is a Playbook for Police Reform: We
Helped Write It, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2020) (discussing the lack of implementation of Obama
Commission recommendations).
127
Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 85–99 (2015)
(failing to mention solving crimes or improving clearance rates as recommendations or
action items in the report).
128
See,
e.g.,
Mission
Statement,
DALLAS
POLICE
DEP’T,
https://dallaspolice.net/abouts/missionstatement (last visited Jan. 2, 2021) (“The Police
Department, in serving the people of Dallas, strives to reduce crime and provide a safe city
by . . . [p]roviding preventive, investigative, and enforcement services[.]”); MPDC: Mission
and Value Statement, METRO. POLICE DEP’T, https://mpdc.dc.gov/page/mpdc-mission-andvaluestatement#:~:text=It%20is%20the%20mission%20of,the%20sanctity%20of%20human%2
0life. (last visited Jan. 2, 2021) (Washington, D.C.) (“It is the mission of the Metropolitan
Police Department to . . . reduce crime and the fear of crime in the community.”); Mission,
NYPD, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/about/about-nypd/mission.page (last visited Jan. 2,
2021) (New York City) (“In partnership with the community, we pledge to . . . fight crime,
both by preventing it and aggressively pursuing violators of the law.”); Adrian Diaz, Mission
Statement and Priorities, SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T MANUAL, https://www.seattle.gov/policemanual/general-policy-information/mission-statement-and-priorities (last visited Jan. 22,
2021) (“The mission of the Seattle Police Department is to prevent crime . . . .”).
129
Management Principles of the LAPD, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEP’T (last visited Nov.
7, 2020).
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While over time police have reduced abusive practices and increased arrests for
minor crimes, not a lot otherwise has changed. Police are still working within the
broad scope of public safety “police power” authority that states originally delegated
to law enforcement, with their daily duties consisting of health, transportation and
social functions. Though in name their focus has increasingly become crime control
over the last fifty years, the reality has not matched the goals as police have solved
generally the same proportion of serious crimes during this period.130
The next section focuses on defining modern police and their function,
including crime control. Part I.E. explores the key functions of police and other
definitions relied on in this Article. This brief section does not appropriately dissect
any of these terms as they all contain serious ambiguity and the definitions presented
are subject to challenge. It does attempt to explain what this Article means when it
refers to police “solving crimes.”
E. Defining Modern Police Function
At the heart of the police myth and reforming police lies the question: what is
the function of modern police? The first aspect of the police myth is that the primary
function of police is crime control. The previous sections have discussed what police
functions have typically been historically, but now it is important to understand what
it is that police currently do? If it is not crime solving, then what is it? Understanding
the police function is a crucial first step to understanding the police myth. And it
provides insight into what public function will be lost by potentially reducing the
role of police. Before endeavoring police reform, this Article carefully considers
what key functions are expected of police.
Starting at the beginning, what is meant by the “function” of the police? Is it
what police understand their job to be, what the public currently understands their
role to be, or what the public should understand their role to be? The first two
questions are addressed here, though not in any sufficient matter, as there is a dearth
of theoretical scholarship that explores these deep and open questions.131 It is also
relevant here that very few policing functions are determined by outside bodies or
the electorate, but most come internally from police.132 Given this lack of guidance,
130

See supra note 39.
A good start to answering these questions is the classic, GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34,
at 21 (“Anyone attempting to construct a workable definition of the police role will typically
come away with old images shattered and with a new-found appreciation for the intricacies
of police work.”); See supra note 18 for further discussion of the police role.
132
Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 85, at 1827 (“All police practices—such as
use of drones or other surveillance equipment; SWAT, Tasers, and other means of force;
checkpoint stops, administrative inspections, and other warrantless searches and seizures—
should be legislatively authorized, subject to public rulemaking, or adopted and evaluated
through some alternative process that permits democratic input.”); William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509 (2001) (noting that as
the law continues to developed “both lawmaking and adjudication pass into the hands of
police and prosecutors”).
131
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this Article settles on considering what the public and police have generally
considered to be the core police function.
To determine these core functions, this Part relies on public surveys that have
largely remained consistent over the years, even with the variation of the poll taker.
Simply stated, the public expects the police to prevent and solve crimes. According
to surveys,133 the public understanding is that police solve major crimes. A recent
public survey found that the top three functions of police according to the public
were that police protect against crime (68%), investigate major violent crimes (78%)
and investigate property crime and robbery (58%).134 In contrast, only 30% of
respondents thought that enforcing drug laws should be a top priority and only 19%
considered enforcing traffic laws to be a top priority. 135 An even larger number of
police (62%) see their role in society as protectors and enforcers of the law.136 The
police view themselves as the front line against crime, which can lead to police
complaints when they are forced to do other work.137 The consensus of the public
and police is that police are focused on preventing and solving major crimes.
How do we determine police key functions? This Article cannot evaluate all
police functions here, though in contemplating policework from a criminal lens, the
interest might naturally be where police could—or should—intersect with the legal
system. In that vein, this Article is focused on identifying the proportion of serious
“crimes” that police ultimately “solve.” Though to focus strictly on that would be to
ignore a large part of the police function, so it is important to consider how police
spend their time. In discussing police function, it is important to acknowledge that
these propositions are highly ambiguous and contestable, and that further discussion
and debate is needed on these important issues.
At first glance, key police functions currently seem to be (and have historically
been)—very broadly speaking—maintaining public order and preventing and
solving crimes.138 Examples of such “peace” functions include aiding individuals
who are in danger, facilitating the movement of people and vehicles, assisting those
who cannot care for themselves, promoting and preserving civil order, resolving
133

Morin et al., Police Views, Public Views, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/01/11/police-views-public-views/
[https://perma.cc/P56A-4WGZ].
134
See supra note 41.
135
Id.
136
In two expansive 2016 Pew Surveys of police and the public, 62% of officers say
their primary role is to serve as both protectors and enforcers while 53% of the public would
agree with this statement. Morin et al., supra note 133. The surveys “included a number of
identically worded questions, which allowed for direct comparisons of how officers and the
public see the role of the police in their communities.”
137
WILSON, supra note 95, at ix (“Ten years ago [1967], the police were popularly
portrayed as ‘crime fighters’ who ‘solved crimes’ by investigation and ‘prevented crimes by
patrol.’ Police officers may privately have then known that this view was simplistic, if not
false, but few pointed it out.”); Friedman, supra note 27, at 18.
138
FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 74, 86–87; Kitai-Sangero, supra note 52, at 614 (“The
main role of the police is to solve crimes. The public’s expectation of the police is to fulfill
this role successfully.”).
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conflict, and providing emergency services.139 Certainly there is ambiguity in all of
these functions and open definitions. It may be valuable to consider whether police
should in fact spend an overwhelming majority of their time on these broad public
functions.140 The other key function of police—and arguably one that is strictly the
job of police—is preventing and solving crimes. Specifically, this includes police
identifying crime, identifying and apprehending offenders where appropriate,
participating in criminal proceedings, protecting constitutional rights, identifying
problems that are potentially serious law enforcement problems, and generally
maintaining a feeling of security in the community.141 The area of most interest here
are the latter functions of preventing and solving crime.142 Though for the purposes
of this Article, police functions seem to include both preventing and solving crimes
as well as broad public order functions—such as health, safety and transportation.
In the following sections, Part I.E.1 considers common police and detective
functions. Part I.E.2 dispels the first part of the police myth in discussing how police
spend their time in training and in the field, demonstrating that little time is spent on
crime control functions. In preparing to consider data on the second part of the police
myth, the final two sections define “serious crime” (Part I.E.3) and “solve” (Part
I.E.4). All of these shed light on the police function and are integral to dispelling the
police myth.

139

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 67; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 32; but see
Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms Approach to Crime
Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34 GA. L. REV. 1253,
1264 (noting that “[a]lthough law enforcement comprises only a small component of an
officer's activities, reform-era officers considered fighting crime the ‘real police work,’
whereas the social service component of their function was ‘shit work’ and “morally
degrading to them as . . . enforcers of the law”) (internal citation omitted).
140
According to some studies, police may spend the largest number of hours dealing
with public order matters—and around 20 percent of time or less on criminal matters.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 24–25 (noting that studies report up to half of calls to police
involve requests to help with personal and interpersonal matters, another study describes it
as 83%, and yet another found “that only 16 percent of calls to police in Detroit were crime
related. . . . [S]tudies report [a] large number of police hours devoted to handling accidents
and illnesses, stray and injured animals, and intoxicated persons; dealing with family
disturbances, fights among teen-age gangs, and noisy gatherings; taking reports on damage
to property, traffic accidents, missing persons, . . . lost and found property” and controlling
crowds and traffic). Some of these functions can bleed into the criminal arena. See also
Woods, supra note 34, at 3–4 (describing “increasing momentum for rethinking police
involvement in the traffic space”).
While many scholars have articulated their vision for police reform, there is very little
in terms of theoretical consensus (or even disagreement) on what the role of police should
be. See supra notes 9–27.
141
See Baughman, supra note 39, at 52 (noting the “principal functions” of police:
“detecting crime and enforcing the law”).
142
Id. at 55 (focusing “on the function of preventing and solving crime”).
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1. Police and Detective Functions
What are the functions of police and detectives? Who is charged with solving
crimes and who solves most crimes? Understanding the current state of policing is
a critical piece of understanding our misperceptions about policing investigation
functions and the police myth.
Solving crimes falls under the basic police function of criminal investigation.143
Criminal investigation involves collecting information about a suspect and bringing
the person into custody and eventually working with prosecutors to charge a crime.
Typically, criminal investigations are dealt with by detectives in a separate division
than patrol officers.144 Detectives progress from the ranks of patrol officers to
separate detective units, that later can become more specialized to solve certain
crimes.145 Basic law enforcement training is around 15 weeks though it has increased
slightly in recent years.146 Homicide detectives typically spend a minimum of three
years on patrol, two years investigation and then possibly obtain further training for
homicide investigation.147 Detectives are ultimately charged with crime solving,
though their work involves police and members of the public.148 It is not commonly
known that most crimes are solved by members of the public first, then by patrol
officers, and then finally by detectives.149
The definition of “solving crimes” used here will be further explored in Part I.E.4.
See, e.g., Guenther, supra note 92 at Fig. 2-1 and 1-4 (providing an example of the
Washington DC police department); David J. Bordua & Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Law
Enforcement, in USES OF SOCIOLOGY 293 (Paul F. Lazarsfeld et al. eds., 1697) (noting the
hierarchical separation of roles within police departments).
145
David L. Carter & Jeremy G. Carter, Effective Police Homicide Investigations:
Evidence from Seven Cities with High Clearance Rates, 20 SAGE PUBL’NS: HOMICIDE STUD.
150, 161 (2019).
146
Brian A. Reaves, State and Local Law Enforcement Training Academies, 2013, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. 4 (July 2016) (noting that, by 2013, the average basic training had increased
by approximately two weeks in comparison to the length of training observed in 2006). In
Europe police training is often two years by comparison. See RUTGER BREGMAN,
HUMANKIND cp. 16 (2020).
147
Carter & Carter, supra note 145.
148
GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 30, at 8–10.
149
Eck & Rossmo, supra note 12, at 605 (“Consequently, detectives invest more effort in
collecting evidence for a prosecution than in trying to identify unknown criminals.”); Jan
M. Chaiken et al., The Criminal Investigation Process: A Summary Report 3, 16 (June
1976) (an extensive study of 153 police departments showed that the majority of a
detective’s time is spent “reviewing reports, documenting files, and attempting to locate
and interview victims”). But see Philip J. Cook et al., Why Do Gun Murders Have a Higher
Clearance Rate Than Gunshot Assaults?, 18 CRIMIN. & PUB. POL’Y 525, 527 (2019)
(finding that higher clearance rates for fatal gunshot assaults were higher than for nonfatal
assaults was “entirely a result of arrests made after the first 2 days, which suggests that the
more sustained effort in homicide cases is an important part of the difference”). But see
THOMAS ABT, BLEEDING OUT: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF URBAN VIOLENCE-143
144
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Little research exists on the effectiveness of investigative functions of police
and how they impact crime solving.150 But what the policing literature makes clear
is that a detective is most effective working with a team of police officers,151 as well
as with close ties in a community,152 and when using broader available
information.153 In addition, greater dedication of investigative resources plays a
role.154 Although policing theory has changed in the last thirty years, the crime

AND A BOLD NEW PLAN FOR PEACE IN THE STREETS

(2019) (aiming to bridge the racial and
socioeconomic divide by offering a plan to reduce homicides by over 50% in eight years).
150
Carter & Carter, supra note 145 at 151 (quoting Janice L. Puckett & Richard J.
Lundman, Factors Affecting Homicide Clearances: Multivariate Analysis of a More
Complete Conceptual Framework, 40 J. RSCH. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 188 (2003)) (“[T]he
present research remain[s] largely silent on the effects of the investigative actions . . . Much
therefore remains to be learned about what detectives do and how what they do affects
clearances.”). We should be careful since police over focusing on their duty to solve crimes
may cause a disconnect between police and the public that could result in them becoming
less effective at preventing crime. Livingston, supra note 92, at 631–32.
151
Carter & Carter, supra note 145, at 164–68 (team approaches took advantage of
information of several bodies and coordination between forensics and crime labs, corrections
organizations, patrol and investigators all part of the same team, moving quickly within the
first 48–72 hours were most effective); Floyd Feeney, Police Clearances: A Poor Way to
Measure the Impact of Miranda on the Police, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 114 n.137 (2000) (citing
J.F. ELLIOTT & THOMAS J. SARDINO, CRIME CONTROL TEAM (1971) (finding that combining
patrol and investigative officers into a team increased clearance)); Fiona Brookman, Edward
R. Maguire & Mike Maguire, What Factors Influence Whether Homicide Cases Are Solved?
Insights from Qualitative Research with Detectives in Great Britain and the United States,
23 SAGE PUBL’NS: HOMICIDE STUD. 145, 160 (2019) (another important factor was having
a large enough team dedicated for enough time, but not too large of a team).
152
GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 30 (the separation of police and detectives in both
space and status prevents information exchanges that could help with crime solving); Carter
& Carter, supra note 145, at 171 (also considering relevant data is important for effective
detective work); Katelyn Rowe, Examining the Value-Add of Non-Adversarial Processes in
the Immediate Aftermath of Police Shootings, 27 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 133, 141–42 (2018)
(including community members to solve crimes as well as to resolve public safety concerns).
153
Seth W. Fallik et al., Policing Through Social Media: A Qualitative Exploration,
22(2) INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 208, 210 (2020) (noting that several incidental and
retrospective case studies suggest that using social media can help discover criminal activity,
identify people and gather evidence); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing
the Cops?t, supra note 92, at 703 (interviews have also been identified as the most effective
police investigative method).
154
Cook et al., supra note 149, at 543 (“Given that fatal and nonfatal cases occur in similar
circumstances, the greater volume of evidence collected in fatal cases was likely the direct
result of extra investigative resources.” In addition, “[i]t seems that persistence paid off but
that staying with an investigation that may take months was a luxury that only the homicide
detectives could afford.”).
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investigation process,155 and crime solving rates,156 have remained largely the
same.157 For instance, almost 30% of police time is spent on patrol, even though
studies show that that random motorized patrols are not effective in crime solving
or prevention.158 Investigation scholars even assert that if changes in policing have
caused crime to drop, it is unlikely to have resulted from improvements in criminal
investigation.159 In sum, policing investigation and crime solving is largely the
charge of detectives, though more crimes are actually solved by the public and
ordinary police.
2. Police Function and Time
There is very little data on how police spend their time. Though, the existing
data on police training and allocation of time demonstrates that the police myth is
inaccurate in asserting that a primary function of police is crime control.
The day to day of policing has remarkably little to do with crime, despite public
perception to the contrary.160 The vast majority of police time is spent on
noncriminal functions—such as health, transportation and public order. Some
estimates put public order (non-criminal functions) at 90% of police time.161 A
155

FRANK HORVATH ET AL., NATIONAL SURVEY OF POLICE POLICIES AND PRACTICES
REGARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER RAND 5 (
2001) (“The police criminal investigation process has remained relatively unaffected by the
significant changes that have occurred in policing, the crime problem and technology in the
past thirty years.”); Eck & Rossmo, supra note 12, at 605 (“Detectives seriously examine a
minority of reported crimes, dealing with most in less than a day. . . . The potential of crime
scene forensics for solving crimes is undermined if the police agency’s evidence processing
capabilities cannot effectively handle the demand. . . . [T]he full potential of forensic science
in criminal investigations remains unrealized. Evidence is analyzed in only a small
percentage of cases, and it occurs more commonly for case building after an arrest rather
than as a means of identifying the offender. Long turnaround times are a problem, in
particular, for less serious crimes.”).
156
See infra Part II.C. for empirical support for this assertion.
157
For instance, it would be difficult to argue that improvements in police investigations
since 1990 caused violent crime to drop. Eck & Rossmo, supra note 12, at 603. It is also
unlikely that increasing minor crime arrests or broken windows efforts have caused the drop
in violent crime, though this is more controversial. See BREGMAN, supra note 146.
158
Kelling et al., supra note 92 (finding the overwhelming evidence patrolling had “no
effect on crime, citizen fear of crime, community attitudes toward the police on the delivery
of police service, police response time or traffic accidents”).
159
See supra note 27.
160
Friedman, supra note 27, at 22. Barry Friedman explains that some scholars have
historically pushed back on the common wisdom that cops spent little of their time fighting
crime. When looking at patrol officers, detectives, and community policing officers, they
found that what some call “order maintenance” is really another method of dealing with
crime. If you include this metric, some half of officer’s duties are crime related. Id.; Waldeck,
supra note 139.
161
Paul Robinson, Opinion, Why Police Should See the ‘Defund’ Movement as a
Golden Opportunity, NEWSWEEK (July 21, 2020, 8:00 AM).
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recent survey of several cities who self-reported time spent by police revealed that
only 4% of police time was spent working on violent crime.162 The bulk of police
time was spent on calls about noncriminal matters (around 37%),163 with traffic
concerns taking up the next biggest chunk of police time at 15%.164 Another
substantial portion of police time is occupied by administrative reporting or personal
time.165 Indeed one set of scholars found that the average officer spent one hour per
week responding to crimes in progress.166 This trend only becomes more apparent
and the ratio of time spent fighting crime to other duties becomes more lopsided as
you move away from populated urban communities.167 Rural and small town officers
often address utility problems, house checks for citizens on vacation, and clearing
cows blocking traffic.168 In short, despite expectations that a primary police function
consists of crime control, police spend a marginal amount of time addressing
crime.169
Police training is arguably geared towards self-defense, yet police spend most
of their time on noncriminal functions. When it comes to crime control training,
police are primarily trained with firearm competency and self-defense but very little
on investigating or solving crime.170 Even detectives get most of their crime fighting
162

Jeff Asher & Ben Horwitz, How Do the Police Actually Spend Their Time?, N.Y.
TIMES (June 19, 2020) (considering time spent by officers in New Orleans, Montgomery
County and Sacramento); In Baltimore, in 1999, Mayor Martin O’Malley reported that
regular patrol officers spent less than 6% of their time dealing with serious crime. Friedman,
supra note 27, at 22 (noting time was split between serious and minor crime like disorderly
conduct, drug possession, drunkenness, and loitering).
163
Asher & Horwitz, supra note 162(noting 37% in Montgomery County, Maryland,
37% in New Orleans, and 32% in Sacramento).
164
Id. (19% in Sacramento, 13% in Montgomery County, Maryland, and 15% in New
Orleans).
165
Friedman, supra note 27, at 23.
166
Id. at 43 (“When it came to actually responding to crimes in progress, Greene and
Klockars found that ‘the average officer spent one hour per week.’”). The available data on
how police spend their time is limited and could benefit from additional research.
167
Id. at 22; see also John Liederbach & James Frank, Policing Mayberry: The Work
Routines of Small-Town and
Rural Officers, 28 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 53, 63 tbl.1 (2003).
168
Friedman, supra note 27, at 23.
169
Id. at 26.
170
Reaves, supra note 146, at 6 tbl.11 (recruits average only 40 hours on investigation;
the Justice Department found that police officers typically receive about 111 hours on
firearms skill and self-defense — but just 11 on cultural diversity and human relations, eight
on basic community policing strategies, and eight on mediation and conflict management.);
Friedman, supra note 27, at 10–21 (breaking down the categories of training for police
officers illustrating the percentage of time spent on each respective topic); Myron W. Orfield,
Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics
Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1029, n.55 (1987) (providing a brief history of the
development of training for the Chicago Police Training Academy noting that “[i]n the early
1980s, the curriculum underwent further change. Training time was increased from 8-9 hours
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skills on the job rather than from formal training.171 Most of police officer’s time is
spent on non-crime emergencies. Yet police receive little training on health,
mediation, social work, and non-law enforcement emergent situations. 172 The police
myth has affected police training most dramatically. If it became clear that police
function only marginally involves crime, police might receive training that is more
narrowly tailored to their daily functions.
Given the tiny fraction of time police spend dealing with crime, the empirics
on crime solving in Part II may not come as a surprise. It is also clear that although
police and the public strongly believe that a primary police function is crime control,
a closer look at the way police spend their time and their training belies this police
myth. The next section considers how to define “serious crimes” for the purposes of
judging police function in the second part of the police myth—that police solve
crimes with regularity.
3. Defining Serious Crimes
What counts as a crime? What should count as a crime?173 To avoid entering
the foray of these debates,174 this Article relies on the accepted federal definition of
to approximately 14 hours and was divided into three parts: (1) discussion of the present state
of the law; (2) discussion of departmental policy; and (3) ‘hands-on’ experience”).
171
Friedman, supra note 27, at 19 (noting “in-service” training requirements for
detectives or tactical team members); Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and
Police Misconduct, 72 GEORGE WASH. L. REV. 453, 478–81, 514–16 (2004) (attributing
significant misconduct of detectives to the on the job culture and field training where cops
are often told to “forget everything [they] learned at the police academy” because that
training was largely “irrelevant to the realities of policing, and that they will learn what they
need to know on the street”); U.S. BUREAU LAB. & STATS., Police and Detectives (Sept. 1,
2020) (outlining the requirements for police and detectives noting moderate on-the-job
training is required).
172
Reaves supra note 146, at 6 tbl.11 (The largest amount of police training time is
spent on firearms, self-defense and health and fitness and eight hours on mediation skills or
conflict management); Id. at 7 tbls. 8 & 9 (indicating that officers receive minimal training
on mental health and social work topics such as cultural diversity/human relations,
mediation/conflict management, problem solving approaches, and crimes against children).
173
Some would argue there are too many crimes. See e.g., HARVEY A. SILVERLATE,
THREE FELONIES A DAY 25 (2009) (arguing provocatively that law-abiding people are “in
the eyes of federal prosecutors” committing “three federal felonies each day”).
174
This legal definition of crime is used throughout this Article. See Ronald C. Kramer,
Defining the Concept of Crime: A Humanistic Perspective, 12 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 469,
470 (1985) (distinguishing between “social” and “legal” definitions of crime and noting the
“‘legal’ conception of crime . . . defines it as behavior in violation of the criminal law and
liable for sanctioning by criminal justice agencies under the political authority of the state”);
Ronald C. Kramer, The Debate Over the Definition of Crime: Paradigms, Value Judgments,
and Criminological Work, in ETHICS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CRIMINAL JUST. 33–58 (Frederick
Elliston & Norman E. Bowie eds., 1982) (addressing the various definitions of crime); see
also Baughman, supra note 39, at 55 (defining crime as “behavior prohibited by law and
subject to criminal sanction under political authority of the state”).
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a serious crime. It does not discuss all crimes but only focuses on serious crimes
because of the wider agreement about the role for police in addressing those major
crimes. Serious crimes in this Article include felonies of murder, rape, burglary,
robbery, aggravated assault, (grand) larceny,175 arson, and motor vehicle theft. It is
certainly important to acknowledge here a question of how much, or whether, these
crimes should be punished, but recognize at a minimum, the importance of police
involvement (or accountability at some level), given that consensus is likely greater
on this point.176 For the purposes of this Article, a “serious crime” is one of the
felonies listed above that is reported by an individual to the police. This is not the
most inclusive count of how many “serious crimes” occur since a large percentage
of serious crimes are not reported to police and this number is double what is
reported. 177 But for clarity, this Article considers the proportion of serious crimes
reported that police ultimately “solve,” acknowledging the profound ambiguity in
all terms.
4. Defining “Solve”
The next question is, how to determine whether a crime is “solved”? The
definition for “solve” used here is subject to challenge. As discussed above, it is
commonly understood that a central function of police is to solve crimes.178 What
does it mean for a crime to be “solved”? What if the victim does not cooperate to
have the perpetrator prosecuted? Such cases would lead to police not “solving” a
crime through clearance, even if they may have found the perpetrator and be
prepared to work with prosecutors.
As with the ambiguity in defining “crime,” there is similar ambiguity in
defining what it means to “solve” a crime. A simple approach is to look at
“clearance” as a proxy for solving crime. A clearance occurs when an individual is
In 2019, the “average value of property taken during larceny-thefts was $1,162 per
offense.” FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: LARCENY-THEFT, 2019 [hereinafter FBI,
LARCENY-THEFT], https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/topicpages/larceny-theft; Baughman, supra note 39, at 55 n.22 (articulating considerations about
the inclusion of larceny in analyzing major crimes). Compare FBI, LARCENY-THEFT, supra
note 175, with FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, BURGLARY, 2019,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/topic-pages/burglary
(indicating that the average dollar amount for larceny may be significantly less than for
burglary).
176
See supra note 108 for further discussion.
177
For more details on measuring the “true” rate of serious crimes that includes all
crimes that occur some of which are not reported to police, see Baughman, supra note 39
178
I acknowledge here that it is not clear to me that the key function of police is to solve
crimes. It seems quite possible that the primary function of police is amorphous, varying by
time and place. However, solving crimes is one key function, and one that the public values.
See Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct “Outside the Legitimate
Investigative Sphere”, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 617, 650 (articulating the amorphous role of the
police because “the parameters of the police officer’s role have not been set exclusively by
the legal rules, and perhaps not even principally”) (internal citation omitted).
175
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arrested and turned over to prosecution for a crime. This is the point at which, the
role of police becomes more limited. Detectives are often evaluated by clearance of
crimes,179 and clearance rates are used to judge the effectiveness of police
departments.180 Prior work has considered some of the problems with clearance
rates,181 and clearance rates are certainly not the best way to determine whether
police solve crimes. In fact, the correct determination of whether crimes are solved
is more complicated and also considers victim crime reporting, arrest, conviction
rates, and crime resolution rates.182 However, for this straightforward analysis, and
because there is no data on crime resolution without arrest or clearance, this Article
considers police solving crimes as the number of reported crimes cleared by
police.183 The next section considers the serious crime solving by police and
illustrates and defines the phenomenon of the police myth.
II. THE POLICE CRIME MYTH
The police myth is based on a two-fold belief. The first is that policing’s core
function is preventing and solving crime.184 And second is that crimes are solved by
police.185 These two assumptions together comprise the police myth.
The first aspect of the police myth is supported by the historical count in Part I
that explains how from early American policing, the function of police has included
crime solving. This role only grew from the 1960s forward as crime increased and
the role of police in preventing and solving crimes was ingrained in the public and
police psyche. The police myth is strengthened by a societal perception that police
are heroes who apprehend criminals and make people safe.186 The police myth has
179

Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 325–26 (2006).
180
SKOLNICK, supra note 52, at 149–50 (citing O. W. WILSON, POLICE PLANNING 103
(1952)) (“[John] Griffin stated that the clearance rate is the most important indication of the
efficiency of the police force as a whole. The clearance rate is also strongly endorsed as a
control measure by the leading authority on police management and professionalization,
O.W Wilson.”).
181
See infra notes 228–21.
182
Baughman, supra note 39.
183
Considering arrest would give us nearly the same results, we settle on clearance as
a more commonly used measure of police crime solving rates. See id.
184
John L. Worrall, Public Perceptions of Police Efficacy and Image: The “Fuzziness”
of Support for the Police, 24 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 47, 48 (Fall 1999) (police are charged to
protect the innocent and prevent crime).
185
In discussing “police” this Article also includes detectives who are a subset of police
that can operate somewhat independently within in police department. See supra note 30.
186
See supra note 11. Police have “superpowers” according to Paul Butler. Paul Butler,
The System is Working the Way it is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform,
104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1446 (2016); see also Don Krause & Mark Smith, Twitter as Mythmaker
in Storytelling: The Emergence of Hero Status by the Boston Police Department in the
Aftermath of the 2013 Marathon Bombing, 3(1) J. SOC. MEDIA SOC. 1, 10 (2014) (discussing
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been buoyed by modern day presidents, film makers and television directors, along
with judges and the general public.187 From Richard Nixon to Bill Clinton and
Barack Obama and Donald Trump, political leaders valorize police for fighting
crime.188 The Supreme Court, and other courts, have both praised and deferred to
police in their role as guardians of law and order and public safety.189 The shared
perception is that crime is controlled by police who capture criminals and
prosecutors who bring them to justice.190 However, as demonstrated in the
how “storytelling tweets have the potential to generate the hero archetype through the guise
of a law enforcement agency.”); Mays, supra note 8; Worrall, supra note 184, at 47 (finding
support for police due to perceptions of law enforcement’s ability to protect people and solve
crimes); Id. (public support for police is in part due to perceptions of law enforcement’s
ability to “protect people and solve crimes”).
187
NEWBURN, supra note 8 (There is a “mythology” around criminal investigation that
can be understood not only in the “glamour” of “catching criminals” that created a “good
living for thousands of authors, filmmakers and television directors, but also in terms of both
the real and the symbolic importance of successful criminal investigation in delivering one
of the key promises of the modern centralized state, on which a significant portion of its
legitimacy has rested: the promise of providing effective security of the state.”). When JFK
praised police and dedicated May 15 as National Police Week in 1963, he assumed policing
had been around since the beginning of the country, but it came a hundred years after the
country’s founding. Waxman, supra note 67. About a quarter of top television programing
involves shows about the police. MATTHEW HORACE & RON HARRIS, THE BLACK AND THE
BLUE: A COP REVEALS THE CRIMES, RACISM, AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S LAW
ENFORCEMENT xv (2018); see also VICTOR E. KAPPELER & GARY W. POTTER, THE
MYTHOLOGY OF CRIME & CRIMINAL JUSTICE 28–31 (5th ed. 2017) (discussing media role in
exaggerating public focus on crime).
188
See infra note 289.
189
See Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 15, 16
n.77 (2013) (conducting a review of 22 years of Supreme Court opinions and determining
that the Court defers to the government 80% of the time and specifically to law enforcement
55% of the time); see also Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(“The courts have respect for the intelligent law enforcement activities of the police, situated
as they are in the front line of the campaign for law and order…. Responsible police are
aware that a responsible procedure which accords to the police the latitude for intelligent law
enforcement but withholds absolute discretion is the sound approach for securing the overall
combination of law and justice that is the inspiration of a democratic society.”); see also
United States v. Cortez, 965 F.3d 827, 834 (10th Cir. 2020) (“[I]n assessing reasonable
suspicion we defer to a police officer's training and ability to discern innocent conduct from
suspicious behavior.”); Couture v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 535 F.3d 1243,
1255 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Tuggle, 284 F. App’x 218, 228 (5th Cir. 2008)
(deferring to police officers’ “seasoned judgments” to ensure safety).
190
NEWBURN, supra note 8 (“The basic message about crime given by western
democratic governments during the twentieth century was that it could be controlled by
catching criminals and processing them through this system.” “[T]he most prominent aim of
criminal investigation has generally been that of ‘bringing offenders to justice[.]’”); But see
David Garland, The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in
Contemporary Society, 36(4) BRITISH J. CRIMIN. 445, 451 (examining “the myth that the
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discussion of Part I.E.2, this assumption is false. Although the public and police
continue to believe that police function is largely crime control, the reality is that
police spend only a tiny fraction of their time dealing with crime.
The second aspect of the police myth is that crimes—particularly serious
crimes—are solved by police. Police receive more training now than ever,191 and the
technology involved in GPS tracking, fingerprint and geospatial monitoring have all
improved immensely in the last thirty years.192 Though none of these factors have
impacted the police myth. This Part conducts an independent review of national
statistics on police crime solving. It reviews reported crime rates and clearance rates
to determine whether police are solving crimes. It relies on data during a roughly
thirty-year period between the years 1990 and 2019.193 Many of the details of these
numbers or calculations are not articulated here, as they are not critical to this
discussion.194 For the purposes of this Article, a simple discussion of reported crimes
and the percentage of those that are cleared by police is sufficient.195 Reported
crimes are those where an individual files a formal report with a police station.196
Serious crimes considered here include violent crimes (murder and nonnegligent
manslaughter, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) and property crimes (burglary,

sovereign state [through policing] is capable of providing security, law and order, and crime
control”); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 110 (2001) (noting that after the 1980s, it became more common
for government reports and police commissioners to admit that they were unable to control
crime and that they could deal with the effect of it better than they could stop it; thus
demonstrating that the “myth of the penal sovereign” and its “law and order powers” were
dismantled).
191
The average number of training hours required of new officers increased by 53 hours
between 2007 and 2016. Compare Brian A. Reaves, Local Police Departments, 2007, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. 12 (Dec. 2010) (noting an average of 922 hours of total training hours for
new recruits in 2007, including 613 academy and 309 field hours), with U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
Local Police Departments: Policies and Procedures, 2016 8 (Aug. 2020) (noting an average
975 hours of total training hours for a new recruit in 2016, including 645 academy and 331
field hours).
192
FERGUSON, supra note 12.
193
See Baughman, supra note 39, at 53 (considering data from 1990-2018. See Table 1
in Appendix for how to calculate overall serious crime clearance rates). See FBI, 2019, supra
note 39 (data for 2019 was not available at time of publication of How Effective, but became
available in fall of 2020. Clearance numbers are very similar between 2018 and 2019. In
2018, the violent clearance rate was 45.5% and the property rate was 17.6%. The overall
clearance rate for serious crime – violent and property – was 21.64%. In 2019, the violent
clearance rate was 45.5% and the property rate was 17.2%. The overall serious crime
clearance rate was 21.52%).
194
Tables and graphs describing these results are available by request of the author.
195
FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: ABOUT CIUS, 2018 [hereinafter FBI, ABOUT]
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/about-cius
(indicating that arrests are also tracked).
196
After reporting to individual police departments, these crime statistics are collected
by the FBI each year in the Uniform Crime Reports. Id.
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larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson).197 Clearance rates are determined by
comparing reported crimes to police with the number of individuals arrested and
turned over to police for prosecution or cleared by exceptional means.198
Before obtaining a picture of police crime solving rates for serious crimes, it is
worth noting that a complete picture of crime is “likely bleaker” than shown by the
current statistics on major crimes.199 National crime data does not track statistics on
many serious offenses. Some of these include identity theft and credit card fraud,
sexual exploitation, human trafficking, revenge porn and child exploitation.200
Presumably, without tracking, police are worse off in solving internet crime than
traditional major crimes.201 Nonetheless, this Article fails to consider all serious
felony crimes, since so many serious crimes are not captured by national statistics.202
Given the data available, the serious crimes listed above are considered here to
establish a baseline for policing function. The next two sections define reported
crimes and clearance rates.
A. Reported Crimes
To understand police crime solving, first this Article turns to reported crimes,
which are the number of crimes reported nationally to police.203 At the outset, this
Article recognizes that about half of all serious crimes are reported to police.204 This
is largely the trend for the last thirty years. Approximately 50% of violent crimes
197

Id.
Reported crimes are used to calculate several crime metrics including arrest and
clearance rates. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: DATA DECLARATION, 2018 tbl.25
[hereinafter FBI: DATA DECLARATION].
199
Baughman, supra note 39, at 84. Although these crimes affect many individuals,
they can be difficult to solve both because they are hard to detect and because some of these
crimes are primarily enforced at the federal level.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
These offenses should be considered as unaccounted costs to victims and
communities who suffer from these crimes. Id.; Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge Porn”
Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1251, 1261–64 (2017) (harms
resulting from revenge porn); Jennifer Lynch, Identity Theft in Cyberspace: Crime Control
Methods and Their Effectiveness in Combating Phishing Attacks, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
259, 263–64 (2005) (identifying the substantial economic losses associated with identity
theft and recognizing the significant non-monetary harm associated with the offense); Daniel
J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96
TEX. L. REV. 737, 756 (2018) (considering the various harms caused by data breaches); Chris
Jay Hoofnagle, Identity Theft: Making the Known Unknowns Known, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
97, 102–03 (2007) (identifying reputational harm and emotional distress because of identity
theft).
203
Although conviction rates and crime resolution rates are also critical to determining
police effectiveness to stick with conventional measurements of police, we examine these
two measures. See Baughman, supra note39, at 74.
204
This is an estimate comparing NCVS and UCR numbers. See id. at 104 n. 293.
198
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are reported to police and between 30-40% of property crimes in a given year.205
This is not to put blame exclusively on police as individuals make the choice not to
report crimes for a variety of reasons that will be discussed below but should be
considered in this evaluation.206 It is presumed that the actual number of crimes
committed is roughly double this amount—for both violent and property crimes—
though crime reporting for property crimes is lower than violent crimes.207
Individuals refusing to report crimes to police is likely emblematic of police
disaffection and the punishment-protection paradox, as discussed in Part III.
B. Clearance Rates
Clearance rates demonstrate what percentage of crimes reported to police result
in arrest and are turned over for prosecution.208 Clearance rates are not a great
measure of police success since there is evidence that crimes with weak evidence
were routinely cleared historically, with some improvement recently.209 While there
are still likely major inaccuracies in clearance rates,210 in order to rely on a simple
metric to determine crime solving, clearance rates will suffice. For the last thirty
years, police have cleared 20% of all serious crimes, including murder, rape,
robbery, aggravated assault, theft, burglary, and motor vehicle theft.211 Clearance
205

See id. at 78.
As far as reports to police, around 1 million violent crimes and 6 million property
crimes were reported to police in 2019. FBI, 2019, supra note 39 (by 2019 there were 1.1
million violent crimes (murder, rape/sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault), 6.2 million
property crimes (larceny-theft, burglary, motor-vehicle theft, excludes arson) and total
reported crime was 7,275,783). Historically all these numbers have been higher, as crime
rates have dropped over the last thirty years. See Baughman, supra note 39, at 113 tbl.1 (1.8
million violent crimes and 12.6 million property crimes were reported in 1990. Total reported
crimes were 14,475,630); see id. at 11 tbl.2 (in 2006 reported crimes included 1.2 million
violent crimes and 8.8 million property crimes. Total crime reported was 10,092,450).
207
Baughman, supra note 39, at 78.
208
This Article relies on the FBI definition of clearance rates that also includes cases
cleared by exceptional means. See FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: CLEARANCE, 2018
(The typical method of determining the number of crimes cleared by police is using the UCR
numbers. Under the UCR, the FBI will only count an offense as cleared for statistical
purposes if it is either cleared by arrest or exceptional means). The FBI finds the percentage
of crimes cleared by arrest or exceptional means by dividing the number of offenses cleared
by the number of offenses reported. FBI, DATA DECLARATION, supra note 198.
209
Eck & Rossmo, supra note 12, at 604 (“[T]he high clearance rates early in this 58year time series could have been exaggerated and more recent clearance statistics might be
more accurate.”).
210
See supra notes 179–74 and accompanying text discussing underreporting of crime
and the difficulty of police incentives with clearance rates.
211
Baughman, supra note 39at 88–89 (noting that in 1990 the overall percent cleared
was 21.25%, in 1995 and 1998, the clearance rates were similar at 21.17%, and 21.32%. In
2004 and 2006, the overall percent cleared were 19.94%, and 19.26% respectively. In 2009
206
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rates are very similar to arrest rates—all between 20% to 25%.212 In other words,
police cleared almost as many crimes as they arrested for in most years.213 This is
certainly a revelation to most people who would have never thought that on a good
year, police solve less than a quarter of reported cases. Figure 1 breaks down the
overall clearance rate for major crimes from 1990 to 2019.214 The percentage of
major crimes where police clear a crime has not changed overall, though individual
crimes fluctuate over the years.215

Figure 1 - Serious Crimes Cleared by Police, 1990 - 2019
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it was 22.04% and 2014 was 23.61%. The overall clearance rate, comparing total crimes
reported to police with clearance rates in 2018 is 21.64%, meaning 78.36% of crimes are not
cleared). In 2019, the percent cleared was 21.5%. See FBI, 2019, supra note 39 (see
Baughman, supra note 39, at 113n.16 for how to calculate).
212
Overall, arrest rates in the last thirty years range from a low of 16% in 1990 to about
20-25% in most years. Baughman, supra note 39, at 85–86 (noting that in 1990, police
arrested individuals for 15.98% of all reported crimes. For 1995 and 1998, the total percent
arrested went up to 24.49%, and 25.72%, respectively. In 2004 it was 21.98% and 2006 was
21.16%. In 2009, the total percent arrested went up slightly to 24.52%, and in 2014 it was
23.76%. In 2018, the total percent arrested was 21.55%). FBI, 2019, supra note 39, at tbl.29
(in 2019 the total percent arrest was 21.46%. See Baughman, supra note39, at 113n.7 for
how to calculate). In 1990, police arrested individuals for 15.98% of all reported crimes. For
1995 and 1998, the total percent arrested went up to 24.49%, and 25.72%, respectively. In
2004 it was 21.98% and 2006 was 21.16%. In 2009, the total percent arrested went up slightly
to 24.52%, and in 2014 it was 23.76%. In 2018, the total percent arrested was 21.55%). Id.
(in 2019 the total percent arrest was 21.46%. See Baughman, supra note 39, at 113n.7 for
how to calculate).
213
“This could be due to misreported “clearance” due to improper definitions,
misrepresentation or faulty counting.” Baughman, supra note 39, at 89 n.212.
214
Id. at 88–89. Total percent cleared is made up of the clearance rates of major crimes.
Those crimes are murder and non-negligent manslaughter, rape/sexual assault, robbery,
aggravated assault, larceny-theft, burglary, and motor vehicle theft. FBI, 2019, supra note
39 (21.52% for 2019. See Baughman, supra note 39, at 113 n.16 for how to calculate).
215
The most serious crime, murder, has a higher clearance rate – usually above 60% –
and other far more common serious crimes, like motor vehicle theft and larceny, have
extremely low rates, between 10% and 20%. Baughman, supra note 39, at 88–89.
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The next section puts the data on police reporting and clearance rates into
context of the police myth.
C. Understanding the Police Myth
The police myth is in part the societal belief that police solve crimes. However,
in the classic sense of apprehending criminal defendants, police are failing—both in
apprehending a large percentage of defendants but also in improving their ability to
apprehend felony defendants over the last thirty years. Most individuals who commit
serious offenses are never held accountable for the crimes they commit, and the
majority of people who endure such crimes suffer with no state rejoinder or
restitution. I recount clearance rates over time with some caution as I realize that
clearance rates are not the entire story by any stretch and that the nature of crime
and crime categories have changed over the time period I am reporting.216 This
Article does not argue that police should arrest felony perpetrators in larger
quantities, though this option is considered below. It simply makes the point that
public and police perceptions are not met by the empirical realities of police
reporting, clearance, and conviction data. This is not to say that because police are
not arresting defendants, they are not preventing crime—and thus succeeding in one
aspect of their crime control function.217 Though for any successful policing theory,
the police myth must be accounted for by scholars grappling with the reality of
police failure to solve crimes. This Article does not dispel the police myth in support
of an instrumental argument that police are capable of solving most serious crimes,
but simply aims to inform a more accurate consideration of the police function.
Ultimately this Article seeks to understand the police function to inform both
instrumental and theoretical discussions of policing.
A fundamental error of the police myth is the societal belief that if a serious
crime occurs, the police will likely solve it.218 This second aspect of the police
216

I appreciate Rachel Harmon for helping me finetune this consideration and for
pointing out that homicides shifting from domestic to gang homicides have complicated
solving crimes and police success.
217
Research is clear that police presence certainly has an effect in preventing crime,
particularly property crime. Jonathan Klick & Alexander Tabarrok, Using Terror Alert
Levels to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime, 48 J. L. & ECON. 267, 277 (2005) (finding
“that an increase in police presence of about 50 percent leads to a statistically and
economically significant decrease in the level of crime on the order of 15 percent”); But see
John M. MacDonald et al., The Effect of Private Police on Crime: Evidence from a
Geographic Regression Discontinuity Design, 179 J. R. STATIST. SOC. A (PART 3) 831, 844
(2016) (clarifying that it is not clear whether private security guards who lack the authority
to make arrests would have a similar deterrence effect). To what extent policing deters crime
is another topic on which the research is not entirely clear.
218
In some areas of the law, advocacy in recent years has focused on this issue. For
instance, there is growing public recognition of police failure to solve sexual assault and
domestic violence cases. See, e.g., Valeriya Safronova & Rebecca Halleck, These Rape
Victims Had to Sue to Get the Police to Investigate, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2019)
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myth—that police are solving serious crime—is relatively straight forward to dispel
with data. Police are not solving a large proportion of major crimes.219 As discussed
above, the crime solving rate for police is around 20% for all crimes for the last
thirty years.220 While for some categories, like murder, the clearance rates are around
60%,221 for all other major categories of crimes, the results are far lower, often less
than 25%.222 Police only clear a small fraction of the crimes that affect the most
citizens – larceny, motor vehicle theft, burglary – between 10 and 20%.223 This is
not to suggest that police should focus on minor crimes; of course we want police
primarily focused on serious crimes. Nor do these broad statistics take into account
that clearance disparities in minority communities tend to be worse than in other
neighborhoods. What is not considered in these numbers is that police never find out
about half of all serious crimes, as they remain unreported.224 In most of what they
do learn of, they never clear the case (only about 20% of the time).225 Very few cases
that are cleared result in convictions, close to only 4%.226 Figure 2 illustrates the
overall crime reporting, clearance, and conviction numbers for a broader perspective
of serious crimes.227
(recognizing a number of lawsuits filed to attempt to force police to investigate sexual
assault cases).
219
Baughman, supra note 39, at 88–89.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 88–89 n.204–210.
222
Id.
223
FBI, 2019, supra note 39. In 2019, Larceny-theft, Motor-Vehicle Theft, and
Burglary were cleared 18.40%, 13.80%, and 14.10% of the time respectively. About seven
times as many individuals experience property crimes, such as burglary, larceny, and motor
vehicle theft, as violent crimes. See supra notes 104–105.
224
Baughman, supra note 39 at 98. Percentage was calculated taking FBI Number of
Offenses Reported / NCVS Number Known = “Individual Reports a Crime.”. See FBI, 2019,
supra note 39; RACHEL E. MORGAN & JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS.,
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2019 3–4 tbl.1&2
(2020).
225
Baughman, supra note 39, at 88–89; see also FBI, 2019, supra note 39.
226
Baughman, supra note 39, at 115 tbl.2. Percentage was calculated taking the Number
Convicted / FBI Number of Offenses Reported = “Arrested Person is Convicted.” See SEAN
ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS,
2006 3 tbl.1.1 (2009) (used for state conviction data); BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., FED. JUST.
STATISTICS, 2006 22 tbl.4.2 (2009) (used for federal conviction data; number convicted is
calculated by adding together state and federal conviction data).
227
See supra notes 224–16.
Crime Reporting: Baughman, supra note 39, at 98. Percentage was calculated taking:
FBI Number of Offenses Reported / NCVS Number Known = “Individual Reports a Crime.”
See FBI, 2019, supra note 39; MORGAN & TRUMAN, supra note 223.
Clearance: Baughman, supra note 39, at 88–89; see also FBI, 2019, supra note 39.
Conviction: Baughman, supra note 39, at 115 tbl.2. Percentage was calculated taking
the Number Convicted / FBI Number of Offenses Reported = “Arrested Person is
Convicted.” See ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supra note 226; BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., supra note
226.
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Figure 2 - Reporting, Clearance, and Conviction of Serious
Crimes
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Figure 2 demonstrates that most serious crimes are not solved by police
clearance,228 or result in conviction if they are reported in the first place.229 In
considering conviction rates, there is a failure to address roughly 85% of violent
crimes and 97% of property crimes.230 While there are many explanatory and likely
confounding explanations of this data, what we do know is that most reported serious
crimes are not solved. And while the public expects police to solve crimes, police
have not improved at solving crimes even with crime rates having gone down. Over
the last thirty years, fewer than half of most serious crimes have been reported to
police, fewer than 20% have resulted in an arrest or clearance, and fewer than 4%
have ended in a conviction.231 Thus, dispelling the police myth, police apprehend
very few of the individuals who commit crimes.
The public and police perception is that police solve crime, though it is not a
part of the scholarly or public policy discussion.232 Is it simply that the public expects
police to prevent crimes, but recognizes that they are not able to solve them? The
228

Baughman, supra note 39, at 89.
Id. at 81.
230
Id. at 115 tbl.2 (calculated taking the number convicted of violent crimes –
murder/non-negligent manslaughter, rape/sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault –
divided by the number reported for those same offenses. That gives the percent convicted.
Next, take the percent convicted and subtract from 100% to get the percent not convicted.
Repeat the same process for property crimes – larceny-theft, burglary, motor-vehicle theft.)
Convicted of Violent Crimes = 186,630; Reported Violent Crimes = 1,240,985. 186,630 /
1,240,985 = 15.04%, Percent Convicted of Violent Crimes. 100% - 15.04% = 84.96%
Percent NOT Convicted of Violent Crimes. Convicted of Property Crimes = 226,396;
Reported Property Crimes = 8,851,465. 226,396 / 8,851,465 = 2.56%, Percent Convicted of
Property Crimes. 100% - 2.56% = 97.44% Percent NOT Convicted of Property Crimes.
231
When considering the number of unreported crimes, the percentage reported to
police is about half of all crimes, and arrest and clearance rates are at 10% and there is an
overall conviction rate for major crimes at 2%. Baughman, supra note 39, at 115 tbl.2
(identifying true clearance and conviction rates which take into account unreported crimes).
Unreported crimes are also referred to as the “dark figure of crime” that considers the
limitations of police reports. SKOLNICK, supra note 52, at 247; see also Joseph G. Weis,
Crime Statistics: Reporting Systems and Methods, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUST.,
VOL. 1 378–91 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
232
See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
229
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empirics certainly belie this possibility, and the scholarly and public policy
discussion is not there.
The police myth remains a “myth” because the general discussion of policing
has largely ignored the police failure to solve crimes. Prior policing literature has
tackled clearance rates,233 unresolved crime in minority communities,234 and
demonstrated the lack of crime reporting among people of color.235 But there is very
little focus on the perpetually low rate of clearance or conviction for crimes
nationally.236 For instance, in the future goals and goals for the last twenty years of
233

See e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91 NW. UNIV. L.
REV. 278, 294 (1996–1997) (discussing issues with previous clearance rate research); Cassell
& Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops?, supra note 92, at 706–08; Handcuffing the Cops?,
supra note 92 1063–66 (using data to argue that “crime clearance rates fell sharply all over
the country immediately after Miranda and have remained at these lower levels ever since”);
Hyunseok Jang et al., Effect of Broken Windows Enforcement on Clearance Rates, 36 J.
CRIM. JUST. 529, 536 (2008) (examining broken windows enforcement and clearance rates
across different types of crime); Charles Wellford & James Cronin, Clearing up Homicide
Clearance Rates, 243 NAT'L INST. JUST. J. 2, 6 (2000) (examining 215 different factors to
determine their relationship with clearance rates in homicide cases); Graham C. Ousey &
Matthew R. Lee, To Know the Unknown: The Decline in Homicide Clearance Rates, 1980–
2000, 35 CRIM JUST. REV. 141, 153 (2010) (finding that “measures of change in the broader
socioeconomic and demographic structure of a city and changes in measures of drug market
arrests are significantly related to changes in homicide clearance rates”).
234
See generally JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA
(2015) (describing that a failure of police to solve black homicide has led to increased
endemic violence); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Criminal Justice and the Mattering of Lives, 116
MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1154 (2018) (explaining that “race-based underenforcement” has led to
a lower clearance rate for homicides involving a black victim than homicides involving a
white victim).
235
Supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Abraham Goldstein, Defining the
Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 MISS. L. REV. 515 (1982) (arguing that
underreporting is substantially based on victims’ perceived or actual separation from the
criminal justice process); Paul Marcus & Tara L. McMahon, Limiting Disclosure of Rape
Victims’ Identities, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1020, 1030 (1991) (arguing that underreporting of
rape and sexual assault is often due to the additional invasion of privacy that victims
experience after reporting the crime); Robinson & Darley, supra note 53, at tbl.1.
236
While very few commentators have noticed low crime solving, German Lopez noted
bleakly in 2017, “[i]f you murder someone in America, there’s a nearly 40 percent chance
you’ll get away with it.” German Lopez, There’s a Nearly 40 Percent Chance You’ll Get
Away with Murder in America, VOX (Sept. 24, 2018). See also Anthony Williams, Police
Aren’t Getting Better at Solving Murders: Why is the Clearance Rate in U.S. Cities so Low?,
CITYLAB (June 26, 2017, 10:29 AM) (Anthony Williams the former mayor of Washington
D.C. laments that U.S. law enforcement is the worst in the Western world at solving crimes
and cites clearance rate statistics like one-eighth of burglaries leading to arrest, or only one
third for rape, and two thirds for murder); Martin Kaste, Open Cases: Why One-Third of
Murders In America Go Unresolved, NPR (Mar. 30, 2015, 5:04 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2015/03/30/395069137/open-cases-why-one-third-of-murders-inamerica-go-unresolved (“[i]f you’re murdered in America, there’s a 1 in 3 chance that the
police won’t identify your killer”).
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the police foundation, improving the proportion of crimes solved is not
mentioned.237 The closest reference to the lack of crime solving is reference to a
crime “funnel.”238 The idea of a crime funnel is that many crimes enter at the outset
with a police report and very few are resolved with a defendant being arrested, then
convicted, then imprisoned.239 The lack of crimes solved has not been connected to
policing theory, training or function on any coordinated level.
There is also a growing field of scholarship dedicated to addressing the rights
of victims of crime.240 But this growing victims’ rights movement has not addressed
the police myth in any way. It has not addressed low clearance or conviction rates at
all, or the large group of individuals affected by unsolved crimes.241 The largest
group of victims of crime are those who never reach the police to get help—almost
237

See National Police Foundation: Recent History, POLICE FOUNDATION,
https://www.policefoundation.org/about-the-police-foundation/history/recent-history/ (last
visited Jan. 7, 2021).
238
For an especially thorough example of a crime funnel see ELISE HANSELL ET AL.,
THE CRIME FUNNEL, ROSE INSTITUTE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOV. (2016); Robinson &
Darley, supra note 53, at tbl. 1.
239
LYNN ADDINGTON, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
AND KEY CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA USERS, DEP’T OF JUST. L. & SOC. 2 (2008) (“Most of us
are familiar with elaborate diagrams of the criminal justice “funnel” depicting the channeling
of crimes through the criminal justice system. But when numbers are attached to the diagram,
it becomes clear that this is more of a sieve than a funnel. About 8 to 10 million felonies are
reported to the police each year, and the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) tells
us that about as many go unreported.”). For discussion of criminal accountability and a full
crime funnel that traces even more crimes from victim report to imprisonment, see
Baughman, supra note 39.
240
See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Meg Garvin, Protecting Crime Victims in State Constitutions:
The Example of the New Marsy’s Law for Florida, 110 J. C RIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99
(1999). See generally DOUGLAS E. BELOOF ET AL., VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3–43
(4th ed. 2018) (discussing modern victims’ rights movement).
241
The victims’ rights movement is focused specifically on the rights of victims and
the way in which they interact with the criminal justice system, rather than with the failure
of police to solve crimes for victims. See generally, Douglas E. Beloof, Constitutions
Implications of Victims as Participants, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 282 (2003) (discussing
Constitutional complexities implicated when victims are granted rights during criminal
trials); Jayne W. Barnard, Allocution for Victims of Economic Crimes, 77 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 39, 74 (2001) (addressing the challenges faced when involving victims of economic
crimes in restitution decisions); Susan Bandes, Victim Standing, UTAH L. REV. 331 (1999)
(analyzing the complex role of victims in adversarial criminal proceedings); Josephine
Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 117 (1984) (advocating for a
more active role for victims in criminal trials); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s
Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1985) (examining the role of victim’s rights procedures in the
criminal process and their potential impact on crime prevention and other goals); Douglas E.
Beloof, Weighing Crime Victims’ Interests in Judicially Crafted Criminal Procedure, 56
CATH. U. L. REV. 1135 (2007) (detailing the incorporation of victim’s rights into the judicial
process); Paul G. Cassell Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims’
Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479 (same).
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double for some serious crimes. With reported serious crimes in 2019, the number
of victims whose cases were never cleared was 5,709,766 victims (around 78.5%).242
Yet the victims’ rights scholarship has never focused on the lack of crime solving,
and the majority of the legal policing literature focuses on the issues arising from
the small number of cases in which a crime victim is brought through the justice
system.243 Likewise, the media has paid little attention to police crime solving as
compared to other criminal justice topics. For instance, in the last ten years, there
have been 56,000 articles in international newspapers discussing mass incarceration
and only 60 articles discussing police clearance rates.244 There seems to be a
disconnect between how the lack of crime solving might affect society, or
policing.245 Thus, the persistence of the police myth has not only misled public
perception but has had other important impacts discussed in the next section.
III. IMPACTS OF POLICE MYTHOLOGY
This Article does not attempt to pinpoint exactly when the police myth came to
fruition or why it exists. What is clear is that at some point Americans started to
firmly believe that core police function comprised crime control, and that police
solved serious crimes. This police mythology grew over time with the help of media
and public figures, ignoring many years of empirical data that contradict
assumptions that police largely focus on crime and generally solve it. Police have
242

See Baughman, supra note 39, at 116 tbl.3; FBI, 2019, supra note 39 (7,275,783 (#
reported) – 1,566,017 (# cleared) = 5,709,766 (estimated # of victims who received no
resolution OR # not cleared)); 5,709,766 (# not cleared) / 7,275,783(# reported) = 78.5%
(estimated percent not cleared). For a more complete picture, note that by using the estimated
number of known crimes (NCVS plus FBI number for murder/non-negligent manslaughter)
there were 14,845,545 known crimes in 2019, meaning reported and unreported, in the US.
Using that number, the percent of victims with a resolution would be: 1,566,017(# cleared)
/ 14,845,545 (# of known crimes) = 10.5% (victims WITH a resolution). Victims without a
resolution: 100% - 10.5% = 89.5% (victims without a resolution, considering known crimes).
243
Often the Victim’s Rights literature is focused on rights relevant after charging,
including trial rights and sentencing rights. See Margaret Garvin & Douglas E. Beloof, Crime
Victim Agency: Independent Lawyers for Sexual Assault Victims, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 67
(2015) (presenting a case for victim’s rights such as right to counsel, right to a speedy trial,
right to discovery, right to make a victim impact statement before trial and a right to be
informed of release or probation).
244
Figures are based on an international search of all newspapers worldwide in LexisNexis from Sept. 2010 to Sept. 2020 exact phrase search: “overcrowded jail” - Worldwide:
2758 U.S.: 1667; “overcrowded prison” - Worldwide: 5065 U.S.: 2502; “mass incarceration”
- Worldwide: 56,107 U.S.: 47,167; “police clearance” - Worldwide: 7942 U.S.: 581; “crime
clearance rate” - Worldwide: 316 U.S.: 155; “police clearance rate” - Worldwide: 60 U.S.:
29. Certainly this search is not conclusive and likely missed articles, but the broader point
likely stands.
245
Alice Speri, Police Make More Than 10 Million Arrests a Year, but That Doesn’t
Mean They’re Solving Crimes, THE INTERCEPT (Jan. 31 2019, 10:32 AM) (“[A]ggressive
enforcement [by police] doesn’t seem to do much to improve public safety or solve crime.”)
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not improved at investigating and solving crimes for at least the last eighty years.246
This is not to say that police have not been anxiously engaged in productive public
work. Or that police have not improved in prevention of crimes, as crime has
dropped, and some evidence demonstrates that police could have contributed to a
national drop in crime.247 Police have historically always helped fulfill a broad swath
of public order functions—health, welfare and transportation—while at the same
time being asked to prevent and solve serious crimes. On top of all of these public
order functions, there are thousands of minor criminal offenses and a growing
criminal code that police are charged to enforce.248 Though this Article does not
focus on explaining the cause of the police mythology, perhaps there is an
unrecognized tradeoff with police focusing on public service and arresting mostly
for minor crimes, leaving little time to solve serious crimes. Regardless of the causes
of the police myth, the consequences are important to dissect. First, police function
is obfuscated. Second, the police myth is a major cause of police disaffection. And
finally, due to complex interconnected issues, the police myth creates a punishmentprotection paradox. These three impacts are discussed respectively in Part III.A, B
and C.
A. Obfuscation of Police Function
The police myth leads to an obfuscation of police role and an imparity between
expectations and reality for crime control. Police are charged with solving crimes,
but their actual function is much broader and more diffuse—and most of their focus
is not on solving crimes. The public misunderstanding of policing and a mismatch
between training, time spent, and expectations remains a problem in eliminating the
false assumption that police solve crimes. Police have historically always had a

246

See supra note 39 (finding that clearance rates since the 1940s have been below
30%, and most recently around 20% overall for serious crimes).
247
Baughman, supra note 39, at 103, 103 n.292 (confirming “that crime has decreased
in America in the last thirty years” and positing that “[t]his could mean that police are more
effective at preventing crime than solving crime, but more study is necessary on this issue”);
Baughman & Wright, supra note 118, at 24 (noting “the sharp decline in police arrests” in
“the last ten to fifteen years”); William J. Bratton, Crime is Down in New York City: Blame
the Police, in POLICING: KEY READINGS 480 (Tim Newburn ed., 2005) (crediting “better,
smarter and more assertive policing” for a crime decrease in New York City); Weisburd,
supra note 11, at 670 (“twenty of twenty-five tests of hot spot[] policing show positive
statistically significant findings” of crime prevention).
248
Baughman & Wright, supra note 118, at 5 (“in most states criminal statutes are
numerous and there are often more than enough options for criminal charging in every area”);
Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1071,
1105 (2017) (“The legislature . . . has continued to increase mandatory minimums in
sentencing and provide an aggressive federal criminal code to give prosecutors more tools to
use against criminal defendants.”).
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multifaceted public role, that policing theory and the public have failed to
recognize.249
Police were borne, in part, out of a desire to control crime. Historically, the
power delegated to police by the state has involved “public order” which includes
preventing and addressing crime. Police core function—according to police and the
public—in the last fifty years been to prevent crime, reduce crime, and apprehend
criminals. As Paul Butler states, “[t]he first responsibility of the state is to protect its
citizens. When people suffer harm from other individuals, the state is now failing
that responsibility.”250 However, as this Article has made clear, at least in the last
fifty years, police have not fulfilled this function. Though because the expectation
is there, particularly among police themselves, the police myth leads police to hide
the rate at which they are solving crimes. It is commonly known by clearance rate
scholars that police departments underreport and misclassify crimes or focus on
making minor arrests to pad arrest rates.251
Another potential obfuscation resulting from the police myth has been that
police have increased drug arrests in order to satisfy the public that they are solving
crimes, when police have not improved at solving any serious crimes. Some
evidence shows that police focus on increasing arrest numbers, no matter how minor,
in an effort to demonstrate productivity.252 While transparency is lacking in this area,
there are high profile examples of departments where police can only be promoted
if they are compliant in increasing arrests and in applying fines.253 When police are
encouraged to arrest in order to demonstrate productivity, the incentive becomes

249

The public believes they understand what police do, but police overwhelmingly
believe that the public does not actually understand what policing entails. Indeed 83% of
Americans say they understand the risks and challenges of police work. Morin et al., supra
note 133. But 86% of the police say the public does not fully comprehend the trials that
officers face. Id. For instance, 83% of Americans believe that typical police officers fire their
service weapon while on duty at least once in their career; when only 27% of police say they
have ever fired their service weapon. Id.
250
“Because, again, most people who suffered harm aren’t going to the state for a
response.” The Crime Story Podcast with Kary Antholis, Interview: Paul Butler, on the
Prison Abolition Movement, CRIME STORY (July 21, 2020); see also George CiccarielloMaher, Opinion, Police Departments Are Broken. Is It Time to Abolish Them All Together?,
PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 2, 2020, 10:41 AM) (opposing defunding police and noting that
“[o]nce we do the math, we see that the police only “protect and serve” a small minority of the
population, but this is nothing new.”).
251
Baughman, supra note 39, at 62–63 (citing “intense pressure in certain police
departments to pad or even falsify clearance numbers,” such as in New Orleans, Tulare,
Biscayne Park, Los Angeles, and Chicago); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 32, at
279–80 (noting that measuring police success through arrest rates can lead officers to be
“overly . . .aggressive in using the arrest power”).
252
HORACE & HARRIS, supra note 187, at 205 (former police chief arguing that police
are focused on keeping arrests up “because arrests are a measure of productivity”).
253
Id. at 224.
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minor crime arrests including drug arrests.254 The evidence is pretty clear that with
drug arrests, police are not reducing violent crime, or increasing public safety.255
Drug enterprises operate more like other businesses and violent crime harms
business.256 Despite the low relative danger posed by drugs as compared to violent
crime, drug arrests top the list of nationwide arrests in most years, potentially
because drug arrests are easier to use to boost arrest numbers.257 So despite the fact
that the public expects police to focus on reducing serious crime,258 police have
historically focused on drug arrests, possibly to appease the public demand for crime
solving.
An even more important contributor to police obfuscation of duty is that while
charged with crime control, police have always also acted as public servants. Indeed,
the very definition of the Constitutional “police power” encompasses so many civil
functions—health, housing, transportation—that have nothing to do with solving
crime. Although police are only a small piece of how states exercise “police power,”
the broad exercise of “police power” by states has led to a broad delegation of
authority to police. At the same time, there is a lack of transparency in what police
typically do, how often they solve crimes, and little oversight on the lack of training
they receive for the functions they perform. In this context, it makes sense that the
police continue addressing traffic problems and noise and interpersonal complaints
in people’s homes. People consider police the general number to call when anything
254

See Shima Baradaran Baughman, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 276
(2015) (noting the increase in drug arrests from 1995–2012); see also ALEXANDRA
NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM
TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL 2 (2018) (most arrests are
misdemeanor arrests nationally); McLeod, supra note 1, at 1633 (hoping to eliminate low
level criminal enforcement).
255
Baughman, supra note 254, at 276–77 (finding that drug defendants—both
possession and trafficking—are among the least violent defendants to release before trial).
256
Indeed, the violence associated with drugs is overwhelmingly connected to a
crackdown by a department on drug crimes and those in the drug trade rarely engage in
violent crime. Id., at 234 (finding that drug defendants—both possession and trafficking—
are among the least violent defendants to release before trial).
257
See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Arrest Data Analysis Tool (last visited Dec. 16, 2020) (drug related offenses
represent the largest individual category of offenses from 2000 to 2014). Drug crimes are
consensual crimes. SKOLNICK, supra note 52, at 248.
258
MALCOM K. SPARROW, MEASURING PERFORMANCE IN A MODERN POLICE
ORGANIZATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES IN POLICING BULLETIN, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (2015)
NCJ 248476 at 2 (police are most measured by “[r]eductions in the number of serious crimes
reported, most commonly presented as local comparisons against an immediately preceding
time period”); Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Are U.S. Cities Underpoliced? Theory and
Evidence, 101 REV. ECON. & STAT. 167, 167, 184 (2018) (“Because of the extraordinary cost
of most violent crimes and the comparatively minor cost of most property crimes, from a
welfare perspective the central empirical issue . . . is not whether police affect crime, but the
extent to which police reduce violent crime, particularly murder” and arguing that we are
potentially not spending enough on policing given the returns we are receiving).
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is wrong. Some may even prefer to have police in a catchall position that responds
to various concerns, often unrelated to crime. Police help guide traffic. They disperse
crowds. They mediate family disputes and serve the elderly, deal with noise
complaints and common problems with animals. They are the front line with
mentally ill and drug addicted. They are also the major defense against crime—
preventing it as well as solving crimes that occur. There is both confusion on what
the function of police is and lack of clarity in their role. Or better yet, there is a lack
of focus or vision on what the priorities of police should be since their role is
ubiquitous as both the crime solving hero and servant of the community. And maybe,
in expecting the police to be the all-encompassing public servant wielding state
“police powers,” the public has unknowingly sacrificed the police crime control
function.
Arguably, any fault of police failure to solve crime results from obfuscation
and lack of clarity in the police role. Under the modern police function, police are
the only government actor charged with solving serious crimes. However, they are
spending most of their time with public order functions that are broader—and
arguably can be handled by other government or private actors. Police are trained to
protect and deal with criminal defendants, when most of the time, their functions
have little to do with crime. This incongruity in dual function has not been reconciled
by legal policing scholars or commentators. The lack of clarity in the police function
also results in a lack of accountability of police performance and inappropriate
training. If the job of police is to solve crimes and deal with dangerous violent
defendants, for instance, the public might expect that police are armed with military
grade weapons and trained in self-defense. However, if their duty is to patrol the
streets to randomly check in on community members, mediate family disputes, and
assist people when requested, then it might make less sense that police are armed
and ready to respond with violence. Community members might be less supportive
of officers using violence to defend themselves and others more broadly if they
understood that police are performing public service functions most of the time. In
addition, there might be a larger push for a whole different training protocol for
officers if there was an understanding that these counseling, mental health, and
conflict resolution functions are performed most often. For detectives to solve major
crimes, they need the public and patrol officers focused on helping provide
information to help them solve crimes. If police are community mediators, they need
training in counseling and deescalating violence.259 Indeed, routine social services
are not necessarily best provided by police.260 Innovation throughout the country has

259

Friedman, supra note 27, at 56.
Monica Bell points out that “routing rehabilitation and social services through the
police could perversely widen the carceral net and reify the ‘culture of control.’” Bell, supra
note 7, at 2147. In addition, there are some functions related to investigating crime, such as
crime labs, that require a different type of training than police receive and could benefit from
being separated from policing. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, AUTOPSY OF A CRIME
LAB: EXPOSING THE FLAWS IN FORENSICS (forthcoming 2021).
260
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demonstrated that first responders need not be police officers.261 At the very least,
understanding that police function is not what the public expects or what even police
expect helps us understand the impacts of the police myth. And assuredly, a deep
dive into the actual and desired functions of police, perhaps led by the community,262
is critical to any potential police reform.
B. Police Disaffection
The police myth creates police disaffection, particularly in communities with
high crime rates. While in general public confidence in police remains high,
members of communities of color are alienated from police because they have grown
used to crime and police not solving it and because they often receive poor levels of
police protection.
Confidence in police is high among whites but much lower among people of
color, particularly when it comes to confidence in crime solving. In general, public
confidence in police has remained high as police are one of the top respected public
institutions, though this confidence fell for the first time in 2020.263 A 2016 poll
found that 76% of Americans had “a great deal” of respect for their local law
261
Friedman, supra note 27, at 62–63. A solution might be a set of highly trained first
responders who have capacity to use force when necessary but have sufficient training to
respond in a variety of ways including intense mediation, social services, and solving
problems without the force of law. Id. One North Carolina police department showed that
repeat calls from “chronic problem homes” were eliminated when social workers intervened.
Id. at 56.
262
See Simonson, supra note 7.
263
Megan Brenan, Amid Pandemic, Confidence in Key U.S. Institutions Surges,
GALLUP (Aug. 12, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/317135/amid-pandemic-confidencekey-institutions-surges.aspx. (overall confidence in police falling to 47% for the first time in
27 years in 2020). A 2018 Gallup poll found that the majority of Americans have a large
amount of confidence in the police. Police were among the top three public institutions that
gained a majority level of public confidence. The average level of American confidence in
institutions since 1993 is 33%. Lydia Saad, Military, Small Business, Police Still Stir Most
Confidence, GALLUP (Jun. 28, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/236243/military-smallbusiness-police-stir-confidence.aspx [https://perma.cc/9ADF-QH3W] (“[t]he military, small
business and the police still receive high confidence ratings from a majority of Americans”).
In 2018, Gallup conducted telephone interviews with a random sample of 1,520 adults living
in the United States. Survey Method: “[T]he margin of sampling error is ±3 percentage points
at the 95% confidence level. All reported margins of sampling error include computed design
effects for weighting. Each sample of national adults includes a minimum quota of 70%
cellphone respondents and 30% landline respondents, with additional minimum quotas by
time zone within region. Landline and cellular telephone numbers are selected using randomdigit-dial methods.” Id. The question asks Americans whether they have a “great deal, quite
a lot, some or very little confidence” in fifteen different institutions. The fifteen different
institutions (in order from highest confidence from the American people to least confidence):
the military, small business, the police, the church or organized religion, the presidency, the
U.S. Supreme Court, the medical system, banks, the public schools, organized labor, big
business, newspapers, the criminal justice system, television news, and congress.
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enforcement.264 Though there is wide disparity in how Americans of different racial
backgrounds viewed police.265 A 2016 survey noted that “[w]hile 68% of white
Americans have a favorable view of the police, only 40% of African Americans and
59% of Hispanics have a favorable view.”266 People of color view police as less
legitimate and trustworthy than more wealthy, white individuals.267 Indeed,
confidence in the police has remained substantially lower for people of color.268
People of color are half has likely to believe that police can solve crimes as white
people.269 In addition to this perception of the police overall, racial disparities are
also present in whether individuals think police are doing a good job.270 Public
perception surveys seem to indicate that people of color do not have a high level of
confidence in police competency and are much more likely to realize that police are
unlikely to solve crimes.
At the heart of these disparate views on police is that people in underserved
communities—often communities of color—do not receive adequate protection
from police. They often wait longer to have police respond to calls for help,271 have
264
Justin McCarthy, Americans’ Respect for Police Surges, GALLUP (Oct. 24, 2016),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/196610/americans-respect-police-surges.aspx.
265
Emily Ekins, Policing in America: Understanding Public Attitudes Toward the
Police. Results from a National Survey, CATO INST. (Dec. 7, 2016),
https://www.cato.org/survey-reports/policing-america.
266
Id.
267
TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW 146–52 (2002) (demonstrating
the gap between black and white perceptions of procedural fairness). People with higher
incomes (over $30K) “are more likely to believe that police can solve crime.” Worrall, supra
note 184, at 57 (emphasizing that income, race, and age are all significant factors in
determining whether a person believes that police solve crimes).
268
Recent studies show that while sixty percent of white respondents express “some”
or “a lot” of confidence in police, only eighteen percent of black respondents would say the
same. Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of
Force, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RSCH. 35 (2016). Literature has also shown that African
American communities—particularly poor ones—have less trust in police than others in the
United States. See Bell, supra note 7, at 2072 (“Structural disadvantage yields a broader
cultural structure of mistrust.”).
269
Worrall, supra note 184, at 57–59 (“Race is the most pervasive predictor of
confidence in the ability of the police to solve crime[]” and urban residence compounds the
effect.); In a 2016 Pew Survey, 79% of blacks overall say there are signs of serious problems
between law enforcement and the black community. Morin et al., supra note 133.
270
One study found that while six in ten white Americans considered their local police
to be competent only four in ten African Americans agreed. Ekins, supra note 265.
271
Bell, supra note 7, at 2114 (residents of disadvantaged communities tend to receive
a slower law enforcement response); ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY,
VIOLENCE, AND THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 34 (1999) (“When called, [police] may
not respond [to inner-city communities], which is one reason many residents feel they must
be prepared to take extraordinary measures to defend themselves and their loved ones[.]”).
See also Rod K. Brunson, Opinion, Protests Focus on Over-Policing. But Under-Policing is
Also Deadly., WASH. POST (June 12, 2020) (“Residents of distressed urban neighborhoods
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the lowest numbers of crimes solved,272 and have inadequate protection against
crime.273 And the more crime occurs and is not solved in a particular neighborhood,
the more likely its members are to distrust police.274 Not just because of the
commonly thought reasons—police misconduct, gang violence, snitch culture, but
because these citizens have seen repeatedly that police are not there to help them.275
This is a neglected piece of the police puzzle. The fact that police are not solving
major crimes with any regularity has an impact on those who are not served. The
more unresolved crimes and victims, the more these communities suffer from police
disaffection.276 If community members believe police are listening to them, they are

have complained about ineffective policing for centuries, including officers’ . . . slow
response times[.]”).
272
LEOVY, supra note 234; Wesley Lowery et al., An Unequal Justice, WASH. POST
(July 25, 2018) (stating that “almost three-quarters” of unsolved murders in the decade prior
to 2018 were black).
273
Note that in a 2016 Pew Survey, “Blacks are significantly more likely than whites
to see their local police as mainly enforcers (39% vs. 26%)” rather than protectors. Morin et
al., supra note 133; See also LEOVY, supra note 234 (depicting the “oppressive and
inadequate” criminal justice system); Bell, supra note 7, at 2117 (“[S]everal forces
converged in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s that shifted the problem from one of utter neglect
to the current problem of overpolicing and underprotection.”); Brunson, supra note 271
(“[U]nder-policing also leaves residents feeling perpetually underserved and unsafe.
Residents of distressed urban neighborhoods have complained about ineffective policing for
centuries[.]”).
274
See Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People
Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 263 (2008)
(considering trust as one facet of police legitimacy and “demonstrating that people are more
cooperative with the police when they believe that police performance in fighting crime is
more effective”). But see Meares, supra note 17, at 1363–64, 1366 n.58 (noting that trust of
police is implicated by individuals’ personal interactions with police and solving crime alone
does not create trust; a strong focus on crime reduction can lead to “overly aggressive law
enforcement strategies [that] can . . . do lasting damage to public trust”). Ineffective policing
seems to breed further inefficiency. Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 14 (examining procedural
justice and the role of community perception).
275
See e.g. WEBSTER & WILLIAMS, supra note 13 (discussing the need for “a profound
change in the relationship between the police department and the communities” and arguing
for reform wherein “[t]he police department must become involved in a working partnership
with the people . . . .”); Coates, supra note 55. See e.g. WEBSTER & WILLIAMS, supra note
13 (discussing the need for “a profound change in the relationship between the police
department and the communities” and arguing for reform wherein “[t]he police department
must become involved in a working partnership with the people . . . .”); Coates, supra note
55; Akbar, supra note 15, at 133 (noting that policing in the twentieth century was shaped
by “the longer arc of enslavement, Jim Crow, and settler colonialism”).
276
See supra notes 43–45, 47 and accompanying text; infra notes 280–75, 286–80 and
accompanying text.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3797945

CRIME AND THE MYTHOLOGY OF POLICE

59

more likely to cooperate with police, which would improve crime solving,277 as the
public are the most likely group to solve crimes.278
The causes of the lack of confidence in police are likely varied. Many scholars
have documented distrustful and tense relationships between blacks and law
enforcement over the last fifty years, and beyond.279 One contributor to disaffection
with police is procedural injustice—or being unfairly treated by police.280 People
also fail to report to police because of poor treatment by police in the reporting
process.281 It is difficult to disentangle the tension and disaffection of people of color
and police to determine the causes and effects. However, a part of this equation is
likely the police myth which results in people of color suffering disproportionately
as victims of unresolved serious crime. Certainly, communities of color are
responding rationally to police failure to solve crimes. Police are less likely to solve
serious crimes in communities of color, therefore these communities have less
confidence that the police will solve such crimes. The public perception surveys in
this context mirror reality. And one study demonstrates that public views of police
are directly linked with how effectively officers solve crime and how well police

277
Frank Rudy Cooper, Cop Fragility and Blue Lives Matter, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 621,
622 (2020) (suggesting that police hold “mediated listening sessions” to build trust in police
since “racial minority communities will only give police the cooperation they need if they
perceive the police to be listening to them.”). As one community resident who lost a son to
violence stated, the way forward needs to include building better relationships with police.
“If they’re right, we work with them.’” Julie Wernau & Erin Ailworth, Push to Defund the
Police Faces Headwinds in Some Poor, Black Neighborhoods, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 21, 2020
7:55 AM ET).
278
See Eck & Rossmo, supra note 12 for discussion.
279
John Hagan & Celesta Albonetti, Race, Class, and the Perception of Criminal
Injustice in America, 88 AM. J. SOC. 329, 343 (1982) (analyzing the impact of race on the
perception of criminal justice through regression analysis and finding that race plays a
“persistent and often striking influence” particularly with police and perception of bias by
courts); Bell, supra note 7, at 2126, 2128, 2139 (suggesting that tense relationships can be
addressed by addressing concentrated poverty racial inequality partly through suing local
police for patterns of violating constitutional rights).
280
See TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3 (1990) (introducing the concept
of procedural justice which is concerned with police legitimacy and authority); Bell, supra
note 7, at 2104 (watching others be treated poorly by police can lead to vicarious
marginalization, indeed partners of formerly incarcerated men are less likely to vote and a
study that shows that other behaviors and world views change when a partner is
incarcerated).
281
“I live in a major, highly integrated urban area with a miserable police force. I’m a
college educated, financially secure, middle-aged white male. I DO NOT REPORT CRIMES
to the police. Trying to report a crime is a horrible experience where you’re made to feel like
you’re a criminal yourself. . . . That’s why crimes are not reported. There’s no point. And as
my Black friends say, calling the cops always makes things worse..” Ed Brown, Comment
to Shima Baughman, Police Solve Just 2% of All Major Crimes, THE CONVERSATION (Aug.
20, 2020, 8:18 AM EDT), https://theconversation.com/police-solve-just-2-of-all-majorcrimes-143878.
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interact with the public.282 According to policing scholars Tom Tyler and Jeff Fagan,
public perceptions of police are positive “when the public views the police as
effective in controlling crime and maintaining social order.”283 Monica Bell also
explains that structural exclusion has resulted in the black community due to
receiving lower quality policing.284 Distrust and disaffection have gone hand in hand
as a result of the police myth in communities of color.
With the notable exceptions above, the legal academy has failed to appreciate
that certain communities have been talking about the police myth for some time.
Indeed, communities of color suffer most acutely since crime solving is lowest in
those populations.285 Public Enemy’s, “911 is a Joke” rap from 1990 quite literally
complains that the police “only come when they wanna” or “don’t come at all.”286
Indeed, the lack of crime solving has led to profound disengagement with the police
and any notion that the police have or ever will serve and protect Black people.287
282

Kristina Murphy & Julie Barkworth, Victim Willingness to Report Crime to Police:
Does Procedural Justice or Outcome Matter Most?, 9 VICTIM & OFFENDERS: AN INT’L J. OF
EVIDENCE-BASED RSCH., POL’Y & PRAC. 178, 194, 198 (2014) (finding that for some victims,
“whether the police are seen to be effective in dealing with crime plays a more dominant
role” when deciding whether or not to report future crime).
283
Tyler & Fagan, supra note 274, at 267.
284
Bell, supra note 7, at 2114 (explaining that structural exclusion involves “policies
that may appear facially race- and class-neutral distribute policing resources so that African
Americans and residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods tend to receive lower-quality
policing than whites” and a slower response); see ANDERSON, supra note 271 (noting the
failure of police to respond and “the profound sense of alienation from mainstream society
and its institutions felt by many poor inner-city black people”); see also Nirej S. Sekhon,
Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 1171 (2012) (discussing the unchecked
discretion of police departments that results in the paradox of under-policing and underprotecting racially and socioeconomically marginalized communities while over-enforcing
in those same communities).
285
LEOVY, supra note 234 (noting the disproportionate failure of the criminal justice
system to solve black homicide). However, broken windows policing created federal
incentives to police urban high-crime neighborhoods. Bell, supra note 7, at 2117–18 (“Yet
several forces converged in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s that shifted the problem from one
of utter neglect to the current problem of overpolicing and underprotection.”); see also
Brunson, supra note 271 (“But a great deal of scholarship has demonstrated that underpolicing also leaves residents feeling perpetually underserved and unsafe. Residents of
distressed urban neighborhoods have complained about ineffective policing for centuries,
including officers’ rudeness, slow response times and lack of empathy for crime victims.”).
286
“Going, going, gone / Now I dialed 911 a long time ago / Don't you see how late
they're reacting / They only come and they come when they wanna / So get the morgue truck
and embalm the goner / They don't care cause they stay paid anyway / They treat you like an
ace they can't be betrayed” PUBLIC ENEMY, 911 IS A JOKE (Def Jam Recordings 1990).
287
Cassell, supra note 49, at 52–53 (discussing delegitimization of police and noting
“changes in public perceptions of police” that recognize a systemic problem of “police
killings of African-American men” and decreasing confidence in police); see Brunson, supra
note 271 (“Some residents of high-crime neighborhoods have long concluded that police are
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According to a DOJ Study, those victimized by crime are significantly less likely to
approve of police.288 The results of disaffection with police is a self-perpetuating
cycle of nonreporting—indeed as police solve less crime, individuals are less likely
to turn to police which creates a problematic cycle.289 When individuals are not held
accountable for crimes, this can lead to a lack of public security and can threaten
law and order.290
The problem with police disaffection is that it has always been a problem
among underserved communities. As discussed in Part I, the history of policing is
rife with violence, racial inequity, and a persistent inability to solve even a quarter
of major crimes. In fact, police suffered from low clearance rates from as far back
as clearance rates have been recorded. And it may actually be that police have gotten
worse at solving crimes.291 Given this reality, there is no “reform” or “restoration”
of police. In fact, America has never had an effective—crime solving—police force.
And police have never enjoyed broadscale legitimacy with minorities or disfavored
populations throughout their history. To this end, the police myth is more of a myth
among advantaged groups who may never have realized that police were not solving
serious crimes with regularity. So arguably, police have never had universal public
legitimacy and unpacking the police myth might exacerbate the problem of police
either incapable of keeping them safe or unwilling to do so”); “The inability of the criminal
legal process to deliver meaningful justice in the aftermath of severe interpersonal harm, and
its overemphasis on the enforcement of laws against conduct that ought not to be
criminalized, will not be corrected by police training or by making officers more respectful
of those they police.” McLeod, supra note 1, at 1644. See, e.g., Aamer Madhani, Unsolved
Murders: Chicago, Other Big Cities Struggle; Murder Rate a “National Disaster,” USA
TODAY (Aug. 10, 2018, 3:19 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/08/10/u-shomicide-clearance-rate-crisis/951681002/
[https://perma.cc/32WSNCX6]
(drawing
attention to the “national disaster” of unsolved murders in large cities).
288
Cheryl Maxson et al., Factors That Influence Public Opinion of the Police, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUST. 1, 6 (2003).
289
SPARROW, supra note 258, at 20–21 (arguing that not only does a focus on reducing
crime rates “produce[] too narrow a focus,” but it also “invites manipulation of statistics and
other forms of corruption”; noting the focus on reported crime overlooks broader unreported
crimes and urging police to conduct victimization surveys to better understand crime); see
Braga, supra note 15 (arguing that stronger relationships between law enforcement and the
communities they serve would result in greater access to information for police); Meares,
supra note 17 (supporting President Obama’s assertion that the most important developments
in law enforcement are greater trust and legitimacy); Kahan, supra note 17 (examining
community policing initiatives aimed at improving relationships between law enforcement
and communities); Rachel Abanonu, De-Escalating Police-Citizen Encounters, 27 S. CAL.
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 239, 241 (2018) (finding that “public awareness and education about
constitutional rights during police encounters” can lessen confrontations between police and
the public); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders, 89 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2245
(2001) (recognizing the value of community outreach in building “monitoring, compliance,
and enforcement structures with the active participation of citizens of color”).
290
SPARROW, supra note 258.
291
See supra note 39.
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disaffection. The failure of police to prevent and solve crimes—or the police myth—
is likely to play a major role in police disaffection.
C. Punishment-Protection Paradox
Another impact of the police myth is what is termed here, “the punishmentprotection paradox.” Individuals refuse to report crime because of the threat of
“punishment” from different avenues. First, it poses a threat to them to report a
crime, both with community members, because of incarceration, as well as their
potential fear of police abuse.292 The “punishment” is also a real deterrent in
reporting because when crimes are solved, they are solved by arrest or incarceration
that adds to disaffection and marginalization from the community.293 But then there
is the “protection paradox.” People in communities of color understand the police
292

Abuse is the second most common type of police misconduct. MIKKI KENDALL,
HOOD FEMINISM: NOTES FROM THE WOMEN THAT A MOVEMENT FORGOT 51–62 (2020)
(examining police perpetration of sexual assault and rape); Kanya Bennett, Say Her Name:
Recognizing Police Brutality Against Black Women, ACLU (June 14, 2018, 4:30 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/reforming-police/say-her-namerecognizing-police-brutality-against-black (“Sexual abuse is the second most reported form
of police misconduct after use of excessive force.”). Victims may fail to report “because they
do not believe that it will be responded to appropriately or that anything will be done about
it.” Baughman, supra note 39, at 77; see also Matthew Desmond et al., Police Violence and
Citizen Crime Reporting in the Black Community, 81(5) AM. SOC. REV. 857, 857 (2016)
(“High-profile cases of police violence—disproportionately experienced by black men—
may present a serious threat to public safety if they lower citizen crime reporting. Using an
interrupted time series design, this study analyzes how one of Milwaukee’s most publicized
cases of police violence against an unarmed black man, the beating of Frank Jude, affected
police-related 911 calls. Controlling for crime, prior call patterns, and several neighborhood
characteristics, we find that residents of Milwaukee’s neighborhoods, especially residents of
black neighborhoods, were far less likely to report crime after Jude’s beating was broadcast.
The effect lasted for over a year and resulted in a total net loss of approximately 22,200 calls
for service.”). For discussion of another paradox of punishment, see also Jeffery Fagan &
Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment
in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 173 (2008) (“The failure of crime rates
to decline commensurately with increases in the rate and severity of punishment reveals a
paradox of punishment: recent experiments have shown that among persons of color,
especially those who are poor or reside in poor neighborhoods, harsher punishment has
produced iatrogenic or counterdeterrent effects.”).
293
Michael Pinard, Race Decriminalization and Criminal Legal System Reform, 95
N.Y.U. L. REV. ON. 119, 120 (2020) (“It is common knowledge that Black communities have
borne the brunt of mass incarceration, mass convictions, and every other aspect of the
criminal legal system.”). But also, of all unsolved murders in the decade prior to 2018, the
vast majority (“almost three-quarters”) were black. Lowery et al., supra note 272; Heather
Mac Donald, Breakdown: The Unwinding of Law and Order in Our Cities Has Happened
with Stunning Speed, CITY J. (July 1, 2020), https://www.city-journal.org/ferguson-effectinner-cities (“So far this year, 78 percent of all homicide victims in Chicago are black, though
blacks are less than a third of the population.”).
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myth all too well. They know from experience of years of ineffective policing that
police are not typically solving crimes.294 The lack of police intervention when a
community member is a victim of serious crime is perceived as a problem of police
refusing to keep the community safe or being unable to do so. With the lack of
protection is the justified belief of underserved communities that police cannot and
will not assist them; and reporting to the police is futile. Jay, a young person in a
high crime New York neighborhood says it well. “Anything could happen to me,
and the cops, they’re not going to be there to save me.”295 And indeed studies show
that a lack of police responsiveness is related to increases in obtaining a firearm for
protection and potentially gang activity.296 Also, in the few cases police intervene,
this may result in more negative interactions and fear of police,297 which might make
people even less likely to approach police to solve crimes,298 and encourages more
self-help.299 Even when police do arrest and sometimes incarcerate members of a
community, this can create marginalization for all who are involved and an
294

Brunson, supra note 271 (raising concerns about the lack of effective policing that
“leaves residents feeling perpetually underserved and unsafe”).
295
Id. (Jay, a young person, had been shot twice and decided to carry a weapon
everywhere he went); see also JAMES FORMAN, LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 35 (2017) (recognizing “the simultaneous over- and underpolicing of crime” in African American communities); Rod K. Brunson, If the Police Weren’t
There, WASH. POST, June 14, 2020, at B1 (underpolicing leaves residents “perpetually
underserved and unsafe”); Estate of Jones v. City of Martinsburg, W. Va., 961 F.3d 661, 671
(4th Cir. 2020) (recognizing a “desperate need” for more and different policing).
296
“These data confirm that lower levels of police legitimacy are significantly related
to a higher probability of acquiring a firearm for protection. I consider the ways that gang
membership, legal changes in Chicago, and gun behaviors are related to protective gun
ownership, as well as how community policing and procedural justice can improve
perceptions of police and enhance their legitimacy, potentially reducing the incentives to
engage in violent, extralegal ‘self-help’ with a firearm.” Michael Sierra-Arévalo, Legal
Cynicism and Protective Gun Ownership Among Active Offenders in Chicago, COGENT SOC.
SCI.,
Sept.
9,
2016,
at
1,
1
https://isps.yale.edu/sites/default/files/publication/2016/09/cogentsocialsciences_2016_sier
raarevalo_legal_cynicism_and_protective_gun_ownership_among_active_offenders_in_chic
ago.pdf.
297
Many individuals in high crime communities do not feel safe around police officers
and only a small number feel that police were responsive to community concerns. See e.g.,
Nancy La Vigne et al., How Do People in High-Crime, Low-Income Communities View the
Police?
URB.
INST.
10–13
(Feb.
2017),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88476/how_do_people_in_highcrime_view_the_police.pdf (only 37.8% of residents reported feeling safe around police
officers, and just 28.3% believed that police are “responsive to community concerns”).
298
There is a racial gap in reporting between white and black people. See Baughman,
supra note 39, at 51 n.13 (identifying prior literature addressing lack of crime reporting).
299
Indeed, due to police abandonment, marginalized communities have resorted to
“self-help,” by relying on family members or friends, which can lead to an increase in
violence. Bell, supra note 7, at 2116.
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encouragement by others not to snitch and turn in a member of the community to
the police.
The major problem of the punishment-protection paradox—identified by
investigation literature—but ignored by legal policing scholars—is that the vast
majority of serious crimes are solved by the public. Without the public commitment
in underserved communities to help police solve crimes, there is a perpetuating cycle
of the punishment paradox: the less people confide in police, the fewer crimes are
solved, the more disaffection from police which furthers the inability of police to
solve crimes and gain trust through increased competency.300 With this fear and lack
of recognition of the harms of under-policing and structural marginalization of poor
communities of color, the police myth is allowed to perpetuate and individuals
continue mistrusting the police. The harms caused by not solving murders of loved
ones, rapes of daughters and sons, and burglaries of the homes of innocents are
unaccounted for. As a result, police not stopping violence in black neighborhoods
may actually increase crime.301 And overwhelmingly, despite police abuse, black
communities want policing and protection,302 as communities of color feel
devastated by crime more acutely than other communities.303 And because so many
poor communities are devastated by crime, the effects are broad and echoing.
The punishment-paradox that this Article grapples with results in the realization
that solving the police myth by making a larger percentage of arrests may not be the
300

See supra Part III.B; notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
See David Kennedy & Jon Ben-Menachem, Moving Toward an American PoliceCommunity Reconciliation Framework, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF POLICING IN THE
UNITED STATES (Tamara Rice Lave & Eric J. Miller eds., Cambridge University Press,
2019).
302
See Bell, supra note 7, at 2119–23; YOUGOV, THE ECONOMIST/YOUGOV POLL: JUNE
14–16,
2020
1500
US
ADULT
CITIZENS
44
(2020),
https://docs.cdn.yougov.com/vgqowgynze/econTabReport.pdf (indicating that 55% of
African Americans oppose abolishing the police with 23% unsure on their stance and 22%
in favor of abolishing the police); Jacob Gershman, Some States are Pushing Laws to Restrict
Police
Behavior,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Aug.
19,
2020,
5:30
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/some-states-are-pushing-laws-to-restrict-police-behavior11597829401; Wernau & Ailworth, supra note 277 (reporting that only 22% of Black
respondents supported the idea of abolishing the police, the poll found, compared with 20%
of Latinos and 12% of white respondents and “don’t see how defunding the police is going
to help anything”); Heather Gillers & Andrea Fuller, Cities Weigh Cutting Police Budgets
and Discover How Hard That Is, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2020 3:38 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/cities-weigh-cutting-police-budgets-and-discover-how-hardthat-is-11597261079 (noting that some Black and Hispanic leaders have urged leaders to
hold off before slashing police budgets and defunding police).
303
Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal Enforcement and
Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1228–29 (2000)
(noting that “blacks are more likely than the general population to view police brutality and
harassment as a problem, they are also much more likely to perceive crime as a serious
problem. Thus, blacks suffer from a ‘dual frustration’—being fearful of both the police and
criminals.”).
301
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answer. If we solve the police myth by increasing arrest rates, we are potentially
lessening the rate of police crime solving due to further alienation of communities
from police. When police imprison large numbers of community members, there is
a real marginalization of members of the community. If we ignore serious crime
however, this also leads to increased distrust in police.304 The good news is that the
vast majority of individuals in high-crime neighborhoods report they are willing to
obey and report crime.305 Indeed, communities of color want to improve public
safety yet they lack trust in law enforcement to improve it.306 Legal policing
scholarship needs to explore whether there is a middle ground where the community
trusts police to resolve crimes, potentially without resorting to punitive methods like
arrest and incarceration. Experimentation in this regard among cities would be
helpful in paving a new path for policing.
While there have been negative impacts of the police myth—including
obfuscation of police role, police disaffection and the punishment-protection
paradox, the next section explores what societal gains have potentially resulted from
the police myth.
D. In Defense of the Police Myth
This Article has explored three negative impacts of the police myth. However,
it is important to consider whether the police myth serves any public purpose. Could
it be providing a sense of security, albeit false? When an individual goes to bed at
night, when he hears a suspicious noise outside, he is reassured by the fact that the
police are only a phone call away. Would understanding how unlikely it is for police
to intervene effectively create greater insecurity? Also, if it were widely
acknowledged that police were not solving crimes, would crime increase? Simply
for the deterrent effect, is it wise to keep the police myth in circulation as long as
possible?
While fear based on the police myth is natural, ignoring it may not be the
answer. The police myth can lead to a lack of public safety which threatens law and
order and may reduce reporting rates. Informing people about the police myth may
discourage more people from reporting crimes.307 Currently, only half of crimes are
304

Tyler & Fagan, supra note 274
“The Urban Institute surveyed residents of high-crime neighborhoods in six
American cities and found that 74.3% believed that all laws should be strictly obeyed, 70.8%
reported willingness to report a crime, and 63.5% would provide information to the police
about a suspect.” Vigne et al., supra note 297.
306
See Kennedy & Ben-Menachem, supra note 301, at 556 (“The fundamental
realization at play here is that it’s possible for communities of color to simultaneously desire
improved public safety while also not trusting law enforcement agencies to implement it.
Instead, such communities are imbued with what scholars call “legal cynicism” a lack of
confidence in the law and its agents.”).
307
See SPARROW, supra note 258, at 2 (noting that police are most measured by
“[r]eductions in the number of serious crimes reported, most commonly presented as local
comparisons against an immediately preceding time period”).
305
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reported to police, and the most common reason is that people (correctly) believe
police cannot or refuse to do anything about the problem.308 The police myth can
also threaten law and order. Although an attack on the myth that police are regularly
solving crime might be viewed by some as an invitation to attempt more criminality
with the promise of going unnoticed, the reality is that these threats already exist,
and continuing to neglect them is not good policy.
One argument in defense of the police myth is that police have never been great
at solving crime, so there is no sense in disrupting the status quo. Without a focus
on the police myth, crime trends over the last thirty years—crime reporting, arrest
and clearance rates—show that police have made no improvement.309 And no
training or new theoretical framework has really helped improve the police myth
over the last thirty years.310 Some research shows that crime levels may not even
relate to policing but indelible factors such as income, levels of employment,
education, and population heterogeneity.311 It is possible that crime solving rates
may always be disappointingly low.
Crime solving rates are also low because crime is very difficult to solve, though
police priorities also matter.312 One reality of the police myth is that crime is
incredibly difficult to solve, and the most difficult crimes to solve are unfortunately
the ones that create the most harm—murder and rape.313 For instance, it is extremely
difficult to solve a murder when the public refuses to assist police in determining the
relationship between the victim and the perpetrator.314 Property crimes are even
308

Baughman, supra note 39, at 107–08; ADDINGTON, supra note 239 (arguing that
“police are precisely in the middle of [an] extraordinarily leaky sieve” that includes “not just
leaks” but has “lapses of justice” that cost police legitimacy “when they fail to bring the vast
majority of serious offenders to justice”).
309
See Baughman, supra note 39, at 53 (establishing that “police are much less effective
than we might think at solving all major crimes and have not significantly improved in the
last thirty years”).
310
Friedman, supra note 27, at 50.
311
SKOLNICK, supra note 52, at 270; but cf. Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, What
Caused the 2016 Chicago Homicide Spike? An Empirical Examination of the “ACLU Effect”
and the Role of Stop and Frisks in Preventing Gun Violence, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1581
(arguing that changes in stop and frisks can affect homicide rates).
312
WILSON, supra note 95, at vii (explaining that in 1968 that it was difficult for police
to solve crimes and “impossible to prevent crimes,” and that “police outputs are hard to
measure” and police are more likely to be “judged not by crime statistics but by the frequency
of scandals, charges of corruption or abuse and political controversies” which makes the
practice “defensive rather than service-oriented” policing).
313
See WILSON, supra note 95, at 59 (“Many serious crimes—murder, forcible rape—
are of [such a] character” as to make it “often difficult or impossible” for police to address);
ANDY KOOPMANS, CRIME AND C RIMINALS 35 (2003) (“It is not that real life police are
incompetent, but these crimes (murder and rape) are very difficult to solve.”). Even when
crimes are known, absence of forensics can make them difficult to solve.
314
See Baughman, supra note 39, at 61 (noting the impact of “variables such as police
workload, firearm use, distant victim-offender relationship, and low visibility/exposure
incident time” on clearance rates).
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more of an enigma given challenges with both fingerprint,315 and DNA
technology,316 and due to the lack of coordination within police departments.317 A
contributing factor according to some scholars is the rights revolution in the 1960s
that made police investigation for serious crimes more difficult.318 Though, pre1960s clearance rates may not support this argument since police clearance rates
have historically always been low.
A key question before formulating any sort of path forward, is whether it is
possible for police to improve at solving crimes. If it is possible, it is worth
addressing the police myth and attempting to improve police crime solving. From a
police perspective, the explanation for failure to solve crimes includes “too many
crimes, a lack of time, witness cooperation problems, and charge reluctance by
prosecutors.”319 None of these arguments are determinative. The argument that there
are too many crimes may be true, but crime rates have reduced substantially in the
last thirty years and police have remained consistent in clearance of crime. It may
be that there will always be more crime than police can solve. Crime rates have
actually shrunk since the 1990s,320 but police arrest rates have remained steady since
1995 (between 20%-25%), showing that police have not changed in their ability to
solve crimes.321 Additionally the percentage of officers per individual in the U.S. has
remained steady with the population, so if there are too few officers, that has always
been the case.322 Reluctance by prosecutors to charge crimes also lacks much
support, as prosecutors are charging at disproportionately higher rates than police

315

See supra notes 12, 192 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 12, 155 and accompanying text.
317
Many who appreciate privacy and civil liberties appreciate this lack of centralized
police coordination and would not change it. See Baughman, supra note 248.
318
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 216 (2011)
(discussing the Warren Court’s rights revolution and arguing that the court’s decisions
“helped usher in the harsh politics of crime that characterized the twentieth century’s last
decades”); SKOLNICK, supra note 52, at 203, 215 (arguing that police see the exclusionary
rule’s purpose as making their job more difficult in apprehending and detecting criminal
defendants); Schulhofer, supra note 233, at 2 (arguing that “national clearance-rate data . . .
offer no reason to think that Miranda hinders . . . law enforcement effort[s]”); Cassell &
Fowles, supra note 85, Still Handcuffing the Cops?, at 706–08 (disputing the claim that
“Miranda had no noticeable effect on crime clearance rates” and finding that “in fact, crime
clearance rates fell sharply all over the country immediately after Miranda and have
remained at these lower levels ever since”).
319
Eck & Rossmo, supra note 12, at 605–06.
320
See supra note 206
321
Baughman & Wright, supra note 118, at 5 (observing that “in the last ten years or
more the number of crimes committed have decreased, the number of arrests per year have
decreased consistently”). See also supra note 206.
322
See infra note 363; DUREN BANKS ET AL., supra note 116, at 2 (“The annual national
estimate of sworn officers per 1,000 U.S. residents ranged from 2.23 in 1992 to 2.51 in
2008.”).
316
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are arresting in recent years.323 There is hope that police can improve in solving
crime as the police investigation literature has acknowledged for some time that
police spend minimal time solving crime. A potential first step might include a
renewed public and police focus on solving serious crimes, with a larger allocation
of time and focus to this end.324 Policing scholars also claim that police would be
more effective at solving and preventing crimes if they better understood underlying
crime patterns and worked closer with communities.325 With greater focus on
improving serious crime solving, police could reduce the impact of the police myth.
A final argument in defense of the police myth is that solving more serious
crime will increase crime and incarceration rates, but this does not have to be the
case. While solving serious crimes is worthwhile, punishment is not required to
obtain lawful behavior and the police myth actually reduces incarceration rates.
Research shows that people do not need punishment to obey the law. Tom Tyler and
others have shown that people do not obey the law due to threat or even the level of
certainty of punishment but for other reasons.326 Arrest, conviction and incarceration
is actually more likely to harm defendants and cause future crime.327 Accordingly,
even with the lack of police solving crimes, serious crime levels have gone down
substantially each year in the last thirty years.328 And a potential benefit of police
not solving crimes may actually be lower incarceration rates. Indeed, without the
police myth we would presumably have much higher incarceration rates if police
arrested a larger proportion of the more than the 14 million felony and misdemeanor
crimes committed each year.329 There are other ways to achieve accountability for
323
Baughman & Wright, supra note 118, at 26 (“Prosecutors are charging more cases
proportionately than police are, and . . . are contributing more to mass incarceration than
police.”).
324
Investigation scholars claim that detectives might be passive in waiting for
information to come to them or rely on technology as a crutch rather than actively solving
crimes. Eck & Rossmo, supra note 12, at 606, 610 (“Detectives sometimes fall victim to the
current ‘quick fix,’ a trap that typically involves detectives waiting for something to
happen—a witness to walk in, the Crime Stoppers phone to ring, the DNA results to come
back.”; indeed “[m]ost recommendations for improving criminal investigations have
involved efforts to increase evidence collection or forensic testing.”).
325
Eck & Rossmo, supra note 12, at 612; see also supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
326
See generally TYLER, supra note 280 (positing that people obey the law because
they believe it is legitimate); BREGMAN, supra note 146.
327
David Roodman, The Impact of Incarceration on Crime, OPEN PHILANTHROPY
PROJECT (Sept. 2017) (synthesizing studies on the effect of incarceration on subsequent
offending).
328
Baughman, supra note 39, at 102; see also Baughman & Wright, supra note 118, at
5 (“[I]n the last ten years or more the numbers of crimes committed have decreased, the
number of arrests per year have decreased consistently, and while people are still serving
long sentences, some federal sentences have been reduced.”).
329
MORGAN & TRUMAN, supra note 224; FBI, 2019, supra note 39 (There were an
estimated 14,845,545 crimes committed in 2019. The number comes from the number of
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crime than increasing arrest rates.330 And refusing to arrest some individuals may
not cause the anarchy critics might fear given it is not very different to the reality of
the current system.331 Understanding the police myth may eventually force the public
to accept criminal behavior and understand that policing and incarceration cannot
stop it and other paths should be pursued. The next section provides a few insights
on how to move forward with policing theory and function after understanding the
police myth.
E. Path Towards Change
Change in policing begins with recognition of the police myth and with that
recognition, reframing of the functions of police. Adopting a correct theoretical
framework for policing is critical,332 though equally important is formulating a
baseline understanding of the function of police and the goals of policing. No
policing theory historically has ever focused on or impacted the rate at which police
solve crimes.333 No overarching police theory will change community relationships
with police if police credibility continues to be challenged by the police myth. And
if goals for police are not determined—focus resources on stopping serious violent
crimes rather than on minor incidents, for instance—police might continue to arrest

rape/sexual assaults, robberies, aggravated assaults, burglaries, thefts, and motor vehicle
thefts estimated by the NCVS as well as the number of murders and non-negligent
manslaughters reported by the FBI.)
330
See Baughman, supra note 39, at 95 (noting the lack of data on “crimes resolved
without arrest”).
331
As Mariame Kaba so poignantly stated “What is it, the numbers that I heard recently
where that a thousand people getting raped, that out of that number, I think it's something
like 200 people report. And from the 200 people that report, 20 are moved forward to a
prosecutor. And out of those 20 convictions, less than five people. And out of those
convictions, only maybe one ends up behind bars in a sexual assault. Out of a thousand cases.
So when people tell me, ‘What are we going to do with all the rapists?’ I'm like, what are we
doing with them now? They live everywhere. They're in your community, they're on TV
being outed every single day.” Why Is This Happening? Thinking About How to Abolish
Prisons with Mariame Kaba, NBC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2019, 10:58 AM). Paul Butler says that
the state is failing to protect citizens: “So if there were approaches that helped better than the
punishment approach, I think that more people would avail themselves of an official
government response because they would know that would help them heal.” The Crime Story
Podcast with Kary Antholis, supra note250.
“So, when we listen to victims, we learn that many if not most, don’t ask for the cops
to come, the guy to be locked up, the guy to be put under the jail. What they often hope is
that the response will be such that the person who caused the harm won’t harm anybody else,
and he’ll understand the injury that he caused. And to the extent that he’s able, he makes up
the injury, to the extent that, that’s possible.” Id.
332
Bell, supra note 7, at 2065 (“In the world of police governance and practice, perhaps
more than in other spheres, theory matters for determining what police departments and
officers do on the ground.”).
333
See supra Part I.A-C (historical periods of policing).
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large numbers of individuals for minor crimes.334 The theory behind policing is
critical, but equally fundamental is the question of the function of police. Three steps
towards better reframing the functions of police are below. This brief section
certainly does not map out the steps towards resolving the police myth, or reforming
police theory or even articulating what the function of police should be. It is intended
as a start in a conversation that will be taken up by legal policing theory and policing
investigation scholars.
First, a thoughtful consideration of the police myth is necessary, along with
police function and structure. A wholesale consideration of the derivation of police
authority from the Constitutional “police power” is in order. While police have
continued to exercise power over health, safety and transportation issues—it may be
that these duties would be best divided. There needs to be broad public
understanding of the police role and a consideration of whether their focus should
be on solving more crimes. Reimagining police may mean that police are no longer
considered crime fighting heroes. The public should recognize that most people are
not held accountable for crimes and that police fail to solve most crimes. This
examination may require a more realistic look at what police are able to do and what
communities want their role to be. If public polls over the years are an accurate
indication, communities want police focused on preventing and solving serious
violent crimes.335 Though it could be the case that the public prefer police as broader
catch-all government actors, and want police to respond to health and public order
concerns as well as fight serious crime. Policing scholars are not currently focused
on improving crime solving, particularly in addressing the resulting harm for
communities of color. In fact, criminal investigation is one of the least researched
areas in policing.336 Reimagining policing function starts with recognition of the
police myth; and second, a movement towards accepting or potentially exploring
how police can increase effectiveness in solving serious crimes, which has proven
in some contexts to be successful.337 An increased focus on solving crimes is not so
See Meares, supra note 43, at 616 (“Policing of low-level offenses in poor, minority,
and high-crime communities was potentially not as effective as we might have thought . . .
[and] such policing potentially is very costly to communities in need of a strong and
responsive relationship to law enforcement.”).
335
Communities of color have a complicated relationship with police, though in general
want protection from crime. Wernau & Ailworth, supra note 277 (quoting a member of an
underserved community discussing the need for police to protect communities of color,
saying “I’m the last person who would be a police cheerleader, because I’ve had my own
run-ins with them,” but adding, “What are you going to do when they’re not there to protect
you?”); Police are viewed as an attractive amenity in a neighborhood or a nuisance depending
on the view of a particular person and their experience with law enforcement see Monica C.
Bell, Located Institutions: Neighborhood Frames, Residential Preferences, and the Case of
Policing, 125 AM. J. SOC. 917, 917 (2020).
336
See Westera et al., supra note 27.
337
Phillip J, Cook et al., Why Do Gun Murders Have a Higher Clearance Rate than
Gunshot Assaults?, CRIMIN. AND PUB. POL’Y (“When additional investigative effort is
expended, law enforcement improves its success in gaining the cooperation of key witnesses
334
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simple as moving a traffic cop to a detective position; it may require hiring
specialists for resource-intensive investigative functions.338
Understanding the police myth eventually requires the public to grapple with
the fact that they collectively demand police spend a lot of time on public order
functions that can potentially be conducted in a more cost-effective manner by those
trained in counseling, or medical provision. Improving police performance in crime
solving may require dividing policing function to allow police to focus on preventing
and solving crime.339 It may be more effective for citizen volunteers to help with
neighborhood distress calls or possibly minor crime mediation. Traffic control could
deal with all traffic issues, including controlling flow of traffic. Emergency health
and social services rather than police could deal with drug issues—the largest
percentage of misdemeanor arrests—and mental health, which are perpetual
problems for police.340 Indeed, social workers could address community disruptions
without the use of force and with police as back up if violence is possible. 341 Even
domestic violence disputes, that are some of the trickiest calls for officers, may be
resolved more successfully by police with the help of social workers.342 This could
free patrol officers to assist detectives in solving serious crimes. Reforming the
police function does not have to increase arrest rates for less serious crimes, as many
of these could be more appropriately resolved by mediation or restitution or other
and increases the amount of forensic evidence collected and analyzed. In turn, the capacity
of the police to hold violent gun offenders accountable, deliver justice to victims, and prevent
future gun attacks is enhances.”).
338
See GARRETT, supra note 257.
339
See also Bell, supra note 7, at 2147–48.
340
There is no easy solution for mental health problems. Jonathan Foiles, We Can’t Just
Replace Cops with Social Workers, SLATE (July 1, 2020, 11:46 AM),
https://slate.com/technology/2020/07/social-workers-cant-replace-cops.html
(discussing
that people trained with self-defense do not need to respond to mental health problems but
sometimes it is hard to determine whether a mental health emergency is the problem and
there are other problems in policing that would not be solved with the use of social workers).
341
Friedman, supra note 27, at 21, 37 (noting that despite being asked to respond to
call and provide “social work solutions,” “[w]here [police] get the least training by far is in
the categories of mediation and social work, and in dealing with non-law enforcement
emergent situations”).
342
See Richmond’s Second Responders: Partnering with Police Against Domestic
Violence, POLICE FOUND. REPS. 2 (Mar. 2005), https://www.policefoundation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/Greenspan-et-al.-2005-Richmond%E2%80%99s-SecondResponders-.pdf (finding that domestic violence victims “experienced less abuse,” “received
more social services,” and “received more services from police” when social workers as well
as police responded, compared to those who only “received a conventional police response”).
The CAHOOTS Oregon program integrates crisis intervention and has been effective at
responding to large quantities of calls, providing medical services, and responding to
“personal welfare safety checks,” at a significant annual cost savings. Candice Bernd,
Community Groups Work to Provide Emergency Medical Alternatives, Separate from Police,
in WHO DO YOU SERVE, WHO DO YOU PROTECT? POLICE VIOLENCE AND RESISTANCE IN
THE UNITED STATES 158 (Maya Schenwar at al. eds., 2016) (saving Eugene Police
department 4.5 million annually and more than 1 million in ER and EMS diversion savings).
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means with cooperation of the victim. A smaller, well-trained crime solving force
could potentially emerge to focus on serious violent and property crimes.
Second, careful data collection with audits and meaningful incorporation of
community perspectives could reduce police disaffection.343 Democratizing police
recognizes the initial insight of the constitutional founders that each locality suffers
from different problems that should be addressed locally. To adequately consider
local problems, data on victims crime reports, police crime reports, police arrest,
searches or abusive practices, clearance, conviction and crime resolution rates
should be collected and available in local communities.344 All of these are not
discussed in detail this Article,345 but given the discussion in Part III.B on
disaffection with the community, it is important to consider police effectiveness in
solving crime and treatment of community members.346 Periodic community audits
can check police by reviewing arrest and search data considering the potential of
racial profiling and abusive practices. Community representatives should be able to
review crime reporting data to provide feedback on how police can improve to gain
public trust. Community members can review crimes solved to provide input on
what the focus of police should be, and to hold police accountable for a failure to
solve serious crimes in a community. In shifting of power to communities, as
Simonson has suggested, communities can be empowered to focus police on finding
alternative ways to address minor crimes, for instance.347 Community boards should
also have the ability to hold police accountable for misconduct in a community, or
for failing to respond to victims of crimes. In some communities this might come as
an independent community audit of police and others a community counsel or even
reparations for abusive policing practices.348 To succeed in this more singular focus
on serious crimes, police need to integrate in communities and increase informal

343

See Bell, supra note 7, at 2143, 2144–45 (suggesting bringing police and black
communities together for “deliberative participation in policing”) (suggesting data collection
including police work videos and transparency through cop watching); PATRICK SHARKEY,
UNEASY PEACE: THE GREAT CRIME DECLINE, THE RENEWAL OF CITY LIFE, AND THE NEXT
WAR ON VIOLENCE 168–79 (2018) (discussing neighborhood organizations who fought with
police to not arrest as many people, and provide needed services instead).
344
A requisite amount of reconciliation will be necessary. See DAVID M. KENNEDY,
DON’T SHOOT: ONE MAN, A STREET FELLOWSHIP, AND THE END OF VIOLENCE IN INNER-CITY
AMERICA 83 (2011).
345
Baughman, supra note 39, at 66 (discussing 7 critical data points for judging policing
including crime resolution rates and reporting of crime).
346
Simonson, supra note 23, at 393 (employing the community to watch police to avoid
misconduct).
347
See Simonson, supra note 7.
348
In some senses the lawsuits in Ferguson have served as an example of this. See
HORACE & HARRIS, supra note 187, at 126–27 (suggesting that greater “citizen involvement
and community interaction” is one “needed change[]” in policing). All of this would involve
dealing with police union prevention of police reform.
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contacts and decrease minor crime interactions to gain trust among citizens.349 And
while it might be tempting to argue that low crime solving rates require a response
of increased criminalization and punishment, this may not be the answer. Without
removing the unnecessary “punishment” from policing, the alienation of
communities of color will persist. Police, in collaboration with communities of
color, can work towards repairing relationships.350 Improving these relationships
could help decrease the impacts of the punishment-protection paradox.
Finally, reworking pay, budgets and training, and police incentive structures
could help improve the police myth. The wage structure in some communities where
officers are paid less to work in urban high crime communities should be
evaluated.351 Some communities should consider higher pay to recruit better officers
or more officers in high crime areas,352 like what some localities do in education.353
Some studies show that increasing police budgets and spending on increased
research and development do not increase the proportion of crimes solved.354 So
while hiring and retaining better officers may help improve abusive practices, it may
not address disaffection or the police myth. The ratio of officers per population has
Maxson et al., supra note 288, at ii (positing that police officers can “increase
residents’ approval of their job performance by participating in community meetings,
increasing officers’ visibility in neighborhoods, and talking with citizens” which also lessons
the negative impact of arrests or questioning by police).
350
See Kennedy & Ben-Menachem, supra note 301, at 576 (“Today, law enforcement
stands face- to- face with a historic opportunity: police leaders can take affirmative steps to
repair relationships with members of communities who have been harmed and alienated by
criminal justice institutions, and in doing so, move toward an inclusive, reimagined vision
of public safety. Reconciliation work can be a tool to connect the police to a history and lived
experience that they may neither understand nor sufficiently respect.”).
351
Bell, supra note 7, at 2131, 2133–34, 2155 (noting that state laws and police policies
may place the least effective police in high-poverty communities and that secondary
employment arrangements where police provide security for high income neighborhoods can
also lead to inequities); Rushin & Michalski, supra note 6, at 298–99 (identifying unequal
funding for communities of color and less officers where highest crime rates exist).
352
Bell, supra note 7, at 2136; Kaste, supra note 236 (noting that solving crimes,
especially homicides, “costs money” and “each case takes a lot of man-hours”); Williams,
supra note 236 (“Cases are more likely to get cleared if more detectives are working.”).
353
Rushin & Michalski, supra note 6, at 320–27 (allowing police departments to have
a similar amount of resources per capita, allocated based on underlying crime rates).
354
SKOLNICK, supra note 52, at 243, 270 (“Criminal investigators solve a very small
percentage of crimes, smaller than clearance rates suggest, and increased time for criminal
investigations seems to yield little in the way of increased productivity or felony
convictions.” In fact, more police, or asking police to be more aggressive has not increased
public safety either, though if police were to disappear entirely, there would be more crime.);
HAMAJI ET AL., supra note 2 (increased spending on police does not make communities safer
if this is spent on policing and incarceration rather than more “effective safety initiatives”);
Bruce L. Benson & David W. Rasmussen, Deterrence and Public Policy: Trade-Offs in the
Allocation of Police Resources, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 77, 78 (1998) (increasing police
budgets does not necessarily increase deterrence of reported crimes because policy makers
“do not necessarily allocate new resources to deter those crimes”).
349
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largely remained unchanged in the last thirty years,355 and while the public is
generally against increasing police numbers, police overall feel they are unequipped
to protect communities.356 Though investigation literature indicates that hiring more
police does not necessarily result in less crime or increase the proportion of crimes
solved.357 However in potentially reducing the numbers of police, there should be a
consideration of the crime prevention function of police presence. Some targeted
policing strategies have reduced violent crime rates.358 And many scholars have
355

The ratio of police to the U.S population has not dramatically changed between 1992
and 2019, ranging between 2.2 and 2.51 sworn officers per 1,000 residents. See BANKS ET
AL., supra note 116, at 2 tbl.1; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICE EMPLOYEE DATA,
2013,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/police-employeedata/police-employee-data; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICE EMPLOYEE DATA,
2014,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/police-employeedata/main; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICE EMPLOYEE DATA, 2015,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/police-employeedata/police-employee-data; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICE EMPLOYEE DATA,
2016, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/topic-pages/policeemployees; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICE EMPLOYEE DATA, 2017,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/policeemployee-data; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICE EMPLOYEE DATA, 2018,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/policeemployee-data; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICE EMPLOYEE DATA, 2019,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/topic-pages/policeemployee-data.Note, the FBI’s Crime Data Explorer produces a graph on “Ratio of Police
Officers to Population.” https://crime-data-explorer.fr.cloud.gov/officers/national/unitedstates/pe. The graph also ranges between 2.0 and 2.5, however it is per 100,000 rather than
per 1,000 as the FBI reports in the Uniform Crime Reports. At this point it is unclear why
there is such a large discrepancy. This Article chose to use the rate per 1,000 reported by the
FBI each year on its webpage about police employee data as it is the rate they have used for
years.
356
The U.S. has 35% less police than other countries. PRESIDENT OBAMA’S COUNCIL
OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON INCARCERATION AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SYSTEM
45
fig.32
(Apr.
2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/CEA%2BCri
minal%2BJustice%2BReport.pdf (noting that the U.S. has more prison guards but less police
than the average of the world). In a 2016 Pew survey, 86% of officers say their department
does not have enough police to adequately patrol their community, though 57% of the public
wants no change in the size of the local police force. Morin et al., supra note 133; Chalfin &
McCrary, supra note 258, at 167 (claiming that the United States currently employs a
suboptimal number of police officers).
357
Puckett & Lundman, supra note 150, at 183 (finding that “detective experience and
detective workload have no effects on homicide clearances”); SKOLNICK, supra note 52, at
270 (noting that once a certain threshold of police department size has been reached, long
ago met in most major cities, neither more police nor more money helps much).
358
See Rushin & Michalski, supra note 6, at 300–01 (“First, a handful of studies have
found that police staffing rates likely have an impact on overall crime rates, particularly
violent crime rates . . . [and] subsequent studies have generally found that increases in police
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shown that the mere existence of police in a neighborhood is effective in preventing
crime,359 mostly property crime.360 As far as training, police time spent and training
often do not reflect the “priorities” of police departments to solve violent crimes. 361
With a focus on police function, policing may shift towards allocating more time
and resources towards solving the most serious crimes and less resources on minor
crimes. Indeed, to target police efforts towards crime solving, officers should be
incentivized to solve serious crimes while disincentivized against inaccurate
punishment through appropriate reprimands.362 The incentives to increase arrest
staffing likely do decrease crime rates. Second, a robust body of research suggests that
specific policing strategies designed to disrupt situational incentives of would-be criminals
can actually reduce, rather than merely displace, crime. . . . And third, some studies have
found that regulation of police may inadvertently impair [police] ability to use crime-fighting
strategies, thereby increasing crime.”); see also Braga et al., supra note 11, at 634–35 (“hotspot policing strategies likely produce small but statistically significant reductions in certain
crime rates, while the use of problem-oriented policing strategies contributes to even larger
decreases in crime”); Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL L.
REV. 721, 768 (2017) (DOJ regulation of police departments may inadvertently result in an
increase in certain crime rates, as police officers adjust to new oversight and training).
359
See Klick & Tabarrok, supra note 217.
360
See id. at 275 (using a series of “high-alert days” in Washington D.C. following
terrorist threats, the study illustrated “very large effects” of police presence on “auto thefts
and theft from autos” but no such response for “violent crimes”); Mirko Draca et al., Panic
on the Streets of London: Police, Crime, and the July 2005 Terror Attacks, 101 AM. ECON.
REV. 2157, 2158 (2011) (showing that a 30 percent increase in police force following a
bombing in London led to “crime [falling] significantly” and that “when police deployments
returned to their pre-attack levels . . . the crime rate rapidly returned to its pre-attack level”);
William N. Evans & Emily G. Owens, COPS and Crime, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 181, 183 (2007)
(using the federal Community Oriented Police Services (COPS) program that increased
police force generally to determine that “additional officers granted through the COPS
program produce[d] statistically significant drops in burglaries, auto thefts, robberies, and
aggravated assaults”). The evidence that private security has the same effect is mixed.
Compare, Paul Liu, Measuring the Effectiveness of Private Security Patrols in Lower
Rockridge
and
Temescal
(Nov.
11,
2014),
https://docs.google.com/document/d/18ClYNh9sotEKS8b1DqFlDJloW27AFPyx5skTJ10u
vOg/edit (claiming a private security patrol lowered “burglary and robbery in Lower
Rockridge” by an estimated 35.2%), and Leah Brooks, Volunteering to be Taxed: Business
Improvement Districts and the Extra-governmental Provision of Public Safety, 92 J. PUB.
ECON. 388, 402 (2008) (showing that business improvement districts that invest in private
security show “sizable” drops in crime in surrounding areas, while “the evidence with respect
to enforcement was substantially more mixed”), with MacDonald et al., supra note 217, at
842 (using the 200% “effective increase in police presence” by the Penn Police verses the
Philadelphia Police to estimate a “60% … reduction in crime”).
361
See supra Part I.E.2. and accompanying text.
362
If there is too much pressure to improve clearance, police might not spend enough
time making sure that the arrest is appropriate, but when officers suffer when mistakes are
made, they might more carefully investigate to avoid errors. See Jordan Adamson & Lucas
Rentschler, How Policing Incentives Affect Crime, Measurement, and Justice, SSRN 11–13,
17 (Aug. 10, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3628595.
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numbers could be replaced with incentives to solve serious violent crimes, and using
alternative means to resolve less serious crimes.363 With appropriate policing
structure and incentives, police have greater incentives not to arrest for minor or
drug crimes, and place their focus on preventing and solving serious crimes.364
CONCLUSION
The movement for black lives has forced a societal reckoning about the
fractured relationship between police and disaffected communities, and has given
traction to removing,365 or reducing police funding nationwide.366 American policing
costs $115 billion per year.367 It is worth reevaluating this number in terms of the
public service received,368 as this Article makes clear that solving serious crimes
363

Bell, supra note 7, at 2125 (describing a Baltimore officer who would meet his arrest
expectations by going to poor communities of color to avoid “trouble” for arresting the
“wrong person” with influence); see PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN
(2017) (discussing the importance of training in criminal investigation and prioritizing
serious violent crime and community safety, rather than arrest and incarceration).
364
Baughman, supra note 39, at 88–90 (showing that the percentage of drug arrests has
stayed consistent over most years while arrests for violent crimes has decreased); Baughman,
supra note 254, at 295 (discussing the relation between drugs and violence and the high
prison rates for drug offenses compared to the much lower rates for violent crimes). It is
possible that plea bargaining affects this police data and analysis. Prosecutors often find it
harder to charge and prove violent crimes than consensual drug crimes, where a witness
might testify to such a crime or a wire-tap might prove the transaction.
365
See Akbar, supra note 15.
366
See supra note 5, at 47. See also Anna Lowrey, Defund the Police, THE ATLANTIC
(June 5, 2020) (“The country needs to shift financing away from surveillance and
punishment, and toward fostering equitable, healthy, and safe communities.”); Conor
Friedersdorf, Unbundling the Police in Venice Beach, California: You Shouldn’t Have to
Call 911 for Problems Related to Homelessness, THE ATLANTIC (July 6, 2020) (arguing that
people should not have to call police regarding people who are homeless); Giovanni
Russonello, Have Americans Warmed to Calls to ‘Defund the Police’?, N.Y. TIMES (July 3,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/03/us/politics/polling-defund-the-police.html
(“Recent polling suggests that many Americans have come to understand the phrase as a
call not to simply eliminate the keepers of the peace, but to reinvest a portion of their funding
in other programs and crime prevention techniques.”); What Policing Costs: A Look at
Spending in America’s Biggest Cities, VERA INST., https://www.vera.org/publications/whatpolicing-costs-in-americas-biggest-cities (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) (announcing that “now
is the time to spend less on policing” in order to create safer communities for black people).
367
Police and Corrections Expenditures, URBAN INST., https://www.urban.org/policycenters/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-finance-initiative/state-and-localbackgrounders/police-and-correctionsexpenditures#:~:text=From%201977%20to%202017%2C%20state,for%20the%20past%20
40%20years (last visited Nov. 17, 2020).
368
See Harmon, supra note 48, at 806 (noting that police receive “60 hours of firearms
training, 36 hours of emergency vehicle operations, 44 hours of self-defense training, and 12
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only constitutes a tiny fraction of the modern police function.369 Despite the police
myth—the strong public belief that a primary police function is crime control and
that police solve crime with regularity—this Article demonstrates that police only
solve serious crimes about 20% of the time. While the police defunding and abolition
movement are both gaining support, critics exclaim that this is highly impractical.
Scholars assert that reducing the role of police would lead to increased crime and
officer safety concerns.370 None of these discussions take into account the police
myth. If police are neither allocating a large portion of their time to preventing or
solving crime, or otherwise solving major crimes, would defunding police actually
impact crime?371 If this is the moment to consider police reform, a meaningful
consideration of police purpose and function is necessary. Legal policing scholars—
both theoretical and investigation—must consider the mismatch between public
expectations of police function and the reality of the police myth.

hours in using nonlethal weapons, but only 8 hours of ethics and integrity training and 8
hours of mediation or conflict management training”). Friedman, supra note 27, at 44
(“Crimefighting actually is a very small part of what police do every day, and their actual
work requires an entirely different range of skills, among them: mediation skills . . . [and]
social work skills[.]” “Yet, police are barely trained in any of this[.]”).
369
Overwhelmingly, even with crime functions, police use their power and resources
to make arrests for disorderly conduct, drugs, and other misdemeanor offenses. Morgan,
supra note 50, at 21 (discussing police arrets for minor offenses like disorderly conduct in
an attempt to improve public order); Shima Baradaran Baughman, The History of
Misdemeanor Bail, 98 B.U. L. REV. 837, 839–41 (2018) (discussing the disproportionate
number of misdemeanor cases in the United States and issues of the current bail system for
these cases); Baughman, supra note 254 (discussing the misconceptions of the war on drugs
and the resulting increase of prison population in the United States).
370
See Rushin & Michalski, supra note 6, at 277, 285, 318 (arguing that defunding the
police could have “unintended consequences” such as increased crime rates, hampered
efforts to control officer misconduct, reduced officer safety, and over ticketing, among other
things).
371
There is an argument by scholars that more police mean less violent crime. Matthew
Yglesias, The Case for Hiring More Police Officers, VOX (Feb. 13, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/2/13/18193661/hire-police-officers-crimecriminal-justice-reform-booker-harris; see also Cassell, supra note 49 (positing that
diversion of police resources from typical law enforcement activities caused an increase in
homicides).
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